United States as against those reflected in the Bonn convention which was approved by the Senate on July 1, 1952. The changes, which are significant primarily from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, may be summarized as follows:

(1) In article 2 of the convention as originally concluded, the three powers retained their rights relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement. These powers were to be held in reserve for special use, related to the Soviet position in Eastern Germany, and were not intended for exercise in ordinary German affairs, either domestic or foreign. It seemed preferable, therefore, that insofar as the territory of the Federal Republic was concerned, the arrangements for the stationing of foreign forces should be put on a contractual basis. Accordingly, the forces in the Federal Republic after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defense contribution will be governed by a separate convention under the terms of which the Federal Republic agrees to the stationing of forces of the same nationality and effective strength as may be stationed in the Federal Republic at that time. Any increase in the effective strength of these forces may be made only with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

The German representatives recognized that the three powers should preserve their rights to protect the security of forces stationed in the Federal Republic until the Federal Government itself were able to take the necessary measures. This depends on the Federal Government obtaining new legislative powers. The termination of the general right of the three powers in this field will not affect the right of a military commander, if his forces are imminently menaced, to take such immediate action (including the use of armed force) as may be appropriate for their protection and as is requisite to remove the danger.

2

(2) A second change in the Convention on Relations relates to the Arbitration Tribunal to be established for the settlement of disputes arising between any one of the three powers and the Federal Government. Under the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal as originally concluded, the Tribunal was given power to take action directly on legislative and administrative measures or judicial decisions applicable within the Federal Republic. These powers, which are not normal to a body created to arbitrate disputes between sovereign states, have been eliminated from the charter.

(3) A third change in the Convention on Relations relates to the situation which will arise on the reunification of Germany. The Convention on Relations as concluded in 1952 provided for its review in the event of reunification (art. 10). The new protocol provides for review of the convention and the related conventions not only in the event of actual reunification of Germany, but also in case an inter

1 Supra, pp. 610-612.

The charter of the Arbitration Tribunal is printed as annex B to the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and Germany, supra, pp. 491–498.

national understanding is reached with the participation and consent of the four Governments parties to the conventions on steps toward bringing about the reunification of Germany. The Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in Germany' will also be subject to review in these circumstances. There must, of course, be agreement by all the signatory governments to any changes made in the con

ventions.

(4) Changes have also been made in the related conventions.2 These changes for the most part involve bringing the conventions up to date by eliminating clauses referring to the EDC Treaty, by taking into account the lapse of time since the conventions were concluded, and by taking into account progress made toward the completion of certain Allied programs in Germany. They also alter certain clauses in the conventions which were not felt to be in harmony with the status of equality being accorded the Federal Republic. Finally, the arrangements for the financial support of foreign forces stationed in Germany have been brought into harmony with more recent agreements with the Federal Republic in this field.

3

The related conventions were executive agreements implementing the Convention on Relations. For these, Senate action was unnecessary and, furthermore, recognized by the Committee on Foreign Relations to be undesirable, inasmuch as it was foreseen that they might require technical revision from time to time to meet changing conditions. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Ex. Rept. No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), stated:

Some of the technical provisions in the [related] conventions are temporary in nature and as the situation in Germany changes, it may be necessary to make modifications in them from time to time. Under such circumstances it would seem impractical to require resubmission of the conventions to the Senate before each such modification could go into effect.

The ratification of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany will not change the nature of those related conventions.

VI

The arrangements for the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic do not affect the status of Berlin. In a declaration made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the London Nine Power Conference of September 28-October 3, 1954, they reaffirmed the declaration made by them in Paris on May 27, 1952,5 that they would maintain armed forces in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required and that they would treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves. In addition, the three powers issued

2

1 Supra, pp. 610–612.

Supra, pp. 498-538, 557–610.

3 Supra, pp. 539-556.

The Declaration of Oct. 3, 1954, is included in the Final Act of the London Conference; infra, pp. 1481-1483.

S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 253–254.

a statement in Paris on October 23, 1954,1 in which they affirmed their determination to insure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation and stated that they had instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the German authorities in the city with a view to implementing these principles jointly and to the fullest degree possible.

