committee examined the authority requested in the President's message with Secretary of State Dulles on January 24, and with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Arthur W. Radford. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff, United States Army, and Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, also appeared and acquainted the committees with their views. In the course of these discussions, the significance and effect of various provisions of the present treaty were explored at some length, particularly as they related to the authority requested under the proposed resolution.

On February 7, Secretary of State Dulles appeared before the committee in executive session, at which time he was heard in greater detail on the specific provisions of the treaty. On February 8 the committee agreed, by a vote of 11 to 2, to report the treaty to the Senate for final action.

4. SUMMARY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

In the previous defense pacts we have negotiated in the Pacific, a more or less standard pattern has been used, with variations to fit the situation confronting the signatory parties. The present treaty follows that general format, and the provisions of several of its articles are virtual reproductions of the corresponding text of our Mutual Defense Treaty With the Philippines.

The preamble to the treaty contains a reaffirmation by the parties of their faith in the United Nations Charter, as well as of their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments and to strengthen the fabric of peace in the west Pacific area. It is keynoted by a formal declaration of their sense of unity and of their common determination to defend themselves against armed attack, to the end that no potential aggressor might entertain the illusion that either signatory stands alone. Finally, the parties express the desire to strengthen their efforts for collective defense pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the area protected.

Article I of the treaty reproduces the provision of previous security treaties under which the parties undertake to settle international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II is predicated upon the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.), which is a common feature of the other security treaties. It obligates the parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity not only to resist armed attack but also

Communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

This recognition of the dangers of subversion is similar to the corresponding clause of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Ex. K, 83d Cong.), in which it first appeared. Unlike that treaty, however, there is no further provision in the treaty with China that

the parties will consult on measures to be taken in the event that their territorial integrity or political stability is threatened by any fact or situation, such as, for example, subversion from without, which endangers the peace of the area (Southeast Asia Treaty, art. IV, 2). A general provision for consultation concerning implementation of the treaty is, however, provided for in article IV.

Under article III, the parties agree to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being. Like the clause on subversion, this provision made its appearance for the first time in the Southeast Asia Treaty, and has no counterpart in prior security treaties. As was pointed out by the committee's report on the Southeast Asia Treaty (Ex. Rept. No. 1, 84th Cong.):1

.. the article does not commit the United States to a specific aid program, nor does it preclude continued economic cooperation with any country whose economic welfare is important to our own well-being. . .

Article IV provides that the parties will consult together from time to time, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, concerning the implementation of the treaty.

5. SCOPE OF UNITED STATES COMMITMENT (ART. V)

Article V, which contains the heart of the treaty, is virtually identi cal with the provisions of article IV of the Philippines and ANZUS Defense Treaties. In the first paragraph, each party recognizes thatan armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

The basic provision is one which has repeatedly received the committee's attention, and requires little comment. It embodies the now familiar "Monroe Doctrine formula," encountered in the previous defense pacts, and the concept that any action taken by the United States must be in accordance with our constitutional processes. Put somewhat differently, there is no question of any automatic commitment such as was discussed with respect to the "attack upon one is an attack upon all" concept of the North Atlantic Treaty. The power of the United States Government to act under this treaty remains precisely as it is defined in the Constitution, without impairing either the right of the Congress to declare war, or the authority of the President to act as Commander in Chief and as director of this Nation's foreign relations. The problem was examined in some detail by the committee in its reports on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Ex. Rept. No. 1, 84th Cong.) and the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea (Ex. Rept. No. 1, 83d Cong.).2

The committee considered carefully the wording of article V and the nature of our commitments under that article. In order to clear

1 Supra, doc. 33.
2 Supra, doc. 26.

up any doubt on this point, it was agreed that its report should include the following statement:

It is the understanding of the Senate that the obligations of the parties under article V apply only in the event of external armed attack; and that military operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China, shall not be undertaken except by joint agreement.

The understanding reflects an agreement manifested by the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in an exchange of notes dated December 10, 1954, under which the use of force from the areas specified must be pursuant to joint agreement, except for emergency actions by way of self-defense.

Finally, in the event of such armed attack as is envisaged by paragraph 1 of article V, the parties agree, in paragraph 2, that—

all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

The paragraph reflects the position of both signatories as members of the United Nations.

6. THE TREATY AREA

Article VI defines the treaty area. It declares that, for the purposes of articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" "shall

mean

in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the west Pacific under its jurisdiction.

