Two important developments in 1955 made themselves felt in the Tenth General Assembly. The first was the convening of the Bandung conference. The second was the summit meeting in Geneva.2 Together they loosened the rather rigid cold war alinements which have thus far prevailed in the United Nations.

The Bandung conference reflected an upsurge of confidence among the Asian-African countries. Representatives of the conference, it should be noted, rejected Communist colonialism as well as the discarded colonialism of former times.

Within the United Nations the "spirit of Bandung" gave rise to increased expressions of solidarity of interest among members of the group and continued cohesiveness on issues of special mutual concern such as colonial questions, questions of race, the needs and desires of underdeveloped countries, and the question of membership. This current of Asian-African self-expression cut sharply across prevailing Communist-free-world alinements and brought the Tenth General Assembly face to face with changing political and economic realities. Despite the "spirit of Bandung," however, the General Assembly, after voting to include the Algerian item on the agenda, subsequently decided not to consider the question further, and on the Cyprus item the Bandung powers were divided."

3

At the Assembly there was felt not only a new sense of urgency arising from anticolonial pressures and a heightened appreciation of the value of the United Nations as a world forum for discussion of pressing problems, but also a sense of the limitations of U.N. action at certain times in dealing with certain problems. As Ambassador Lodge has said, "Public debate is curative in many cases, but it cannot cure all problems any more than a certain medicine will cure all diseases." 6 On the ground of interference in domestic affairs, South Africa withdrew its delegation from the General Assembly. The issue, of course, was over South Africa's racial policies. Here again, the Assembly recognized the United Nations limitations. While reaffirming the hope that South Africa would live up to its charter obligations, the Assembly did not again appoint the commission which had been set up to study race problems in that country and with which South Africa had refused to cooperate.?

The Asian and African countries, however they may differ in their foreign policies, share a compelling desire for rapid advancement along the road of industrial, economic, and social progress. Many of these peoples are newly free of colonial rule. They find the climate of independence no less invigorating now than it was for us in 1776. Nor did the United States, after winning its independence, emerge

1 Bandung, Indonesia, Apr. 18-24, 1955; for the final conference communiqué see infra, pp. 2344-2352.

2 See The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955) and supra, pp. 111-114, and infra, pp. 1887-1897, 2005-2016, and 2841-2843.

* Item 64.

See General Assembly Res. 909 (X), adopted Nov. 25, 1955 infra, p. 2302. See the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546, footnote 10. Statement of Sept. 21, 1955; ibid., p. 545.

See General Assembly Res. 917 (X), adopted Dec. 6, 1955; infra. pp. 2308

into a static world assured of a secure and prosperous place among the nations. True, it did not, as do the newly independent lands today, have recourse to a United Nations. But one may well imagine some of the issues we would have hotly pursued in such a forum.

The summit meeting held in Geneva last July also left its imprint on the Tenth Assembly. This historic meeting raised the hopes of peoples that the danger of war had further receded. It appeared that the U.S.S.R. joined us in realizing that neither side can survive a global hydrogen war. It seemed possible that some of the outstanding political differences could now be dealt with in good faith.

The General Assembly began its work in this warm afterglow of the Geneva summit meeting. Many delegates invoked the "spirit of Geneva" in their speeches. The Soviets came wearing the smile of conciliation. The Great Powers for the time being at least were not glaring at each other across conference tables, fighting out problems born of the Second World War.

In the freer atmosphere, pressures of a changing world were felt with new force. The smaller nations, the less-developed countries, the former colonial peoples of Asia and Africa spoke up with a new vigor. They spoke not only of their particular problems; they addressed themselves to the Great Powers about the kind of world they want to live in.

While the Bandung conference and the Geneva summit meeting did not confront us with an entirely new situation, we can agree that there was a shift of emphasis which resulted in blurring traditional issues and alinements. At least until the close of the second Geneva conference in November,' Soviet tactics in the Assembly appeared more flexible than in the past. Prior to that time the Soviets used the gloved rather than the mailed fist.

Our impression from this past Assembly is that Soviet leaders would like to maintain the appearance of cooperative relations, even though they are not willing to create the indispensable conditions for a secure peace. The cold war, in the sense of peaceful competition between conflicting ideologies, was in fact conducted with much vigor.

We must therefore reckon coldly with the true aims of the new flexibility of Soviet tactics in the United Nations. These are to divide the non-Communist world and to gain acceptance as the champion of all peoples seeking a better life.

The Soviet challenge was met resourcefully and to good effect. Let us consider four of the important issues before the Assembly: the admission of new members, the peaceful development of the atom, disarmament, and economic assistance for underdeveloped areas. These are issues of major import for the future of the United Nations and for United States policy.

In its first decade the United Nations has grown from an original membership of 51 to a more broadly representative organization of

1 i. e., the Geneva Foreign Ministers conference which met from Oct. 27 to Nov. 16, 1955; see The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (Department of State publication 6156; 1955) and supra, pp. 115–122, and infra, pp. 1897-1927, 2018-2039, and 2844-2850.

76. As a result, it should be better equipped to serve the needs of mankind during its second decade.

There are six points that I wish to stress regarding the United States attitude on the admission of new members. I shall then try to assess the implications for our foreign policy of the increase in size of the United Nations1.

First, we have followed a consistent policy based squarely on the principles of the charter. In the words of Ambassador Lodge, the United States was guided by three basic principles:

1. To bring into membership all qualified states which apply;

2. To follow the provisions of the charter as to judging the qualifications of the applicants;

3. To avoid thwarting the will of a qualified majority by use in the Security Council of the veto.2

The admission of qualified states had been prevented solely by the Soviet veto. These would long ago have been members of the United Nations had not the Soviet Union used the veto 45 times on the membership question in the past 10 years.

