their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and that they will refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II incorporates in the treaty the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.). The parties pledge themselves, by self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack. The increasing need for capacity to resist internal subversion as well as external attack, which was reflected in the Manila Pact, is also reflected in this Árticle II of the China treaty. It speaks of "communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability." Article III is similar to the corresponding article of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in pledging the parties to strengthen their free institutions and cooperate to promote economic progress and social well-being.

Consultation regarding implementation of the treaty is provided for under article IV.

Article V, substantially identical with article IV of the Philippine treaty and article IV of the ANZUS pact, says that each party recog nizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area against the territories of either party would be dangerous to itself and that each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Like the other treaties, and in identical language, this article provides for reporting immediately to the Security Council all measures taken to deal with an attack, and for terminating all such measures when the Security Council has taken the necessary action.

Article VI specifies the territories mentioned in articles II and V to be "in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction." It also provides that articles II and V will be applicable to "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." It is our view that an agreement to extend the coverage of the China defense treaty to additional territories would in practical terms amount to an amendment of the treaty and should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

Article VII grants to the United States the right to dispose such land, air, and sea forces in and about Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement. It does not make such disposition automatic or mandatory. A similar provision is found in article IV of the Korean treaty. Article VIII, substantially identical with article VI of the Philip pine and the ANZUS treaties, makes it clear that the obligations of the parties under the treaty do not affect in any way their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.

Article IX requires that the treaty be ratified by constitutional process before it shall come into force.

Article X provides that the treaty shall remain in force indefinitely but that either country may terminate it one year after giving notice. Substantially identical provisions are found in our treaties with Korea and the Philippines.

To summarize-what the treaty would accomplish is this:

It would give the Chinese Communists notice, beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that the United States would regard an armed attack directed against Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores as a danger to its own peace and safety and would act to meet the danger such action to be in accordance with our constitutional processes.

It would provide firm reassurance to the Republic of China and to the world that Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores are not a subject for barter as part of some Far Eastern "deal" with the Chinese Communists.

Taken in conjunction with the treaties which have already been concluded by the United States and to which I have referred above, this treaty rounds out the Western Pacific security system. It would be theoretically preferable if that rounding out were accomplished by a multilateral regional pact. This may come as a future development. However, that is not practical at the present time, and, in the meantime, we need to act within the limits of the practical.

After the treaty was signed, there took place an exchange of notes, dated December 10, 1954, between the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself. These were designed to insure that our two Governments will act in harmony and concert in relation to the present troubled state of affairs in that area. It was agreed that offensive military operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China would be undertaken only as a matter of joint agreement. This is obviously a reasonable and prudent understanding, because unilateral action of an offensive character by one party might throw heavy burdens upon the other party. Therefore, neither will act in disregard of the other.

It is furthermore agreed that military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution will not be removed from the treaty area to a degree which would substantially diminish its defensibility unless by mutual agreement. This means, for example, that, if the United States has granted supplies and equipment for the forces on Formosa or has aided in the training, support, and equipment of armed forces, the resultant strength will not be removed from Formosa to other areas without our consent. Otherwise, the United States might be required continuously to replace what we had designed for the defense of Formosa.

The understandings thus expressed are important and reasonable in the light of the existing situation. They are the kind of arrangements which are proper as between friends and allies facing a common danger. They do not in any way impugn the sovereign equality of the parties.

Since this treaty was submitted to the Senate, the Congress has

enacted Public Law 4' authorizing the President to use the armed forces of the United States in relation to Formosa and the Pescadores. The President's request for that authority arose out of Chinese Communist activities which in turn seemed to bear some relationship to the decisions of the United States which would be solemnized by this treaty and by the Manila Pact, which was approved by the Senate last week.

Relative quiet had prevailed off the China coast since 1949 until on September 3, 1954, the Chinese Communists opened heavy artillery fire on Quemoy Island. That was just 3 days before the opening of the Manila conference which concluded the Manila Pact. Then when it was known that the United States intended to negotiate this Treaty of Mutual Defense with the Republic of China, the Chinese Communists stepped up their anti-American activities. They announced their condemnation to imprisonment of United States flyers. Indeed, that announcement coincided to the very day with the initialing of the security treaty by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of China and myself. Subsequently, Chinese Communist military activities in the Formosa Straits have been greatly intensified as part of what Communist propaganda proclaims to be their intention to exert their full force to conquer Formosa.

