Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. 8. The Council heard a statement by the Foreign Minister of Italy on the recent agreements reached on the Trieste problem.1 The value of these agreements from the Atlantic and European point of view was emphasized.

9. The Council agreed to hold its next Ministerial Meeting on or about 15th December next.

10. The Council reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty remains a basic element in the foreign policies of all member governments. It agreed that there must be the closest possible cooperation between Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in all fields and that any duplication of the work of existing agencies of NATO will be avoided. The Council reaffirmed its unity of purpose in the pursuit of peace and progress. The present conference and the agreements reached represent a new and decisive step in the development of the Atlantic Community.

11. The text of the agreements and documents will be issued separately tomorrow, Saturday, October 23, after the signing

ceremony.

54. THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF NATO: Report by the SecretaryGeneral of NATO,2 November 1, 1954 (Excerpt) 3

Chapter IX. The Increase in Strength

It would be easier to describe the progress that has been made in increasing the armed strength of NATO during the last five years if this had resembled a line of guardsmen on parade advancing steadily in review order. But it has not, of course, been anything like that. Progress was slow at first, suddenly feverish, galvanised by the shock of the aggression in Korea, then steady and sustained. The point has now been reached at which much has been achieved, but a great deal still remains to be done.

Owing to the multiplicity of human endeavour and the large geographical area involved, progress was faster in some areas and some directions than in others. For instance, fighting units were raised more quickly than the logistic support necessary for them to take part in sustained operations. In our attempt to describe these changes in tempo, and to summarise the achievements of such a considerable undertaking, let us not forget that all figures of divisions or ships or aircraft are only approximations. A division, for example, may consist of anything from 10,000 to 25,000 men, of whom probably half would actually come to grips with the enemy. The rest exist to ensure that the rifleman or the tank crew can be brought to the front

1 See quadripartite understanding of Oct. 5, 1954; supra, pp. 423-425. 2 Lord Ismay.

3 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 28, 1955, pp. 506–514. For the full text of the report, see NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954 (Utrecht, 1955).

line and supplied with ammunition, food, clothing and the necessities of life. If the communications in one division are bad, if the junior leadership in another is poor, or if the Commander of a third proves incompetent, then the value of each formation is lowered: but by how much it is impossible to say. So "division counters"-those who would judge the fighting quality of armies by the criterion of numbers only are on dangerous ground.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

In order to determine the size and pattern of the forces required for any particular purpose, the first essential is to have a strategic concept based on an estimate of the intentions and capabilities of the potential enemy. The next step is to determine the broad strategic plan. Thereafter the size and pattern of the forces that are required follow more or less automatically: but the speed with which they are raised depends on a number of factors, foremost of which are the estimate of the imminence and magnitude of the threat, and the economic conditions of the contributing countries.

The strategic concept approved by the North Atlantic Council in January, 1950, laid down that the primary mission of the military forces of NATO was to deter aggression. Only if this mission was unsuccessful were these forces to be used against armed attack. This concept has never changed. It is as valid today as it was four years ago. We saw in Chapter IV that the broad strategic plan resulting from this concept was to hold the potential enemy as far to the east in Europe as possible. Today, this "forward strategy" is even more necessary in view of the tremendous range of modern weapons, guided missiles, rockets and long-range artillery-perhaps using atomic heads. German participation in the defence of the West is therefore a stern necessity, and German participation postulates a defence covering as much as possible of Western Germany. Early in 1950, the Standing Group issued strategic guidance to the Regional Planning Groups and instructed them to make plans on the hypothesis that war would break out in 1954. Needless to say, the reason for the selection of this date was purely academic: it was sufficiently far ahead for long-range planning, but not too remote to make plans unrealistic. These plans, when completed, were coordinated by the Standing Group which then estimated roughly the total aggregate forces required to defend the NATO area. The Regional Planning Groups also produced emergency plans to be used in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.

4

After the establishment in April, 1951, of Allied Command Europe,

1 See the communiqué of the Third Session of the North Atlantic Council, Jan. 6, 1950; supra, p. 1604.

2 NATO: The First Five Years, pp. 31-38.

3 For the terms of reference and functions of the Standing Group, see Section V of the Final Communiqué of the First Session of the North Atlantic Council, Sept. 17, 1949; supra, pp. 1594-1600.

For the terms of reference and functions of the Regional Planning Groups, see Section VI, ibid.

the military planning of NATO changed not only in tempo but in character. The Regional Planning Groups had produced plans-the outcome of committee work-at a time when there were no NATO assigned forces. The plans produced by Supreme Headquarters were backed by the personality of a Commander who would himself wield operational control in time of war, who had the prestige necessary to obtain results, and who had forces definitely assigned to him.

THE STAGES OF THE BUILD-UP

A summary comparison of the forces available in December, 1949, (when planning began), in April, 1951, (when SHAPE was activated) and in December, 1951, (eight months later) provide a good illustration of the variations in tempo. In December, 1949, the forces available to NATO were estimated at about 12 divisions, 400 aircraft and a proportionate number of naval vessels. Fifteen months later, in April, 1951, there were only "fifteen NATO Divisions" and "fewer than 1,000 operational aircraft." The increase in forces and aircraft had, in fact, been inconsiderable, although the position from a naval point of view was somewhat better. But eight months later, in December, 1951, the prospect was brighter. By that date the NATO forces were approximately 35 divisions, in varying states of readiness, slightly less than 3,000 aircraft and 700 naval vessels.