Second, consistent with these principles the United States took the initiative early during the Assembly session. We actively sought the agreement of the five permanent members of the Security Council not to use the veto on the admission of new members.

The United States has long favored such an agreement. We stressed this point in varying ways with each of the permanent members. In the present case we ourselves said publicly that we would not use the veto and that we would abstain in the voting on the applications of the Soviet satellites even though in our view their present governments are not independent and their conduct has been reprehensible. This voting position accorded fully with the spirit and intent of the Vandenberg resolution, adopted by the Senate in 1948 by a 64 to 4 vote, which expressed the view that there should be agreement among the permanent members not to use the veto to prevent the admission of new members.3

Third, we believed that the admission of qualified applicants would enrich and strengthen the United Nations morally and materially. Their participation in the organization would outweigh any disadvantages which might follow from the admission of the four satellites. Fourth, it is evident that the pressure of world opinion does exert influence on the Soviet Union. Its original position was that the United Nations must admit all the Soviet satellites, including Outer Mongolia, or the Soviet Union would veto all qualified candidates. We made no comparable insistence. We did not condition the admission of one state upon another under threat of veto. But evidently, among other motives, the Soviets did not wish to bear the onus for having vetoed the long list of free-world applicants.

We should frankly recognize that Soviet willingness to see 16 nations admitted was a come-down from its rigid 18-or-nothing position. But we must nevertheless hold them accountable for frustrating the admis

Effected by the admission of 16 new members; see supra, p. 337.
Statement of Dec. 7, 1955; supra, 335–336.

A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 197.

sion of Japan. Contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,' the Soviet Union conditioned Japan's admission on that of the fictional entity of Outer Mongolia. It withheld United Nations membership as a new instrument of pressure on the Japanese in their peace treaty negotiations. We deeply regret the continued exclusion of Japan, whose candidacy was backed by every member of the Security Council except the Soviet Union. We also deplore the exclusion of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet-Nam, both of whom we regard as fully qualified.

Fifth, the abstention of the United States in the voting on the satellites does not mean that we accept as permanent the present situation in Eastern Europe. We will continue to hold the four new Eastern European members responsible for past agreements. We will continue to charge the Soviet Union with its undeniable responsibilities in this regard. As Secretary Dulles said recently, the United States "will accept no compromise with the Soviet Union" that would seem to be acquiescence in the present status in Eastern Europe.2

Meanwhile, we hope that United Nations membership will have a salutary effect on the international behavior of these governments and will encourage freer contacts between their peoples and the outside world. We trust that they will be brought to feel with new force the need to respect the human rights and basic freedoms which they now deny their people. They have now bound themselves to observe the terms of the charter. The world will note how they carry out this pledge.

Sixth, our abstention on the satellite applications does not mean any change in United States policy on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. We continue to support the Government of the Republic of China. We continue to oppose vigorously the seating of the Chinese Communists.

What are the implications of the admission of 16 new members? On the organizational side it is clear that the number of members on the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and perhaps on other bodies should be increased.

Let us look, for example, at the Security Council. Asia has never been adequately represented on the Council. With the admission of six additional Asian members, this imbalance must be redressed. The increase of 10 European countries also requires a review of the number of Council seats allocated to the European region. While we have made no decision on this matter, it may be that only two seats need to be added, although perhaps three or four more will be

1 Advisory opinion of May 28, 1948; International Court of Justice Reports, 1947-1948, pp. 57 ff.

2 Cf. Secretary Dulles' statement of Nov. 18, 1955:

"... there are sharp differences between the objectives of the Soviet Government and our own. We believe in justice for all and in the right of nations to be free and the right of individuals to exercise their God-given capacity to think and to believe in accordance with the dictates of their mind and conscience. We shall not cease to pursue these objectives or ever seek a so-called peace which compromises them." Supra, p. 120.

required. I believe the concept of the semipermanent membership as it evolved in the League of Nations is also worthy of study.

Any increase in members of the Security Council would, of course, in turn affect the number of votes required for decisions. Moreover, this question of the size of the Council involves an amendment of the charter, which requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. This complex question will obviously require extensive diplomatic negotiations. The United States hopes to begin such negotiations within the next month or two.

We can also expect that new and important political problems will be brought to the General Assembly for solution as a result of its new membership.

The enlarged United Nations will speak with wider authority. It will more accurately mirror underlying conditions as they are in the world and confront all of us in a more decisive manner with the crucial problems of the atomic age. A greater sense of responsibility will be required of all the members if the organization is to develop in a sound and practical way and if problems are to be solved and not aggravated.

There are, of course, those who are already predicting that the United States will lose voting support in the General Assembly. I have this comment regarding such dim predictions:

Up to the present time the United States has been able to retain a position of leadership through the justice of its cause and the logic of its arguments. Almost invariably on important issues our policies have been overwhelmingly supported by the members of the free world.

If the time should ever come when we found ourselves consistently outvoted on important issues in the United Nations, that would surely be a sign that we ought to reexamine in a hardheaded way our basic policies.

We face another major challenge in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. President Eisenhower originally announced his atoms-for-peace plan at the United Nations. He proposed that an agency be established under its aegis. This reflected his estimate of the value of the United Nations as a mechanism for promoting international cooperation. That is why he also proposed that, once established, the agency should be brought into an appropriate relationship with the United Nations.

The traditional way would have been to continue with our bilateral programs. The need to safeguard our security interests and the difficulty of working out an international mechanism for parceling out and controlling the use of fissionable materials would have justified a unilateral approach. But President Eisenhower rejected the pattern of the past in recognition of the needs of the present.

He rejected it in the knowledge that the acquisition of nuclear technology and material brings with it the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. Atomic power reactors can be utilized to produce

1 See infra, pp. 2798-2805.