to contribute to the development of air defence. The Council also noted that the NATO Defence College, now in its fourth year, has made a valuable contribution of qualified personnel to staffs and agencies of NATO and of member governments.

6. The Council considered a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength over the next few years, taking into account modern developments in weapons and techniques. It approved this report as a basis for defence planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities.

7. The Council considered the report on the annual review for 1954, which sets forth the coordinated NATO defence programmes for the next three years. The review was based on the Council directive adopted in December, 1953, that it would be necessary for member countries to support over a long period forces which, by their balance, quality and efficiency, would be a major factor in deterring aggression. The ministers considered and accepted as military guidance a report by the Military Committee giving its comments on the 1954 annual review. This report stressed that the level of forces for the defence of the NATO area should be maintained as planned.

The Council noted that there had been an increase in the strength of NATO forces and further steady improvement in their efficiency over the past year. This improvement in quality resulted primarily from the large-scale combined exercises held by NATO land, sea and air forces, from the increases in operational and support units and from the supply of large quantities of new equipment.

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the expansion of European production of defence equipment as well as the continued provision of North American equipment, and urged continued cooperation in research and development.

Following the recommendations made in the annual review report, the Council adopted firm force goals for 1955, provisional goals for 1956 and planning goals for 1957. The force goals agreed upon for 1955 are of about the same numerical strength as those for 1954, but further improvements in training, equipment and effectiveness are provided for. The German defence contribution under the Paris Agreements remains, in the opinion of the Council, an indispensable addition to the defence effort of the West.

8. The Council noted with satisfaction the encouraging economic developments in many member countries over the past year and particularly the expansion of production in several European countries. The additional resources thus made available have enabled further improvements to be made in general welfare and social progress, while at the same time permitting a continued contribution towards increases in the strength and effectiveness of NATO forces. The Council recognised that further steady growth in the economic strength of the

1 Agreement of Dec. 14, 1954; TIAS 3236 (6 UST 915).

See supra, pp. 1633-1636.

alliance as a whole is essential in order to preserve and increase the well-being and security of all member countries, and that to this end it is necessary to strengthen economic cooperation between member

countries.

56. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 21, 1954 1

I returned yesterday from the Paris meeting of the NATO Council The communiqué which was issued 2 reports in summary form what took place. I would like to comment briefly on two items in the communiqué.

The first was the statement that Soviet policy continues to be directed toward weakening and dividing the Western nations and that the threat to the free world has not diminished. It is significant that there was complete agreement on this proposition by all of the 14 nations represented on the NATO Council.

During the course of the discussion of this matter at the Council, I made a statement on behalf of the United States delegation in which I said that Soviet policy is like a poweful stream, the surface of which is sometimes ruffled, the surface of which is sometimes calm, but that we cannot judge the force and direction of the current merely by looking at the surface manifestations. The important thing, I said, is that we should proceed in our own way, steadily building our own strength and our own unity upon which our strength depends. There were, I said, three great dangers to be avoided:

(1) that we might by surface calm of the Soviet stream be lulled into a false sense of security;

(2) that by the rough appearance of the Soviet stream we might be frightened into a state of paralysis, or

(3) be provoked into ill-considered and divisive action.

In developing the first danger, I pointed out that behind the recent Soviet peace offensive was to be found ever-increasing military strength far beyond defensive needs and the development of subversive activities in every free country, and notably attempts to exploit the theme of colonialism so as to divide and weaken the free world.

In connection with the second danger-being frightened into inaction-I quoted violent Soviet threats which had been directed against the West in connection with the Marshall plan, the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty, the adherence of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, the development of the Federal German Republic in. West Germany, and against Yugoslavia when it broke loose from the Soviet Communist orbit. At that time, the Soviet Union denounced the treaty of friendship which had been made in 1945 between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.3

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 9–10.

? Communiqué of Dec. 18, 1954; supra.

3 Treaty of Apr. 11, 1945; Documents and State Papers, July 1948 (Department of State publication 3171), p. 231.

I recalled that, at the time of the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty,' the Communists had suggested that, since the peace was not joined in by the Soviet Union, it was a separate peace which violated the armistice 2 and that the Soviet Union would be free to resume hostilities.

There is a striking parallel in the past to what is going on in the present. I expressed confidence that, if we persist in building defensive strength and unity in Western Europe, it will actually promote

peace.

To illustrate the third danger of being provoked into rash and divisive action, I referred to the provocation to which the United States is now being subjected by Communist China and the patience being demonstrated by our country under the direction of President Eisenhower.

I took occasion to thank the NATO nations which were members of the United Nations for their support of the recent United Nations resolution condemning the Chinese Communists and calling for the liberation of our wrongfully imprisoned airmen.3

The second item of the agenda to which I would allude is that which reports the approval of a report by the Military Committee which defined the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength for the next few years, taking into account modern developments and [in] weapons and techniques.

