There is, of course, a whole range of defensive measures which might be appropriate depending upon the circumstances. Just what might be done is something that will no doubt be considered by the Council that is to be set up under article VII of the treaty, or by the consultations that would normally take place under article III. In any event, any action in which the United States joined would have to be taken in accordance with our constitutional processes.

Article V defines, in a geographic sense, the area within which the treaty is to operate. By the terms of that article an armed attack on any of the parties includes not only an attack upon the metropolitan territory of the party but also on the Pacific island territories under its jurisdiction or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific. So far as United States interests are concerned, this is an exceptionally broad provision. It would mean, for example, that Australia and New Zealand would be obligated to take appropriate action under article IV if an armed attack were launched against our occupation forces in Japan. Likewise, an armed attack against the former Japanese mandated islands which we are now administeringthe Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Carolines-or an attack upon the Ryukyu or Bonin Islands over which we will be exercising jurisdiction under the Japanese Peace Treaty,' would be considered an armed attack against the United States and would bring the security treaty into play.

It is not contemplated that any elaborate international machinery will be set up as a result of the treaty. Under article VII the parties establish a Council, which consists of their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, to consider problems relating to the implementation of the treaty. While the Council will be organized so as to be able to meet at any time, it is not expected that the Council will find it necessary to convene often unless an emergency should arise.

The committee paid particular attention to the language of article VIII. The words "Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area" leave the implication that the treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and the other security treaties, are but the first step in the creation of a more effective security system for the Pacific. Representatives of the executive branch expressed the conviction that there should be a further evolution in that area although there are at present no plans for the negotiation of a regional arrangement in the Pacific comparable to the Atlantic Pact or the Rio Treaty. At the moment it seems impractical to go beyond what is now being proposed, particularly in view of the reluctance of certain states to enter into a regional security pact.

According to the terms of article X the treaty is to remain in force over an indefinite period. Any party may cease to be a member of the Council, however, 1 year after notice of withdrawal has been given. Since the threat to peace in the Pacific is of indefinite duration, the provision seems to be a logical one.

The committee agrees that the treaty will serve the national

1 See article 3 of the Japanese peace treaty, supra, pp. 426–427.

interests of the United States by making clear our mutual interests and our sense of common destiny with our allies in the Pacific. It seems highly desirable that our friends as well as our enemies understand that our concern over such matters as the North Atlantic Pact and the Japanese Peace Treaty in no way implies any lack of interest on our part in working together for peace with such valuable allies as New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines.

Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan

19. TEXT OF TREATY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951 1

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers.2 On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty,

TIAS 2491; 3 UST 3329-3340. Ratification advised by the Senate, Mar. 20, 1952; ratified by the President, Apr. 15, 1952; entered into force, Apr. 28, 1952. Supra, pp. 425-440.

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to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down largescale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

ARTICLE II

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

ARTICLE III

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.'

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.2

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

20. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951 3

With regard to the Security Treaty we are gathered here to sign, there are several points I should like to emphasize:

First, this treaty of security between the United States and Japan is part of a pattern for defense of peace in the Pacific area. Taken

1 See infra, pp. 2406-2423.

2 Instruments of ratification were exchanged Apr. 28, 1952. Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 17, 1951, pp. 463-464.

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2

together with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States. and the Philippines,' the Tripartite Security Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and the Japanese peace treaty which we signed this morning,3 this action adds another link in the chain of security against aggression in a most important part of the world. These treaties constitute, in the words of President Truman, natural "initial steps in [toward] the consolidation of peace" in the Pacific area.

The signing of this Security Treaty today marks the conclusion of 10 days of historic importance to free peoples all over the world.

Second, the present treaty takes its place as a part-and an important part of the system of security which has been developed within the framework of the United Nations Charter. The treaty is not only conceived within the spirit of the charter; it is a fulfillment of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense which the charter recognizes as belonging to all sovereign nations.

Third, this Security Treaty is a voluntary arrangement between free peoples. It stems from a freely reached decision on the part of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people to seek protection for an unarmed Japan against the threat of aggression.

Fourth, there should be no misunderstanding of the purpose of this Security Treaty. Its purpose is peace. In a world in which aggression and the threat of aggression are rampant, the maintenance of peace and security requires us to take affirmative steps to bulwark freedom with military strength. Weakness is an invitation to aggression, both external and internal. We are here providing for the defensive strength without which peace would be jeopardized. In building this strength, the present treaty does not create a threat of further aggression. Of importance to all Japan's neighbors in the Pacific is the principle recognized in this treaty that Japan shall avoid any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Fifth, the defense arrangements provided for under this treaty will constitute a shield to protect the progress being made by the Japanese people toward better conditions of life. It will give the Japanese people the opportunity to continue their constructive work of building the new peaceful Japan, free from the paralyzing threat of aggression. Finally, this treaty expresses the mutual trust and confidence which has been growing between Japan and the United States over the past 6 years. In this time, the people of Japan have had reason to be assured as to the purposes of the United States. And we, in turn, have come to the conviction that the Japanese people want no more of the old militarism, but sincerely desire real peace. The United States believes that Japan, in the spirit of trust and confidence in which this treaty is formulated, will in due course increasingly assume

responsibility for its own defense against aggression and in so doing make its contribution to the collective defense of the free world.

It is with these thoughts in mind that we welcome the opportunity to sign this Security Treaty on behalf of the Government of the United States.

21. STATEMENT TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, JANUARY 7, 1952 (Excerpts)2

In June 1950 the United States was faced by a dual problem, namely (1) bringing to Japan a peace which would end the 9-year-old war and the resultant occupation, then approaching its fifth year, and (2) doing so on terms which would avoid Japan's becoming a vacuum of power into which the nearby aggressive power of Soviet communism would move.

This dual problem was thoroughly discussed at Tokyo in June 1950 by Secretary of Defense Johnson, General MacArthur, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. John Foster Dulles.

At these conferences General MacArthur emphasized the following basic points:

1. Historically, military occupations have a maximum utility of from 3 to 5 years. Thereafter the occupation assumes the character of "colonialism," the occupation forces assume the complexion of entrenched power, and the people under occupation become restive. In the case of Japan, there would be danger that bitterness and resentment would dominate the Japanese mind.

2. The Japanese people had faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed under the instrument of surrender and had every moral and legal right to the restoration of peace.

3. The Japanese people, in the exercise of their sovereignty, would presumably welcome the maintenance by the United States of security forces in Japan, since Japan was itself unarmed and since irresponsible militarism existed in close proximity to Japan.

4. The consummation of a peace and security program as suggested would meet the most impelling need of the moment in the Japan area, namely, the regaining of initiative, without which there would be a progressive deterioration in our position which, if long enough extended, would inevitably confront us with a situation of general hostility. The Soviet Union, General MacArthur pointed out, might seize the initiative for peace in which event the position of the United States would become virtually irretrievable.

1 John Foster Dulles.

2 S. Execs. A, B, C, and D, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 17-22.

3 Instrument of Surrender of Sept. 2, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 625-626.