forces, these states can apply themselves to the urgent task of reconstruction lying ahead of them.

The four treaties further contain obligations to grant the full exercise of human rights and the enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms to the people in the territories affected. Maintenance by the ex-enemy states of military, naval, and air forces, armaments, and fortifications is limited, in harmony with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to the strengths necessary for local defense and internal order.1 The extent of reparations which had been claimed against these states is finally settled by the treaties. The problem itself presented marked difficulties between the claims of those states which were devastated by the forces of the ex-enemy states and therefore felt entitled to require that reparation be made to the greatest degree possible, and those countries which felt that the important thing was to build a sound basis of economic rehabilitation for the future. Agreements as finally reached were determined by the prior armistice commitments or by agreement on the amount which could be paid without depriving the states in question of the essential resources necessary to enable them to live without external assistance and without placing additional burdens upon the Allied and Associated Powers. The provisions relating to Italian colonies, while not providing a final settlement, lifted this issue from the controversial aspects of conflicting claims. By affording opportunity for consultation, not only among the interested governments but with the peoples of the areas in question, the treaties give promise that any final solution will be in harmony with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The settlement involving Trieste and the establishment of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier gave rise to the greatest difficulties throughout the entire negotiations. Without a settlement of this problem it seemed likely that no over-all agreement could be secured. When agreement upon the ethnic solution proposed by the United States proved impossible, and no agreement could be reached on alternative frontiers proposed by different delegations, internationalization of this area was suggested as the only means possible of achieving agreement. The United States then took the lead in making certain that the security and independence of any such area should be assured by the Security Council, the body which has been entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining peace. Guaranties have been inserted so that the population of this area may be free to enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all peoples by the United Nations Charter and may develop their own institutions under the protection of international authority. The frontier line between Italy and Yugoslavia establishes furthermore a certain balance between the two ethnic groups. The statute for the free port of Trieste was drawn with the aim of making it possible for Trieste to resume its traditional place as a port for the hinterland of 1 For the text of the Atlantic Charter, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1-2.

2 For the texts of the armistice agreements with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, see ibid., pp. 455-457, 482-485, 487-491, and 494-499, respectively.

Central Europe without the conflicting rivalries of national sovereignties impeding its development.

It is important to note that the treaties established the obligation that none of the states in question should for a period of 18 months be permitted to discriminate among the nations in matters pertaining to commerce and industry. Thus the principle of the open door in commerce and economic relations has been established for a period sufficient to permit the subsequent incorporation of this principle in bilateral commercial treaties which will in any case have to be negotiated, and to give to the United Nations time to agree in a more general way upon future commercial practices to govern international trade.

The treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary each contain a provision to insure that navigation upon the Danube is to be free and open to the nationals, vessels of commerce, and goods of all states on a footing of equality, thus establishing the principle that artificial barriers and discriminatory practices at least as regards this important international waterway should be eliminated. Although provision is not contained in the treaties themselves, the Council of Foreign Ministers further agreed that a conference would be held within 6 months for the purpose of establishing an international regime in respect of the Danube.1

The treaties likewise provide that the property of the United Nations removed as a consequence of occupation of their territories by enemy forces should be returned, and that the property of these nations and their nationals in the territories of the ex-enemy states themselves must either be restored to their owners or if loss or damage prevents restoration, the owner should receive compensation in local currency. This was set at the rate of two-thirds of the loss suffered, sufficient to compensate the owner in part and at the same time to avoid placing too heavy a burden upon the economic reconstruction of the countries in question.

2

THE COMMITTEE HEARINGS

On March 4 the committee began its public hearings on the peace treaties when Secretary Marshall and former Secretary Byrnes appeared on behalf of the Department of State. Secretary Marshall spoke briefly, expressing the hope that the Senate would approve ratification. Former Secretary Byrnes then discussed the treaties and analyzed the Italian treaty in some detail, explaining the position the United States delegation had taken at the Peace Conference. Hearings were resumed on April 30 and May 1, 2, and 6, when 26 witnesses appeared to testify, all but one in opposition to the Italian treaty. Most of these individuals represented Italian-American organizations in the United States. Although the committee heard all those who This agreement was reached at the Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, New York, Nov. 4-Dec. 12, 1946; see ibid., pp. 92-97. Treaties of Peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on Executives F, G, H, and I (Washington, 1947), pp. 1–3.

3

Supra.

asked to be heard there were no witnesses appearing either for or against the treaties with Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. One witness against the Rumanian treaty is represented by a complete brief in the committee hearings. On the final day of the hearings Secretary Marshall and former Secretary Byrnes dealt with the arguments presented by the preceding witnesses, and once again expressed the hope that the treaties would be ratified at an early date. A complete list of the witnesses and the organizations they represented follows below:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ITALIAN TREATY

Witnesses who appeared in opposition to the Italian treaty raised criticisms of both a specific and a general nature. They denounced the treaty as harsh and unjust, claiming that it failed to recognize adequately the contributions Italy made to the United Nations during the final phases of the war. Specific criticisms centered about reparations, the internationalization of Trieste, the Venezia Giulia settlement, the cession of Tenda-Briga to France, the Italian colonies, and the military clauses of the treaty. All these arguments are examined in detail in later sections of this report.1

Apart from these specific objections a number of criticisms were directed to the general proposition that it was not in the interests of the United States or world peace to proceed with ratification at this time. The United States had agreed upon the terms of the Italian treaty, the argument runs, as a part of a general pattern and on the assumption that real progress would be made with respect to the total world settlement. Meantime, the international situation has changed considerably and we might do well to withhold action until we can see better the pattern of events unfolding in the world. In particular, certain witnesses argued, we should not commit ourselves to any course of action in Italy until we know what is going to happen with respect to Austria and Germany. The program of assistance to Greece and Turkey reemphasizes the necessity of thinking in global terms. What would be the effect upon the world political situation of the withdrawal of American troops from Italy? And why should the United States take steps to weaken Italy at the same time we are extending military assistance to Greece and Turkey? The whole matter should be reviewed, declared some of the witnesses, in the light of our evolving policy in the Mediterranean and in the light of our failure to secure satisfactory progress with respect to the peace settlement in general.

