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Part III

POSTWAR SETTLEMENTS

Treaties of Peace With Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, February 10, 1947

[Ratification advised by the Senate June 5, 1947; ratified by the President June 14, 1947; entered into force September 15, 1947. For the full texts of these treaties, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1648, 1649, 1650, and 1651, respectively; 61 Stat. 1245-2229; and Treaties of Peace With Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania and Finland (Department of State publication 2743; 1947). Summaries of the treaties appear in S. Execs. F, G, H, and I, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 5-13, and in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 460–465, 492-493, 486, and 500.]

1. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT, FEBRUARY 27, 1947 1

The PRESIDENT,

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to their transmission to the Senate 2 to receive the advice and consent of that body to their ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, copies of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, states with which the United States has been at war. There is also transmitted herewith a summary of each treaty which does not purport to explain or analyze the text itself but merely to outline the subjects dealt with therein." With the signature of these treaties in Paris on February 10, 1947, by the representatives of the states which were at war with the former enemy state in question and which took an active part in the war

1S. Execs. F, G, H, and I, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-4.

The President transmitted the treaties to the Senate on Feb. 28, 1947; ibid. Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) 1648; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1245.

TIAS 1649; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1757.

TIAS 1650; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1915.
TIAS 1651; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 2065.

For the texts of the summaries, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 460-465, 492-493, 486, and 500.

against the Axis with substantial military forces and by the representatives of the ex-enemy states themselves, a long series of negotiations on the part of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Conference at Paris has been brought to a successful termination.'

The treaties are not completely satisfactory to any one signatory, nor are they perhaps the best which might have been devised in different circumstances. But they do represent the best which could be achieved by general agreement not only among the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers but among those states which had suffered most from Nazi and Fascist aggression. Moreover they form a cornerstone of the peace structure of which the keystone will be the settlements with Germany and Japan, on the first of which work has already begun aided by the experience gained in these long months of negotiation and discussion.

The genesis of these treaties of peace was the Conference held in Potsdam in July 1945, when the United States, the United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, with the subsequent agreement of France, determined that the first step toward the reestablishment of peace should be the creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers, whose immediate tasks should be to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria. Hungary, and Finland. In this fashion the Council of Foreign Ministers was charged with the duty of preparing the peace for the United Nations which are responsible for maintaining it. As the United States was not at war with Finland, it does not become a signatory of the treaty of peace with that country.

5

6

Discussions, which began in London in September 1945,3 were continued in Moscow in December of the same year, were resumed by the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers in London in January 1946, and by the Council again in April and June in Paris. They were followed by the Conference at Paris, which lasted from July 29 to October 15, and which gave those United Nations which had participated in the military operations against the Axis full opportunity to make known their views and to have those views taken into consideration in the final drafting of the treaties. The latter was accomplished at the November-December meeting of the Council in New York; consequently, when these treaties were finally concluded they had been considered not only by the states members of the Council of Foreign Ministers but by other United Nations in Paris whose recommendations were a most important, if not the determining

8

1 See Paris Peace Conference, 1946: Selected Documents (Department of State publication 2868; 1947).

2 See the protocol of Aug. 1, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 34-36.

3 See Secretary Byrnes' report of Oct. 5, 1945; ibid., pp. 51–58. See the tripartite communiqué of Dec. 27, 1945 (ibid., pp. 58-66) and Secretary Byrnes' report of Dec. 30, 1945 (ibid., pp. 66-72).

See Secretary Byrnes' report of May 20, 1946; ibid., pp. 72-79.
See Secretary Byrnes' report of July 15, 1946; ibid., pp. 79-86.

7 See Secretary Byrnes' report of Oct. 18, 1946; ibid., pp. 86-92.

8 See the report by the Department of State (released Feb. 2, 1947); ibid., pp. 92-97.

factor, in settling the issues still remaining unsolved when the four Ministers met in New York.

Throughout the meetings of the Council in 1946, and the Conference at Paris, Senator Tom Connally, the then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the then ranking Republican member, were members of the United States delegation and throughout the negotiations gave their most valued and effective counsel.

The subjects covered by these treaties have all been discussed at considerable length and require only mention in a report of this nature. In brief they include the guarantee of human rights, the limitation of armaments in the ex-enemy states, the fixing of reparation, the treatment of the former Italian colonial possessions, the settlement of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier, particularly as it concerned Trieste, the economic and commercial policies to be followed by the former enemy states, freedom of navigation of the Danube, restitution and return of United Nations property, including compensation for damages.

The four treaties all contain obligations to grant the full exercise of human rights and enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms to the people in the territories affected by these settlements.

The maintenance by the ex-enemy states of military, naval, and air forces, armaments and fortifications is limited to the strength necessary for local defense and internal order.

The problem of reparation presented marked difficulties as between those countries which had been devastated by one or another of the ex-enemy states and therefore felt entitled to require that reparation be made to the greatest degree possible and other countries which felt that the most important thing was to build for a future in which all states, even the ex-enemies, would have a definite prospect of economic recovery. The figures as finally established were determined either by prior armistice commitments or by agreement upon the amount which could be paid without depriving the state in question of essential resources necessary to enable it to subsist without external assistance. In the case of Italy the problem was the most acute, not only because of the number of claimants but because it was necessary to find a practical means of payment which would avoid interference with Italy's economic reconstruction and avoid placing a burden upon the Allied and Associated Powers which are determined that Italy shall live.