On January 24, the Chinese Communist Premier and Foreign Minister said, "The Chinese people must liberate Taiwan (Formosa) and the United States must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan (Formosa) and the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits." 3

The armed hostilities in the area seemed so likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security that on January 28, 1955, the representative of New Zealand brought the situation to the attention of the U.N. Security Council; and on January 31, 1955, the Council invited a representative of the Chinese Communist regime to participate in the discussion of this item. On February 3, 1955, the Chinese Communist Premier and Foreign Minister rejected that invitation. In so doing, he referred to this defensive treaty as "aggression" and again demanded that the United States "withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan (Formosa) and the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits."

I doubt that the Chinese Communists really intend to wage war against the United States unless the United States abandons this treaty with all that that abandonment would imply. However, I do not doubt that the Chinese Communists are probing our resolution. They no doubt hope that we want peace so ardently that we will retreat in the face of their threats.

It is true that we want peace and that we want it ardently.

1 Infra, pp. 2486-2487.

How

2 For the text of the judgment of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 23, 1954, see Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 348-352.

3 Statement broadcast by the Peiping radio on Jan. 24, 1955; New York Times, Jan. 25, 1955.

See U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Tenth Year, 690th Meeting. 5 New York Times, Feb. 4, 1955.

ever, we do not want it at the price of our security or of our honor. Indeed experience shows that those who try in that way to buy peace in fact only increase the ultimate danger of war. They encourage the aggressors to make ever-mounting demands, so that in the end there is no alternative to fighting.

Under the circumstances which the Chinese Communists themselves have deliberately created, failure to conclude this treaty would have the gravest consequences. It would at once endanger the entire non-Communist position in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. It would stimulate the aggressive activities of international communism everywhere and would grievously hurt the interests of free peoples everywhere, including the interests of our own United States.

Such a course is to my mind unthinkable. In the face of Communist probing deeds and blustering words, the United States should remain calm, but it should remain firm in its purpose. It is at least possible that the enactment of Public Law 4 and the ratification of this treaty will together create a situation in which the present warlike mood of the Chinese Communists may subside.

The congressional authority to the President and the treaty ratification are two complementary acts. Under the circumstances that the Chinese Communists have created, neither, alone, is enough.

Therefore, I now urge the prompt consent of the Senate to the ratification of the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China.

39. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
1
RELATIONS, FEBRUARY 8, 1955 1

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Ex. A, 84th Cong., 1st sess.), signed at Washington on December 2, 1954, reports the treaty to the Senate, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

The present treaty constitutes the sixth link in the chain of security pacts which the United States has concluded with other governments in the Western Pacific. Like the ones which have preceded, its primary purpose is to prevent aggression on the part of a potential enemy, by giving advance notice that the United States will regard an armed attack upon the area covered by the treaty as dangerous to our peace and safety. Should such an attack occur, we will act to meet the danger in accordance with our constitutional processes (art. V). Purely defensive in character, the text of the treaty reaffirms the parties' faith in the principles of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples (preamble, arts. I, V, and VIII). Likewise, the parties undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations (art. I). They pledge 1 S. Exec. Rept. No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

themselves to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack as well as Communist subversive activities (art. II). They also agree to cooperate in the development of economic progress and social well-being (art. III), and to consult together from time to time concerning the implementation of the treaty (art. IV). Other articles define the territory to which the provisions of articles II and V are applicable (art. VI) and authorize the United States to dispose its land, air, and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as required for their defense, subject to mutual agreement.

2. BACKGROUND

Conclusion of this treaty reflects the continuing and increasing concern of the United States with the security of the Pacific area. In 1951, the United States negotiated Mutual Defense Treaties with the Philippines' and with Australia and New Zealand 2 and a Security Treaty with Japan. A Mutual Defense Pact With Korea followed in 1953. Last year the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Mutual Defense Treaty With the Republic of China were added to the security system of protection against Communist aggression in Asia.

5

Preliminary consideration to the desirability of a treaty with China was given following a proposal for such an agreement by the Republic of China in December 1953. After the Southeast Asia Treaty was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles visited Formosa and discussed the scope of such a treaty with President Chiang Kai-shek. Further negotiations were carried on by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Robertson, at Taipei in October 1954, and later at Washington with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Yeh Kung-ch'ao. The treaty was signed at Washington on December 2, 1954. It was transmitted to the Senate on January 6, 1955.7

6

3. COMMITTEE ACTION

Although the administration had requested that the treaty receive prompt consideration, action by the Senate was delayed somewhat owing to the necessity of giving more immediate attention to the President's message of January 24, 1955.8 In that message the Chief Executive requested congressional authority to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands against armed attack.

In a meeting held jointly with the Armed Services Committee, the

1 Supra, doc. 13.

2 Supra, doc. 16.
Supra, doc. 19.

Supra, doc. 23.

5 Supra, docs. 27-28.

See the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 25, 1954, pp. 614-615.
7S. Exec. A, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

• Infra, pp. 2483–2486.