VII

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty Providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to in I above, has no precise counterpart in the documents which were submitted to the Senate in 1952, although, as mentioned, there was then a protocol, approved by the Senate, which extended the treaty area to include that of the EDC. It was, however, not then contemplated that the Federal Republic of Germany would itself become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. The German defense contribution would have been made solely through the European Defense Community. Under the arrangements now contemplated, it is essential that the Federal Republic of Germany should become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A protocol to that effect was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, by the representatives of the 14 nations now parties to that treaty, and is one of the two documents referred to in section I hereof which it is recommended should be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The protocol is framed so that its entry into force is tied to that of the other arrangements relating to German participation in the common defense.

VIII

One of the documents above referred to in section II hereof, is a resolution concerning the powers of the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) approved by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954. The general effect of this resolution is to strengthen the role of SACEUR over the forces under his authority. One result of these changes will be to enhance the effectiveness of the NATO forces in Europe, with consequent benefits to the entire NATO effort. Increasing the authority of SACEUR will also mean that the national forces assigned to SACEUR will become integrated and interdependent to an extent that will minimize the possibility of individual nations exercising an independent military initiative in Europe.

IX

Another of the resolutions of the North Atlantic Council suggested to be submitted to the Senate for its information is that of October 22, 1954, which took note of an exchange of declarations between the

1 Infra, p. 1758.

2 Infra, pp. 1493-1496.

London and Paris Agreements, September-October 1954 (Department of State publication 5659; 1954), pp. 35-36.

Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on October 3, 1954, in London and associated all members of the North Atlantic Treaty with the tripartite declaration issued by the three Governments last named. In its declaration, the Government of the Federal Republic declares that it has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of the charter. The Federal Republic also declares that, upon its accession to the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, it will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic.

In the tripartite declaration, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond appropriately to this declaration, reaffirming in relation to this situation the principles of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, condemning the use of force as between nations.

X

A major element in the new arrangements signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, are the four protocols 2 designed to modify the Brussels Treaty. This treaty, signed on March 17, 1948, by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, was the first major step toward the military integration of postwar Europe, antedating the North Atlantic Treaty by more than a year. Under the terms of the Brussels Treaty all countries were pledged to give full and immediate military assistance to any party against which aggression might occur. The treaty also provided for consultative machinery, for the development of common defense plans. With the advent and growth of NATO, the organizational machinery under the Brussels Treaty became relatively inactive, but the treaty remained in full force and has now afforded a basis for realizing certain major political and security objectives.

The first of the protocols will bring about several important changes in the Brussels Treaty. First, it provides for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty so that the membership will correspond to that of the proposed European Defense Community, plus the United Kingdom. Second, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty will be transformed into a new "Council of Western European Union" for the purposes of strengthening peace and security and promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Western Europe and closer cooperation between them and with other European organizations. Special provision is made for votes by two-thirds majority or simple majority on specific questions. Provi

1 The Declarations of Oct. 3, 1954, are included in the Final Act of the London Conference; infra, pp. 1481-1483.

2 Infra, pp. 972-989.

3 Infra, pp. 968-971.

sion is made for close cooperation between the Brussels Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There is a clause stating the undesirability of duplicating the work of the military staffs of NATO and stipulating that the Council and its Agency for the Control of Armaments will rely on the military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The second protocol is concerned with the size of the forces of Western European Union. It provides that the total strength and number of formations of the land and air forces of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands placed under SACEUR shall not exceed those laid down in the special agreement annexed to the European Defense Community Treaty. The forces of the United Kingdom under SACEUR shall not exceed those presently under SACEUR command, and Luxembourg's forces shall be set at one regimental combat team. Naval forces are to be set by the NATO annual review process. Any increase in the agreed maximum forces will be subject to the unanimous approval of all parties to the Brussels Treaty.

An important feature of this protocol is the commitment by the United Kingdom to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, i. e., four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such other forces as SACEUR regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of a majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers. The The protocol provides that this undertaking does not bind the United Kingdom in case of an acute overseas emergency. It further provides that if maintenance of forces on the Continent at any time places too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions under which the United Kingdom forces are maintained.

This commitment is in addition to the commitment implicit in the United Kingdom's membership in the new Council of Western European Union.

The third protocol relates to the control of armaments. It is concerned both with armaments which are not to be manufactured in the Federal Republic and those which are to be controlled within the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland. The prohibited arms, which the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the right to produce, are atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft. Unanimous vote of the Council of Western European Union is required to give Germany the right to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. A two-thirds majority of the Council can give Germany the right to produce guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic aircraft, provided that SACEUR recommends that Germany be given this right.

1 The text of this special agreement has not been made public.