The disposition of the former Italian colonial possessions was the subject of much discussion. The question whether the inhabitants of some of these areas were prepared for independence or might wish to be incorporated as part of a neighboring state was considered. Various forms of United Nations trusteeship-of a single state, of one or more states, or by the Organization itself-were suggested. No final choice could be made, but it was decided that the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France should be given a further year to consider this issue in a more deliberative atmosphere. If at that time they are not able to agree

among themselves, the matter will be placed before the United Nations, whose decision will be final.

The proposed settlement for the Trieste area and the establishment of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier was long and warmly discussed. As finally agreed, it provides for the establishment of a Free Territory of Trieste, whose free port and transit facilities will be available for use on equal terms by all international trade and, in particular, by Yugoslavia, by Italy, and the States of Central Europe. It is hoped this settlement will make it possible for Trieste to resume its traditional place as a port for the hinterland of Central Europe, without the conflicting rivalries of national aspirations impeding its progress and development. The statute which has been approved by the Security Council of the United Nations provides that the integrity and independence of the Free Territory, the human rights and freedoms of its inhabitants, shall be guaranteed by that body, thus creating a framework for the establishment and maintenance of a genuine international regime for this troublesome and disputed area.

It is important to note that the treaties established the obligation that none of the states in question should for a period of 18 months be permitted to discriminate among the nations in matters pertaining to commerce and industry. Thus the principle of the open door in commerce and economic relations has been established for a period sufficient to permit the subsequent incorporation of this principle in bilateral commercial treaties which will in any case have to be negotiated, and to give to the United Nations of the world time to agree in a more general way upon future commercial practices to govern international trade.

The treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary each contain a provision to insure that navigation upon the Danube is to be free and open to the nationals, vessels of commerce, and goods of all states on a footing of equality, thus establishing the principle that artificial barriers and discriminatory practices at least as regards this important international waterway should be eliminated. Although provision is not contained in the treaties themselves, the Council of Foreign Ministers further agreed that a conference would be held within 6 months for the purpose of establishing an international regime in respect of the Danube.2

The treaties likewise provide that the property of the United Nations removed as a consequence of occupation of their territories by enemy forces should be returned, and that property of these nations and their nationals in the territories of the ex-enemy states themselves must either be restored to their owners or if loss or damage prevents restoration the owner should receive compensation therefor in local currency. This was set at the rate of two-thirds of the loss suffered, sufficient to compensate the owner in part and at the same time to avoid placing too heavy a burden upon the economic reconstruction of the countries in question.

1 Annex VI to treaty.

2 For information regarding the Belgrade Conference of August 1948 concerning the Danube, see Documents and State Papers, November-December 1948 (Department of State publication 3363; 1949), pp. 487-513.

Building the foundations for a peoples' peace, as has been repeatedly said, is a long, a hard, and a slow process. In these treaties a beginning has been made. The nations which were at one time partners of the Axis have severed these ties and through the entry into force of these treaties will be enabled to make their own start upon the road to reconstruction and to enter the community of democratic nations. Not the least of the results of the entry into force of these instruments will be the expected admission of these states to the body of the United Nations, by which act they will of their own volition accept the obligations of the Charter with its guiding principles for the maintenance of future international peace and security and its machinery to ensure that the principles of the Charter are not empty promises.

Respectfully submitted.

G. C. MARSHALL.

2. STATEMENT BY FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
JAMES F. BYRNES, MARCH 4, 1947 1

I do not propose to burden you with long explanations of the discussions in which I participated, leading to the conclusion of the four treaties which are now before you. Nor do I propose to analyze these treaties in detail. Your chairman, Senator Vandenberg, and Senator Connally were at my side throughout the long negotiations, lending me their wise counsel and immeasurably lightening the difficult task. They know at least as much of these treaties as I and probably more.

There are several aspects of the negotiations, however, to which I should like to draw your attention. Under the Potsdam agreement the task of preparation of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland was entrusted to the Council of Foreign Ministers.2

At London3 the American Delegation insisted that there should be a peace conference so that other states which had fought the war should be given the opportunity to help make the peace. The Soviet representative opposed the proposal and the Conference adjourned in complete disagreement. At Moscow, three months later, the Soviets agreed to hold the Peace Conference.

Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 16, 1947, pp. 486-492.

2 See Section IX of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, Aug. 1, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 44-45.

3. e., the First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, Sept. 11-Oct. 2, 1945; see ibid., pp. 51-58.

Not a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but a meeting of "periodical consultation" of the Foreign Ministers of the "Big Three" as provided in Section XIII of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Feb. 11, 1945 (ibid., p. 32) and confirmed in Section I (C) of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, Aug. 1, 1945 (ibid., pp. 35-36); see also ibid., pp. 59-66.

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