網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

member of the United Nations-may present any grievance it might have with respect to the treaty to the General Assembly. Likewise, if Italy believes that a specific provision of the treaty "endangers the maintenance of international peace," it could present the matter to the Security Council under articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. Moreover, with respect to provisions which affect Italy and one or two other states, there would surely be no bar to a future revision which might be agreed upon between Italy and the states concerned.

Provision is also made in the treaty itself for the modification of its military, naval, and air clauses. Article 46 provides that these clauses shall

remain in force until modified in whole or in part the Security Council and Italy.

.

by agreement between

This means that when a general plan of disarmament is agreed upon, Italy will be brought into that plan along with the other United Nations and the military, naval, and air clauses of the treaty would be abrogated. Likewise, when Italy is asked to make armed forces available to the Security Council, under article 43 of the Charter, it would seem reasonable to assume that the present treaty limitations would be appropriately altered.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

When Secretary Marshall appeared before the committee at its final hearing after his experience in Moscow, he was even more emphatic in his view that the treaty should be ratified as quickly as possible. He stated that

The further developments of the final draft and its significance are familiar to all. [But] this was a community of the world, of the allied side of the world, which endeavored to draw up the terms of the various peace treaties in a democratic manner. We were successful in that. But to me it would be a most

serious affair if we now fail to go through with the treaties [it].

We really took the leadership in this affair. Should we now [we would] back away from it[.] That to my mind would be fraught with most serious consequences. My own view, to state it very frankly, if we fail to ratify these treaties, is that the whole situation practically dissolves. That would be my own position in approaching any further conferences, because we would have again begun [...] what we did in 1919, 1920, and 1921. And the world would lose all confidence in our proposals and our leadership. I do not think we can afford that.

I will not go into the various aspects of the treaties other than to say that I should imagine it would be impossible, or has been impossible in history, ever to draw up a treaty that met the approval of all parties concerned. Now, the longer these treaties remain unratified the greater and greater will be the difficulty in securing ratification.?

In response to a question concerning the effect of the delay in the ratification of these treaties upon the negotiations for the Austrian and German treaties, the Secretary of State replied that

-

If these treaties are suspended or rejected, I think it would be exceedingly harmful to the prospect for completing a satisfactory treaty with Austria, and the

1 At the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mar. 10-Apr. 24, 1947; see ibid., pp. 97-106.

2 Hearings, p. 173. The insertions in brackets supply the textual variants in the hearings as opposed to the text printed here in the Senate report.

development of one with Germany. As a matter of fact, to repeat again what I said before, I have decided fears that the situation would so deteriorate that I do not know quite how we would go about the further negotiations. It is already exceedingly difficult, as everyone knows. Now all we would do is make it more difficult, if not impossible. That is my view.

The integrity of the position of the United States, its consistency, are tremendous factors in this matter, and the minute we appear to be wobbling this way or that way, and not going through with something that was adopted under the very conditions that we were aggressively pressing for, would be a very serious blow to us.1

When the Secretary was asked whether an indefinite or serious delay in the ratification of the treaties would lend color to the uncertainty which might exist as to the attitude of the United States and to its willingness to go through with our commitments and whether such delay would not play into the hands of those who are seeking to add to the confusion for their own political purposes, the Secretary of State said that it was his opinion that such was considered a correct statement, adding that

I think in a great many cases it would be the confirmation of a belief that we cannot be depended upon as a consistent factor in international relations and would cause a deep resentment because of [...] our insistence upon certain stipulations and certain arrangements. It would be very much opposed by those people who suffered a great deal [when] should we insist upon certain things and then back away from [the] our commitment.2

PRESIDENT TRUMAN URGES RATIFICATION AS VITAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY

3

When Secretary Marshall appeared before the committee on May 6, at the conclusion of the hearings he read into the record a letter from President Truman expressing the view that it is vital to our foreign policy that the peace treaties be promptly ratified. For the information of the Senate the letter is reproduced in full below.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 5, 1947.

Hon. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Since your return you and I have carefully canvassed the existing situation regarding the ratification of the Italian and the three satellite treaties now pending before the Senate. I understand that you will appear soon with Mr. Byrnes before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to conclude the hearings on these treaties. You are authorized to say that I concur wholeheartedly in the views which you and Mr. Byrnes will express to the effect that it is in our opinion vital to our foreign policy that these treaties be promptly ratified.