A comparison of numbers alone, however, does not give the full picture of the change in combat effectiveness. By December, 1951, the NATO forces were no longer a mere collection of national units; their training had been substantially improved by a series of manoeuvres held in the autumn and they were beginning to gain cohesion. In addition, a great effort was being made to provide them with better logistic support: this included the construction of airfields, the improvement and extension of communications and the provision of support troops. Finally, not only was SHAPE itself a going concern, but its subordinate Headquarters in the North and South were already functioning satisfactorily, as of course were the Headquarters in the Centre, which had been established in late 1948 under the Western Union Defence Organization.1

2

A new phase in the build-up came after the meeting of the Council at Lisbon in February, 1952. As a result of the consideration of the report of the Temporary Council Committee,3 the goals to be achieved. by December, 1952, were set at 50 divisions (of which 25 were to be active), about 4,000 aircraft, and a large number of naval vessels.

The basic idea was that the active forces should form a shield capable

1 The Western Union Defense Organization was established as a step in the implementation of the Brussels Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948 (supra, pp. 968-971). The details of the Organization were agreed to at a meeting of the Defense Ministers of the five member countries, Sept. 27-28, 1948, and were approved by the Consultative Council of Western Powers in Paris, Oct. 25–26, 1948. See Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. X (Princeton, 1950), p. 584.

2 See the communiqué of the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Feb. 26, 1952; supra, pp. 1620-1624.

See statement of Feb. 24, 1952; supra, pp. 1618-1620.

of withstanding the initial shock of any aggression, and that the reserve forces should be mobilised and moved up to support the shield as rapidly as possible.

THE POSITION IN APRIL, 1952

1

Two months after the Lisbon Conference, General Eisenhower was able to report that substantial progress had been made in the year since SHAPE was activated.

Already [he wrote] our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions, whether in service or quickly mobilisable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their co-ordinated efforts the tide has

begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago.

This encouraging account of progress was, however, qualified by General Eisenhower on the first page of the same Report: "There is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning."

During 1952, the build-up gathered momentum and as a result the goals which had been set by the Council at Lisbon were for the most part substantially achieved numerically by the end of the year. Nevertheless, the state of readiness of the forces was not in all cases as high as had been planned, and there were still serious deficiencies in support units, equipment and supplies.

As the forces grew, so the military structure of NATO expanded. As shown in Chapter VII, the Atlantic Command and the Channel Command both came into being during the spring of 1952, and later that year Headquarters were set up at Izmir to control NATO forces in Greece and Turkey. In addition the details of the Mediterranean Command were agreed in November, 1952:3 the Headquarters at Malta did not, however, become operational until the following year.

The great design was beginning to take shape; but there were no grounds for immoderate optimism, still less for any relaxation of effort. For, while the Atlantic Alliance was gaining in strength, so also were the Soviets and their European satellites. The equipment of the Soviet Army was being constantly improved; the Soviet air forces were being largely re-equipped with jet aircraft; airfield construction was proceeding apace throughout Eastern Europe; the Soviet naval programme included the construction of a growing number of ocean-going submarines as well as a large number of surface

1 Report of Apr. 2, 1952; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 14, 1952, pp. 572-579.

2 NATO: The First Five Years, pp. 68-88.

3 See the communiqué of the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 18, 1952; supra, pp. 1629–1631,

vessels, and the forces of Russia's satellites were rapidly increasing in numbers and improving in quality.1 Despite, therefore, the remarkable progress in the military strength of NATO, it was clear that further sustained efforts were required.

This was made abundantly clear by General Ridgway in his Annual Report to the Standing Group of May, 1953: 2

Within the strictly military field [he wrote] I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find Allied Command Europe critically weak to accomplish its present mission.

The disparity of which General Ridgway spoke was not merely a question of numbers. To be equal to their task it was necessary for the forces of NATO to be, not only sufficiently numerous, but also of high quality, properly supported logistically, well-equipped and backed by adequate and efficient reserves. With these considerations in mind the Council decided in December, 1952,3 that, while there was a continuing need for progressively increasing the number of NATO forces, the emphasis during 1953 should be on improving combat efficiency.

INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES

There are several ways in which the combat efficiency of forces can be improved. Perhaps the most obvious is by training. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO Commanders. All of these revealed the spirit of co-operation which has now become characteristic of NATO. Among them were the "indoor exercises" conducted at SHAPE by Field Marshal Montgomery, on behalf of the Supreme Commander, to study the major problems confronting the Higher Command. There were, in addition, Command Post exercises destined to test the efficiency of subordinate Headquarters. But the vast majority of exercises involved operations by the fighting forces themselves.

As an example of the character and scope of these exercises, let us take the story of Exercise "Mariner". This took place at the end of the summer of 1953 and was the largest international naval exercise ever held. It was sponsored jointly by SACLANT, SACEUR and the Channel Commanders. Nine countries, almost fifty different types of ships, and twenty types of aircraft took part. The exercise lasted nineteen days, and included convoy protection, naval control of shipping and striking fleet operations in northern waters. In order to make the training as realistic as possible, the enemy role was taken by surface raiders, submarines and land-based air elements drawn from NATO forces.

In summing up the value of these combined exercises Admiral

1 For detailed estimate of Soviet and satellite forces, see Annex B. [Footnote in original report.]

2 Report released May 30, 1953; for excerpts, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1953, pp. 899-904.

3 See supra, pp. 1629-1631.