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In his announcement of the withdrawal of two Army divisions from
Korea, President Eisenhower alluded to this statement and added:

United States military forces in the Far East will be maintained at appropriate levels to take account of the foregoing and to fulfill the commitments which the United States has undertaken in that area, and which are vital to the security of the United States. These forces will feature highly mobile naval, air, and amphibious units.

The committee was informed that the withdrawal of the two Army divisions is, therefore, a part of the regrouping of United States forces in the Pacific to enable the United States to react with greater flexibility to any renewed aggression in the area.

In the words of Secretary Dulles:

If we had to try to maintain ground forces, let us say, in Asia, to meet an attack by ground forces at any place where the enemy chooses to attack, then I believe that we are virtually subservient to the enemy.

What we must do is to make clear that if there is such an attack, which involves our vital interest, our reaction will be, as I said last night,' at places and by means of our own choosing. We will not necessarily allow the enemy to pick the rules of battle and the place of battle and the conditions of battle which best suit his purposes.

.

By making that clear it is possible for us to protect our vital interests without an overextension.2

The committee wishes to call attention to these assurances from responsible administration officials that the defensive posture of the United States has not been impaired but rather strengthened by the proposed withdrawal of the two Army divisions from Korea, and that the United States has the military capacity to fulfill its commitment to Korea in the event of renewed Communist aggression.

9.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE TREATY TO THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER

The United Nations Charter is referred to in article I of the treaty, where the parties agree to—

refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by
any Party toward the United Nations.

This reference to the charter compares with similar references in the
Philippine and the Australia and New Zealand Treaties.

The Korean Treaty, like the two latter treaties, according to Secretary Dulles' testimony, falls under article 51 of the charter which provides:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

1 Address of Jan. 12, 1954; supra, pp. 80-85.

2 Statement of Jan. 13, 1954; Hearings, p. 7.

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The Secretary of State testified that it would not be necessary to secure the previous consent of the Security Council to take defensive action under the Korean Treaty. Our only obligation would be to report the action taken to the United Nations. He stressed that chapter VIII, relating to regional arrangements, and in particular article 53 in that chapter, requiring the previous authorization of the Security Council for regional enforcement action, did not apply to this treaty any more than it does to our other security pacts in the Pacific.

. . . in my opinion we could act under this treaty without the prior consent of the Security Council. The treaty would not have much value if we had to get the prior consent of the Security Council, carrying with it a Soviet assent, which would not presumably be obtainable; but we would be obligated to report to the Security Council what we were doing under the provisions of article 51.1

The Secretary of State, however, added that as a practical matter the United States would probably bring any recurrence of Communist aggression immediately to the attention of the United Nations Security Council and, if a Soviet veto obstructed action there, to the General Assembly which, under the "Uniting for peace" resolution,2 has the power to recommend action.

I would hope very much that we would resort to that "Uniting for peace" resolution and the action which it authorizes, and that we would not allow ourselves to be isolated in any action.3

The committee noted that the specific language of the Philippine, and Australian and New Zealand Treaties, relating to the submission of reports to the Security Council, had been omitted from the Korean Treaty. (See p. 14 of the hearings.) Some concern was voiced lest this omission be interpreted as a deliberate disregard for the United Nations and our obligations under the Charter.

The executive branch has assured the committee that such is not the case. The sole reason for the omission of the language is the fact that article 51 refers specifically to members of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea is not a United Nations member. During the negotiations, therefore, it was considered preferable to omit the reference to the Security Council. This in no way reflects any change in the strong support of the present administration for the United Nations.

10. DETERRENT NATURE OF TREATY

The primary value of the treaty, in the words of Secretary of State Dulles, consists in giving to the Communists notice, beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that the United States would not remain indifferent to any new Communist aggression in Korea. Together with the other measures taken until now in the Far East, the treaty, by relieving the Communists of any illusions concerning the consequences of any new aggression in Korea, should serve as a powerful deterrent to any reckless course of action which might plunge the 1 Hearings, p. 22.