STATUS OF ITALY UNDER THE TREATY

It has been argued that the treaty does not take into account Italy's contribution to the common struggle waged against Nazi Germany, and that Italy is treated as an enemy state and not as a cobelligerent. There is no doubt that many of its provisions seem 1 Not reprinted here.

harsh to Italy. In this respect, however, the treaty represents a balance between the more far-reaching claims of those states which had suffered from Fascist aggression in the past and the insistence of other states, including the United States, which considered that the contribution of the new Italy toward the defeat of Germany should weigh against these heavier demands. In the view of the 20 United Nations which signed the treaty sufficient guaranties are contained in the agreement to enable Italy to begin its reconstruction knowing what it has to face in the future and with the possibility of improving its status. Furthermore, through these treaties Italy would obtain the right to join the United Nations and its various specialized agencies. Thus it will be enabled to cooperate on an equal footing with the other United Nations in joint action looking forward to the stabilization and improvement of international economic relations and the general increase in trade and employment.

REPARATIONS PAYMENTS

Witnesses who appeared before the committee criticized the reparation settlement in the Italian treaty on the ground that it placed an impossible economic burden on Italy; that the reparations, at least in part, would in fact be paid by the United States as a result of our relief grants to Italy; and that the reparations would tie Italy to the Soviet economy.

The total amount of reparation which the treaty requires Italy to is $360,000,000, divided as follows:

pay

Albania

Ethiopia

Greece

$5, 000, 000 25, 000, 000 105, 000, 000

100, 000, 000

125, 000, 000

In addition, France will obtain the hydroelectric plants in the territory ceded to her, subject to the guaranties in Italy's favor referred to below, and certain other countries will have the right to satisfy their claims from Italian assets in their territories.

The reparations will be paid in part, although probably not to a large extent, from Italian factory and tool equipment designed for the manufacture of war material which is not needed to support the limited military establishment Italy is permitted to have under the treaty and which is not readily susceptible of conversion to civilian

purposes.

The $100,000,000 share of reparations to the Soviet Union is to be paid in part by the transfer of Italian assets in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The value of these assets is to be fixed by the Ambassadors in Rome of the four powers. During the negotiation of the treaty, their value was variously estimated between $15,000,000 and $75,000,000.

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The remainder of the Italian obligation will be met over a period of years by deliveries from current Italian industrial production, ie, all of the nations represented at the Paris Conference except China, which was not at war with Italy.

but no deliveries may be made during the first 2 years unless the Italian Government agrees to make an exception to this provision.

There are several provisions, in addition to the 2-year moratorium, which were insisted upon [by] the United States delegation, to safeguard the interests of Italy and of the United States. The materials needed to produce reparation goods which are normally imported into Italy must be furnished by the reparation-receiving country. The schedules of deliveries must be agreed upon with Italy and must be so arranged as to avoid interference with Italian economic reconstruction or the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied countries. In his appearances before the committee, Mr. Byrnes testified that claims totaling $20,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000 had been put forward against Italy. It was also brought to the committee's attention that during the preparation of the treaty Italian representatives had indicated they had no objection to the arrangement for meeting the claims of the Soviet Union; that they preferred payments from current production to the removal of factories and plants; and that they themselves had talked of total reparation payments of $200,000,000 to $300,000,000.

The figure of $360,000,000 finally agreed to be paid over a period of 5 to 7 years does not seem unduly burdensome, particularly in the light of the safeguards incorporated into the treaty. With due allowance for the damage suffered by Italy during the war, it might be pointed out that this figure is very much smaller than the amounts which Italy spent for military purposes just before the war during a single year. The average military expenditures in 1937 to 1940 were $900,000,000 per annum. Nor does it seem likely that annual payments of the scale required would necessarily cause Italian trade to be oriented toward the reparation-receiving countries. The safeguards included in the treaty also appear adequate to insure that the cost of the reparation will be borne by Italy and will not be transferred to other countries.

TRIESTE AND THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

Witnesses who appeared before the committee argued that the predominantly Italian city of Trieste should have been returned to Italy, that the new frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia was not drawn in accordance with ethnic principles, that the cession of Venezia Giulia is morally, strategically, and economically unsound, and that by depriving Italy of its strategic position in the Adriatic it is exposed to attack from Yugoslavia. On the other hand evidence was presented to the committee to show that this problem represented one of the most difficult of all with which the Council of Foreign Ministers had to deal.

The population of this area is a mixed one, and even the Italian Government admitted that from an ethnical and economic point of view Yugoslavia was entitled to some rectification of the frontier. The United States had originally proposed that the area west of an ethnic line, drawn after careful study by American experts, be re