We have today initialed a draft of a Mutual Defense Treaty.1 That treaty is designed to unite our nations in common action to meet common danger and it will cement the ties which have brought us together to combat in Korea the menace of Communist aggression. Our two Governments will actively proceed with the constitutional processes necessary to bring this treaty into full force and effect. These constitutional processes, in the case of the United States, require that the United States Senate consent to the ratification. The United States Senate, having adjourned this week, will not again be in regular session until next January. However, United States Senate leaders have been kept fully informed of the exchange of views which have led to the action we have taken today and it is our sincere hope that this will lead to prompt and favorable United States Senate action. 2 Between now and the date when the Mutual Defense Treaty can be expected to come into force and effect, our armed forces in Korea will be subject to the United Nations Command which will comply with the armistice terms. If, during this period, there should occur unprovoked armed attack by the Communist forces against the Republic of Korea in violation of the armistice, the UNC, including the Republic of Korea forces, would at once and automatically react, as such an unprovoked attack would be an attack upon and a threat to the UNC itself and to the forces under its command. Such reaction to an unprovoked armed attack would not be a new war but rather a resumption by the Communist forces of the active belligerency which the armistice has halted. The UNC will be constantly alert against such an attack. Our Governments will promptly negotiate agreements to cover the status of such forces as the United States may elect to maintain in Korea after the Mutual Defense Treaty comes into force and effect, and the availability to them of Korean facilities and services needed for the discharge of our common task. In the meantime, the Republic of Korea will continue to cooperate with the UNC and the status of UNC forces in Korea and the availability to them of Korean facilities and services will continue as at present. 5 The armistice contemplates that a political conference will be convened within 3 months, that is, prior to October 27, 1953. At that conference the United States delegation, in cooperation with the ROK delegation and other delegations from the UNC side, will seek to achieve the peaceful unification of historic Korea as a free and independent nation. We and our advisers have already had a full and satisfactory exchange of views which we hope and trust will establish a preparatory foundation for coordinated effort at the political conference. 1 The treaty was signed Oct. 1, 1953; supra. Agreement of July 27, 1953; supra, pp. 724-750. 3 U.N. Command. No "status of forces" agreement under this treaty in force as of Dec. 31, 1955. See The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26-June 15, 1954 (Department of State publication 5609; 1954); also infra, pp. 2685-2693 and 2695-2701. • Republic of Korea. STANFORD L If, after the political conference has been in session for 90 days, it becomes clear to each of our governments that all attempts to achieve these objectives have been fruitless and that the conference is being exploited by the Communist delegates mainly to infiltrate, propagandize, or otherwise embarrass the Republic of Korea, we shall then be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal from the conference. We will then consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free, and independent Korea which is the postwar goal the United States set itself during World War II, which has been accepted by the United Nations as its goal and which will continue to be an object of concern of United States foreign policy. We recognize that the Republic of Korea possesses the inherent right of sovereignty to deal with its problems, but it has agreed to take no unilateral action to unite Korea by military means for the agreed duration of the political conference. We contemplate that the projected 3- to 4-year program for the rehabilitation of the war-ruined Korean economy shall be coordinated through the combined economic board, under the joint chairmanship of the Korean and American representatives.2 This program contemplates the expenditure of approximately one billion dollars of funds, subject to appropriations thereof by the United States Congress. Two hundred million dollars has already been authorized, out of prospective defense savings. We have exchanged preliminary views with respect to various problems involving the maintenance and development of ROK land, air, and sea forces. We feel confident that the relationship thus established between our two Governments marks an important contribution to the developing of independence and freedom in the Far East. With unshaking faith in the principle of collective security, and with loyal adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, we intend to move forward together toward the achievement of our common objective-the restoration of a unified, democratic, and independent Korean nation. There are no other agreements or understandings stated or implied resulting from these consultations other than those herein contained. 25. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT, DECEMBER 30, 1953 3 THE PRESIDENT, I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to the transmission thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington on October 1, 1953. The provisions of the treaty were negotiated with the Republic of Korea by me during the course of a visit to Korea last August to 1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 677-678. 2 See Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, pp. 65-67. 3 S. Exec. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess. discuss problems of mutual concern with President Syngman Rhee.1 Senate leaders were consulted and kept fully informed of the exchange of views which led to the development and formulation of this treaty. As I stated at the signing of the treaty, it is a defense treaty firmly dedicated to peace. It is designed to deter aggression by making clear that each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area upon the territory administratively controlled by either would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The undertaking of each party to aid the other operates only in case that party is the victim of external armed attack. Armed attack by a party, either against a foreign state, or against territory not at the time recognized by the other as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the first, does not bring the treaty into operation. An armed attack by either party does not obligate the other to come to its assistance. As another step in the development of a Pacific security system, the treaty will complement the earlier treaties which have entered into force with Australia and New