The treaty area is thus defined in a limited way and as such does not extend the obligation of the United States to defend any territories other than Formosa and the Pescadores. Embraced within the protection given our own "island territories in the west Pacific" are such groups as the Ryukyus (including Okinawa), the trust territories (former Japanese mandated islands) and Guam.

However, article VI expressly contemplates that the obligations of articles II and V of the treaty may be made applicable

to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

During the hearings, some members of the committee expressed concern lest the words "mutual agreement" be interpreted as permitting an important extension of our treaty commitments without the approval of the Senate. Secretary Dulles assured the committee, however, that as in the case of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

an agreement to extend the coverage of the China Defense Treaty to additional territories would in practical terms amount to an amendment of the treaty, and should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.1

1 Statement of Feb. 7, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 288.

SITES VAD LIN LIBRARY

Nevertheless, the committee, with the aim of avoiding any doubts as to the nature of the "mutual agreement" required, decided to include the following statement in this report:

It is the understanding of the Senate that the "mutual agreement" referred to in article VI, under which the provisions of articles II and V may be made applicable to other territories, shall be construed as requiring the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States.

7. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article VII of the treaty, as in the Japanese and Korean defense pacts, authorizes the United States to dispose its Land, Sea, and Air Forces in and about the territory of Formosa and the Pescadores. With respect to a corresponding privilege granted by article IV of the Korean Treaty, the administration made it clear that this provision did not impose on the United States an automatic or mandatory obligation to do so. We are free to station forces or not, as circumstances may indicate. At the present time there is a United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Formosa charged with responsibility for our military assistance to the Republic of China.

Article VIII reproduces the declaration found in the Southeast Asia, the Philippine, and the ANZUS Treaties, that the treaty shall not be construed as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or that body's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article IX provides for ratification in accordance with the parties' constitutional processes, and sets the coming into force of the instru ment as the date of exchanging ratifications at Taipei.

Finally, article X stipulates an indefinite duration for the treaty, subject to a right of termination by either party after 1 year's notice has been given.

8. STATUS OF FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES

China ceded Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan by the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki after the Sino-Japanese War. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek agreed that Formosa and the Pescadores "shall be restored to the Republic of China." At the Potsdam Conference this decision was confirmed in the proclamation defining the terms for Japanese surrender, July 26, 1945.3 Administrative control of the island was turned over to the Republic of China subsequent to the Japanese surrender in September 1945.4

Formosa became the seat of the National Government of the Republic of China in December 1949. By the peace treaty of September

1 Treaty of Apr. 17, 1895; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 87, pp. 799-805. 2 Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 22. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

Instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945; ibid., pp. 625-626. See also General Order No. 1, issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on Sept. 2, 1945; Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. II, pp. 442-445.

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8, 1951, signed with the United States and other powers, Japan renounced "all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." The treaty did not specify the nation to which such right, title, and claim passed. Although the Republic of China was not a signatory to the treaty it and the parties at the conference expressly recognized that it did not dispose finally of Formosa and the Pescadores. The Republic of China concluded a separate peace treaty with Japan on April 28, 1952, "on the same or substantially the same terms" as specified in article 26 of the Japanese treaty.

2

At a press conference on December 1, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles was asked whether the treaty recognized the claim of the Republic of China to sovereignty over the mainland. He replied: "It does not deal specifically with that matter one way or another." Later, during a discussion of this question in executive session, he informed the committee that the reference in article V to "the territories of either of the parties" was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or another as to their sovereignty.

It is the view of the committee that the coming into force of the present treaty will not modify or affect the existing legal status of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty appears to be wholly consistent with all actions taken by the United States in this matter since the end of World War II, and does not introduce any basically new element in our relations with the territories in question. Both by act and by implication we have accepted the Nationalist Government as the lawful authority on Formosa.

To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on this aspect of the treaty, the committee decided it would be useful to include in this report the following statement:

It is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies.

9. FORMOSA TREATY AND PUBLIC LAW 4 (H. J. RES. 159) COMPARED

On January 28 Congress approved a joint resolution, Public Law 4 (H. J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting against armed attack the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and

such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

During the debate on this resolution in the Senate (which adopted it by a vote of 85 to 3) some concern was voiced as to the possible use of our Armed Forces to defend certain Nationalist-occupied islands