their collective security. The pact does not bind the Congress to reach that same conclusion, for it does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. Thus, if you ratify the pact, it cannot be said that there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

I therefore earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military assistance program. At the same time, I urge that both the treaty and the proposed military assistance program should be considered separately and on their own merits. For my own part I believe that both the North Atlantic Treaty and the military assistance program will contribute to world-wide security. The treaty is wholly consistent with the Charter and designed to strengthen the system of international law of which the Charter is the basis. It will give security and confidence to the signatory nations, whose common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs draw them naturally together and whose well-being is vital to world recovery.

The added security of these nations does not threaten or weaken any other nation or portion of the world. The principles which draw these nations into natural affinity and which they seek to defendfreedom of the individual, tolerance and restraint, and the rule of law, are the principles which unite free peoples throughout the world.

The determination to provide defense for these principles by the 12 nations joining in this treaty-added to the other steps taken by these and other nations to wage peace-must be an encouragement to all peoples who wish peace based on these principles.

The treaty is the practical expression of the determination that an aggressor cannot divide these nations and pick them off one by one. History has taught us that the absence of such determination and of its clear statement in advance is gravely dangerous. The knowledge that armed attack will be met by collective defense, prompt and effective, will surely have a steadying effect on anyone from whom that transgression might come.

The political and moral strength which this treaty adds to the accumulating economic strength of a vital portion of the world will strengthen our ability to build a world in which freedom is maintained and expanded and in which the problems remaining and growing out of the war can be solved in an atmosphere free of the fear of aggression. In conclusion I should like to repeat to you words which the President used at the signing of the treaty: 1

It is a simple document, but if it had existed in 1914 and in 1939, supported by the nations which are represented here today, I believe it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two World Wars.

For us, war is not inevitable. We do not believe that there are blind

1 For the complete text of the address made by the President at the ceremony at which the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, see the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 17, 1949, pp. 481–482.

tides of history which sweep men one way or the other. In our own times we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom-war or peace.

I have no doubt which they will choose. The treaty we are signing here today is evidence of the path they will follow.

If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and

peace.

6. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 1 RELATIONS, JUNE 6, 1949 1

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the North Atlantic Treaty (Executive L, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, unanimously report the treaty to the Senate and recommend that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

PART I. BACKGROUND

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

The basic objective of the treaty is to assist in achieving the primary purpose of the United Nations-the maintenance of peace and security. It is designed to do so by making clear the determination of the members of the North Atlantic community to safeguard their common heritage of freedom by exercising collectively their inherent right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack upon any of them, while making clear at the same time their determination to live in peace with all governments and all peoples.

2. TEXT OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

[For the full text of the North Atlantic Treaty, see supra, doc. 4.]

3. BACKGROUND OF TREATY

The paramount desire of the American people is and always has been for peace and freedom. Since 1776 they have constantly striven, and sometimes fought, to maintain their own freedom and to further the development of freedom elsewhere. They have always sought to live in peace with all men.

Since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, this Government has contributed to the peace and freedom of the Americas

18. Exec. Rept. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess.

The portions of President Monroe's message to Congress of Dec. 2, 1823, known as the Monroe Doctrine, are quoted on p. x of Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine (Department of State publication 37; 1930).

by making clear that it would regard an armed attack upon any part of the Americas as an attack upon the United States. No other doctrine has become more deeply imbedded in American foreign policy. In 1947 all the American Republics joined in signing the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro,' which provided that each would regard an attack on any one of them as an attack upon all.

Since World War II

In 1945 the United States Government and the American people wholeheartedly accepted the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations. In doing so they undertook the obligation not to use force except in conformity with the Charter and the responsibility, not only of living up to that obligation but of using their influence to see that other powers live up to it. No government has labored harder or more unceasingly to reach international understanding through the United Nations and to make the United Nations a more effective instrument.

Unfortunately one great power and a small group of nations under its domination have not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, but have sought to prevent it, both within and without the United Nations. That power and its fifth columns in other countries have sought to prevent the establishment of such a peace. It has sought to obstruct efforts for the promotion of human welfare and stability in order to profit from human misery and hunger in propagating its own system and advancing its own imperialistic ends.