Zealand,3 the Philippines, and Japan." Like those treaties, the treaty with Korea is in full conformity with the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It affirms the belief of this Government that the security of an individual nation in the free world depends upon the security of its partners and constitutes another link in the collective security of the free nations of the Pacific. The treaty consists of a preamble and six substantive articles. The preamble sets forth the circumstances for making the treaty, providing in particular that the treaty is designed to coordinate the efforts of the parties "pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." Thus evolutionary developments are contemplated as in the treaties with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. Article I is identical with the comparable articles in the tripartite and Philippine treaties, except for the inclusion of an additional phrase whereby the parties agree to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent not only with respect to the purposes of the United Nations, but also with respect to the obligations assumed by any party toward the United Nations. Article II calls for consultation between the parties whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or the security of either party is threatened by external armed attack. The article also embodies the principle established by Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, the Vandenberg resolution, which calls for "self-help and 1 See supra. Statement of Oct. 1, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 484-485. Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951; supra, doc. 16. • Resolution of June 11, 1948; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 197. 415900-57- -61 mutual aid" by all the parties to security arrangements joined in by the United States and which involve commitments by the United States. The provisions of the article are similar to comparable provisions in the treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines. Article III is the heart of the treaty. Under that article each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. This language is the same as the comparable provisions in the treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines except that it defines the area within which the treaty is to operate, namely in territories now under the respective administrative control of either party, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other. This provision is designed to take cognizance of the fact that the Republic of Korea presently has effective control over only part of Korea. If either contracting state should initiate an armed attack against any terri tory not under its administrative control when the treaty was signed or thereafter recognized by the other as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the first, the treaty would not apply. Under its terms the treaty could continue to be applicable in event that a political settlement unifying Korea is reached. In the Australian and New Zealand and Philippine treaties the area within which they are to operate is defined in a separate article. Article IV grants to the United States the right to dispose land, air, and sea forces in and about the territory of Korea as determined by mutual agreement. It does not make such disposition automatic or mandatory. According to article VI, the treaty has indefinite duration, but either party may terminate it 1 year after notice is given. In view of the importance of this treaty as a deterrent to aggression and thus to the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific area, it is hoped that it will be given early and favorable consideration by the Senate. Respectfully submitted. JOHN FOSTER DULLES. 26. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, JANUARY 21, 19541 The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Mutual Defense Treaty With Korea (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.), signed at Washington on October 1, 1953, without objection reports 1 S. Exec. Rept. No. 1, 83d Cong., 2d sess. the treaty to the Senate with an understanding, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date. 1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY The primary purpose of this treaty is to deter further aggression in the Pacific area by a clear warning to potential aggressors that the United States and the Republic of Korea will regard an armed attack on the territory of either party as dangerous to their peace and security and that they will act to meet this danger in accordance with their constitutional processes (art. III). Other articles of the treaty spell out the obligation of the parties to refrain from force or the threat of force in their relations with other nations (art. I), to consult should an external attack threaten, and to maintain and develop through self-help and mutual aid their individual and collective strength to repel an armed attack (art. II). Finally, in article IV, the Republic of Korea grants and the United States accepts the right to station armed forces in South Korea subject to mutual agreement. 2. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY Since the outbreak of Communist aggression in Korea, the United States has sought by various means to strengthen the security of the Pacific. One of these has been to enter into mutual defense or security pacts with certain nations important to the security of that area and to our own defense interests. Three such treaties are now in effect-the first with the Philippines,' the second with Australia and New Zealand,' and the third with Japan. The Senate gave its advice and consent to these treaties on March 20, 1952. The Korean treaty makes the fourth strand in this network of mutual defense treaties in the Pacific. 3 The treaty grew out of the Korean armistice negotiations and the legitimate concern on the part of the Republic of Korea for its security in the period following the armistice. In an exchange of letters last May and June with President Rhee, President Eisenhower stated that he was "prepared promptly, after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice, to negotiate" with the South Korean Government a mutual defense treaty similar to those with the other Pacific nations, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Preliminary discussions on the treaty were held between Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and President Rhee in June while armistice talks were still in progress. They reached a considerable area of agreement, and following the conclusion of the armistice on July 27, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles and President Rhee finished the negotiations on the Mutual Defense 1 Supra, doc. 13. Supra, doc. 16. See infra, pp. 2627-2662. See President Eisenhower's letter of June 6, 1953 to President Rhee; infra, pp. 2729-2731. See the Joint Statement of July 11, 1953; infra, pp. 2673-2674. C STANFORD |