2 Res. 377 (V), Nov. 3, 1950; supra, pp. 187-192.

3 Hearings, p. 23.

Pacific area into a wide-scale war. At the same time, the prospect of stability in the Korean area is further increased by the express limitation on the territorial scope of the treaty contained in article III.

11. A PACIFIC PACT

Reference has already been made in this report to the security and mutual defense treaties between the United States and Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. The treaty with Korea makes the fourth such arrangement which the United States has negotiated in the Pacific area. The committee has noted the difference in the approach of the United States to security problems in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. The North Atlantic Treaty embraces 14 nations of the North Atlantic Community together in 1 multipartite agreement for their collective self-defense. In the Pacific, on the other hand, the United States has entered into bipartite, or in the case of Australia and New Zealand, tripartite treaties with particular nations in that area. The committee, therefore, raised the question of a Pacific pact or Pacific NATO with the Secretary of State. Although he felt that such a development would have certain advantages, the Secretary pointed out that the Pacific countries have cultural and political differences in addition to physical separation, which distinguished that area from Europe.

I think it would be very fortunate if [a Pacific security system could be developed] and it certainly is a possibility which we have very much in mind, but it does not seem as though that could be achieved at any early predictable date.1

The committee, while concurring in the Secretary's evaluation of the prospects for a Pacific Pact, wishes nonetheless to express its belief that such a pact is a desirable ultimate objective of United States policy in the Pacific and hopes that the Department of State will continue to encourage such a development. The security of the Pacific area would be measurably enhanced if the nations of that region would join and work together for their regional and collective self-defense.

12. NEED FOR RATIFICATION NOW

The terms of the Korean armistice agreement state that after January 22, 1954, all prisoners in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be released. At the same time, the prospects for a political conference on Korea are not encouraging, preliminary negotiations having been broken off in December. These two facts combine to make the Korean situation uncertain.

The committee, in view of this circumstance, explored with administration witnesses the timing of the United States ratification of this treaty. It was their consensus that prompt action by the Senate would be helpful. Secretary Dulles testified:

It is my judgment that it is wise to act now, and promptly, because this treaty will be, itself, one of the stabilizing factors.

1 Hearings, p. 9.

See Ambassador Arthur H. Dean's address of Dec. 21, 1953; infra, pp. 2680

A postponement of action on the treaty could not but raise doubt in the minds of enemies of the Republic of Korea as to what our intentions were.1

And General Ridgway added:

I would think the sooner the treaty were in effect, the better, in our interests.2

The committee concurs in these opinions, in the conviction that the entry into effect of this treaty, which the Republic of Korea has already ratified, will be a stabilizing factor in the Korean situation.

13. CONCLUSIONS

The committee believes that the objectives of this treaty are important to the security of the United States in the Far East. The treaty constitutes an essential link in the system of collective security thus far developed. Because it gives clear and formal notice to wouldbe aggressors that we will react with prompt measures to defend the peace in the event of an attack upon an area vital to our safety, it eliminates a factor which may have played a major role in the outbreak of the major wars of this century-that of miscalculation by the enemy as to what our conduct would be.

While there are risks in any course of action of this kind in the Pacific, there are greater risks in not advising a potential enemy just what he can expect us to do, and in not recognizing the advantages to the United States in having a powerful and loyal ally whose subjects fought valiantly at our side during a 3-year campaign in the interests of peace and justice.

For these reasons the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty, subject to the understanding noted above.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact)

27. TEXT OF TREATY, SEPTEMBER 8, 19543

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive

1 Hearings, p. 6.

2 Ibid., p. 48.

3 TIAS 3170; 6 UST 81-86. Ratification advised by the Senate Feb. 1, 1955; ratified by the President Feb. 4, 1955; entered into force Feb. 19, 1955.

by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence

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