This threat to free institutions everywhere has caused free nations to draw together in increased cooperation for both defense and economic recovery, as reflected in the Brussels Treaty 2 and the Convention for European Economic Cooperation. The United States Government, in giving effect to the desire of the American people to assist in promoting peace and freedom, has taken far-reaching steps to this end in the act to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey and in the European recovery program of 1948 and 1949.5

4

Senate Resolution 239.-The concern of the American people at the unfavorable trend of postwar developments led to the introduction into the Senate during the Eightieth Congress of a large number of resolutions which aspired to change the United Nations Charter or to chart a more effective course for Ünited States foreign policy through the United Nations. The committee thoroughly canvassed the issues involved, in close cooperation with the Department of State, and, on May 19, 1948, unanimously approved Senate Resolution 239, which sought to focus these aspirations on the most constructive measures it considered practicable.

1 Supra, doc. 1.

2 Infra, pp. 968-971.

Infra, pp. 992-1000.

Act of May 22, 1947; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 1257–1261.
Ibid., pp. 1268-1327.

That resolution was adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64-4. It advised the President

of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter: (1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Pursuant to this advice the President in July authorized the Secretary of State to enter into exploratory conversations on the security of the North Atlantic area with representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These conversations resulted in October in agreement that the establishment by treaty of a collective defense arrangement for the North Atlantic area within the framework of the United Nations Charter was desirable and necessary.2 The North Atlantic Treaty was accordingly negotiated and signed on April 4, 1949, by representatives of the seven governments which had participated in the initial conversations and of the Governments of Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal.

Executive-legislative cooperation.-The committee commends the close cooperation between the executive branch and the Senate, which has characterized the development of this treaty from inception to conclusion as an example of how important matters in the field of foreign relations should be handled. First the committee and the Department of State considered together the problems facing the United States in this field and the courses of action best suited to deal with them. The Senate then gave the President its advice as to particular objectives to be sought. The executive branch faithfully followed the advice of the Senate and, during the negotiations with the other governments, consulted fully with the committee, which played an effective part in

1 See statement of July 6, 1948, by the Department of State regarding Under Secretary of State Lovett's meeting of that date with the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Benelux countries; Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1948, p. 80.

2 See communiqué of Oct. 27, 1948, by the Foreign Ministers of the Brussels Pact countries and statement of the same date by Acting Secretary of State Lovett; ibid., Nov. 7, 1948, p. 583.

formulating the terms of the treaty. From the beginning the deliberations of both the committee and the Senate on Senate Resolution 239 and the treaty have been conducted on a wholly nonpartisan basis. Finally, in order to give the American and other peoples the earliest possible opportunity to consider the treaty, its terms were made public considerably in advance of signature, as soon as they had been agreed upon by the negotiating governments.

4. COMMITTEE HEARINGS AND ACTION

The committee discussed with the Secretary of State the draft of the North Atlantic Treaty in two informal executive meetings on February 18 and March 8. The treaty, made public on March 18, was signed in Washington on April 4, and was transmitted to the Senate on April 12. Before commencing public hearings the committee met again on April 21 to consider the relationship of the treaty to the proposed military-assistance program. Public hearings, beginning on April 27, were held on 16 days-April 27-29, May 2-6, 9-13, and 16-18. Besides the committee members, various Senators attended or participated in the cross-examination of the witnesses. The very extensive and thorough hearings comprise three printed volumes.1

The first administration witness was Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson on April 27, 1949. The Hon. Warren R. Austin, Chief, United States Mission to the United Nations; Hon. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense; Hon. W. A. Harriman, United States special represent tative in Europe of the Economic Cooperation Administration; Hon. Robert A. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State; and Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the United States Ármy and representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, completed the testimony presented for the administration by May 3.

In the succeeding weeks the committee heard all witnesses who requested to be heard. Among the 90 nongovernmental witnesses were representatives from a number of our important business, labor, agricultural, church, veterans, and service groups. In addition, the committee also received communications from organizations, such as the American Federation of Labor, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Junior Chamber of Commerce, placing them on record as favoring the treaty.

Following the conclusion of public hearings, the committee met in executive session on June 2 and 6 to evaluate the evidence gained in committee hearings and to consider the committee report. On June 6 the committee voted unanimously (13-0) to report the treaty favor ably to the Senate with the recommendation that it be approved for ratification.

1 The hearings were published with the title North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, First session on Executive L, 81st Cong., 1st sess., the North Atlantic Treaty.