This report, which assumes a unity that includes Western Germany, shows for the first time the means of developing a forward strategy which could be relied on to protect Western Europe from invasion. As that capability is developed, it will surely constitute the strongest deterrent against military aggression. Furthermore, it will assure that, if unhappily aggression should be attempted, it would not succeed and that the aggressor would be thrown back at the threshold. Thus we see the means of achieving what the people of Western Europe have long sought—that is, a form of security which, while having as its first objective the preservation of peace, would also be adequate for defense and which would not put Western Europe in a position of having to be liberated.

The Council action made it clear that, in approving the report, it did so for the purposes of planning and preparation and that this did not involve a delegation to the military in a field which is properly the responsibility of governments with respect to putting plans into action in the event of hostilities. The situation is thus normal in this respect. In this country, as in the other NATO countries, it is the civil authorities of government and not the military who make the grave decisions. That, of course, will be the situation as regards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Council meeting showed a spirit of fellowship and a spirit of optimism which grew out of the prospect that the Western European

1 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1951; supra, pp. 425-440.

2 Instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 625-626.

3 Res. 906 (IX), Dec. 10, 1954; infra, pp. 2711-2712.

unity planned by the recent London and Paris accords1 would shortly become an accomplished fact and thus both strengthen NATO and assure that it will effectively serve its purpose in deterring aggression and preserving peace.

57. MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (PARIS): Communiqué, May 11, 1955 2

The North Atlantic Council, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, met in Ministerial Session in Paris on May 9th, 10th and 11th, 1955.

I

To welcome the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council held an opening public session. In speeches made on that occasion, the texts of which have already been made public, Ministers stressed the significance they attach to the entry of the Federal Republic as a democratic and sovereign state into the North Atlantic Community.3 The Federal Chancellor, replying to the welcome extended him by his colleagues, emphasised the full harmony existing between the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and the ardent desire for peace, security and freedom felt by the German people including the eighteen million in East Germany.

II

The Council reaffirmed the purely defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance. It recorded its deep satisfaction at the entry into force of the agreements which establish Western European Union and which promote peace and provide specific safeguards, including the control of armaments. The Council also noted the valuable mutual support made possible by close collaboration between NATO and Western European Union in their respective fields of activity. The Council welcomed the declarations made by the Ministers of member governments signatory to the Italian Peace Treaty recalling the active part taken by Italy in the progress of Atlantic and European cooperation, and reaffirming that various discriminatory aspects of that Treaty were considered to be inconsistent with the position of Italy as an ally.

III

5

The Ministers examined major aspects of the international situation within and beyond the NATO area.

They discussed a report on the current negotiations regarding the Austrian State Treaty, and welcomed the indications that the Soviet

1 See supra, pp. 483-612, 972-989, and 1474-1491.

Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1955, pp. 831-832.

For the full text of Secretary Dulles' statement of May 9, 1955, see ibid., p. 831.

4 Supra, pp. 972-989; these agreements entered into force May 6, 1955.

5 Treaty of Feb. 10, 1947; TIAS 1648 (61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1245).

Union may now join in concluding such a Treaty long sought by the Western Powers.i

They were resolved to continue the policies followed heretofore in building and maintaining the strength and unity of the West.

The Council welcomed the initiative of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in proposing to the Soviet Union negotiations to find means for resolving outstanding issues.2 The Council hoped that this initiative would lead progressively to agreements which would remove sources of conflict and contribute to the security and liberty of all peoples. In particular, the Council hoped that such negotiations might help to bring about the peaceful unification of Germany in freedom, and promote progress toward reduction, under effective safeguards, of armaments and armed forces. The Council emphasized that this process of negotiation required careful preparation, and must be pursued with patience and determination.

The Council also reviewed the situation in the Middle East and Far East.

3

The Council received reports on the conclusion of various security pacts in these areas, including the Manila Pact and the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The Council welcomed measures taken to strengthen the defence of the Middle East and Far East areas.

A report was made to the Council on the Bandung Conference. The Council expressed the hope that there would be a cessation of hostilities in the Far East and no further resort to force, since this would so clearly endanger the peace of the world.

IV

Ministers expressed their satisfaction that the procedures followed in the Council had enabled them to have frank and free discussions and a thorough exchange of views. These discussions constitute a most significant proof of the solidarity of the Alliance and show the great value of the Council as a forum for political consultation on matters of common concern. They are resolved to continue to follow these procedures, which enable the member governments to develop their policies on common principles.

58. MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (PARIS): Communiqué, December 16, 1955 °

The North Atlantic Council held its regular December Ministerial Session in Paris on the 15th and 16th of December. Member governments were represented by Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers. This treaty was signed May 15, 1955 (supra, pp. 643-676); see also infra, pp. 1884-1885.

2 See tripartite note of May 10, 1955; infra, pp. 1886-1887.

3 Treaty of Sept. 8, 1954; supra, pp. 912-915.

4 Treaty of Feb. 24, 1955; supra, pp. 1257-1259.

For the text of the communiqué of Apr. 24, 1955, on the conference of Asian and African countries at Bandung, see infra, pp. 2344-2352.

Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 26, 1955, pp. 1047-1048; see also Secretary Dulles statement of Dec. 13, 1955 (ibid., p. 1048).