I understand that it has been urged that the inability to agree on an Austrian treaty at Moscow has made the ratification of these treaties inadvisable at this time and that their provisions conflict with the views which I stated to the joint session of Congress on March 12. I do not share this view. These treaties are the result of months of effort by outstanding leaders of both parties in this Government and of other governments to work out a common peace in this important

[blocks in formation]

area of the world. Nothing has occurred to render their efforts unsound or unwise. It is more than ever important that the Government of the United States should appear to the world as a strong and consistent force in international relations. Treaties which have been worked out with the approval of so large a proportion of all the nations convened at the Paris Conference represent the considered judgment of the international community. Moreover, many of the most difficult problems were resolved as the result of American initiative. It would be a great misfortune and a heavy blow to our country's leadership in world affairs should we now unilaterally withhold approval of these treaties.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

ACTION TAKEN BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

On May 9 the Foreign Relations Committee met in executive session to consider the testimony submitted at the hearings by the various witnesses. Since no objection except one had been raised with respect to the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian treaties, the discussion centered mainly about the Italian treaty. After a careful consideration of the issues involved, the committee unanimously agreed to report the four treaties to the Senate with the recommendation that the Senate's approval to ratification be given. The final vote was 13 to 0.

SUMMARY OF REASONS RATIFICATION SEEMS DESIRABLE

In view of the many considerations outlined above the committee agreed that the wisest course of action is to proceed with ratification at an early date. The main reasons for the position of the committee may be summarized as follows:

1. The treaties appear to be the best that could be secured under the circumstances.

2. There seems to be little reason to believe that better terms could be secured with respect to any of the treaties if attempts were made to reopen negotiations now or at any later date.

3. The uncertainty that would come from our refusal to ratify would only add to the many difficulties and the unsettled conditions already existing in Europe.

4. If the treaties are suspended or rejected, it would seriously endanger the prospects for completing a satisfactory treaty with Austria and Germany.

5. Since the United States took the leadership in framing the treaties other nations would have reason to question our integrity and to criticize our unwillingness to go through with our commitments if we failed to ratify.

6. Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the ex-satellite states would fail to bring about the results that either the United States or these other nations desire.

7. The many advantages that would come from putting an end to the state of war that exists, such as the removal of occupation troops, the termination of the armistice regimes in the exsatellite states, the resumption of normal peacetime relations, and the later admission of these states into the United Nations,

should far outweigh any advantages that might result from our failure to ratify.

8. Approval of the treaties would constitute an important step forward in the development of the total peace settlement which is so necessary if a regime of law, order and stability is to prevail in the world.

Understandings Regarding Trieste

4. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ITALY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, MAY 9, 19521

1. In accordance with the decision announced on the 27th March, 1952,2 and with a view to arriving at arrangements for a closer collaboration among themselves and with the local authorities in the administration of Zone A, the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States have approved the following conclusions and understandings reached by their representatives. 2. The three Governments have started from the premises, which they all share, that such arrangements should be of a nature so as not to prejudice the ultimate solution of the future of the Territory as a whole and so as to continue to ensure to all inhabitants of the Zone the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

3. Since the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States retain the responsibilities with regard to the administration of Zone A devolving on them under the Treaty of Peace with Italy,3 particularly Annex VII thereof, the Commander of the United Kingdom and United States troops retains all powers of government in the Zone.

4. Taking the foregoing into account, the three Governments have approved the following arrangements.

5. An Italian Political Adviser to the Zone Commander will be appointed by the Italian Government to represent it in all matters

TIAS 2564; 3 UST, pt. 3, p. 4189. In releasing the text of the Memorandum of Understanding, the three Governments issued a communiqué stating, inter alia:

"Without prejudice to a final solution of the problem of the future of the Free Territory as a whole, this understanding is designed to give greater practical recognition to the predominantly Italian character of the Zone." (Department of

State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, p. 779)

Ibid., Apr. 14, 1952, p. 585, footnote 1. 'TIAS 1648; 61 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1245.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]
« 上一頁繼續 »