Limitation on the Power of Governors to Remove Mayors

The extent of power vested in the governor of Ohio to remove the mayor of a city was considered by the Supreme Court of that state in the recent case of State vs. Donahey, 140 N.E. Reporter, 609. In the course of its opinion, the Court said:

"In respect to the finding that the relator was guilty of misconduct in office in the selection of his chief of police and other police officers, it is sufficient to say that we know of no provision of law which authorizes the mayor to appoint his chief of police and other law enforcement officers by and with the consent of the governor.

"The matter of the appointment of police officers is purely a matter of local self-government, and while the mayor of a city may be called to account for the conduct of such officers, of which he has knowledge, he may not be removed from office by reason of the past history or general character of such appointees.

"Touching the question of misconduct of the relator during a former term, it is not the purpose of the provision of the constitution requiring the Legislature to enact laws providing for the prompt removal from office of officers guilty of misconduct, or of the Legislature in the enactment of section 6212-34, General Code, in pursuance thereof, or in the enactment of section 4268, General Code, prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision, to vest in the governor of the state, or any other tribunal, a veto power upon the right of the electors of the municipality to elect their own city officials, the right conferred being to remove for cause. which cause must arise during the term, and subsequent to the exercise of the power to elect vested in the electors of a municipality."

Validity of Provision for Paying Municipal Improvement Contractors in Bonds

Where there is no provision in a city charter requiring the municipal authorities to sell bonds to the highest bidder after a proper and legal notice, the authorities, wher authorized to issue and sell bonds to pay for a public improvement, may, the contractor consenting, deliver the bonds at par in payment of the contract price, in

lieu of raising money upon them by loan and then paying that money in discharge of the contract obligations.

A provision in a notice to contractors that a city reserves the option to make payment in warrants or city bonds is unenforceable, except with the consent of the contractor; and, if such provision prevents competition to such an extent that it increases the cost of the work, the city should be enjoined from entering into the contract. (Nebraska Supreme Court, Ledwith vs. City of Lincoln, 193 Northwestern Reporter, 763.)

Ordinance Forbidding Parking of Automobiles in Front of Railway Station Without Consent of Superintendent of StationHeld Void

An ordinance of the city of Cincinnati forbidding parking of automobiles in front of a railway station without consent of the superintendent of the station, is void, according to the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of City of Cincinnati vs. Cook, 140 Northeastern Reporter, 655. The Court said:

"That this ordinance works a delegation of power, which may, and under the facts disclosed by this record, did, result in lack of uniformity and in discrimination, is clear and unmistakable. It confers upon some person to be designated by the owner of a specified premises the power to select persons who may use and enjoy the street in that location, and to exclude others therefrom, so that he may, for a consideration or otherwise, let that space for the purpose of a taxicab stand to certain favored individuals or companies, and, in order to make it more valuable, exclude all others from that portion of the street.

"The city has ample power to control the use of the streets, and to regulate travel over the same, as well as to establish stands for omnibuses and taxicabs; but it is elementary that it cannot delegate such powers to an individual. There is no such question as taking from the owner of property the right of ingress and egress to his own premises involved here, but rather the question of conferring upon him a

proprietary interest in the street, which he may transfer to whomsoever he may choose, and such right be enforced by the provisions of this ordinance. In effect this ordinance is no different than if the owner of the premises in question had been requested by council in advance of the enactment of the ordinance, placing therein the name or names of the person or persons exempted from the operation of its provisions, and prohibiting the standing of vehicles of any other person or company at that place."

Duty of City to Afford Police Protection to Street Railways During Strike

Enjoining the authorities of Schenectady from interfering with the operation of plaintiff's street car system during a strike, although attempt of the authorities to prevent running of the street cars was attempted to be justified by them as a meassure to preserve law and order, the New York Supreme Court for Schenectady County said in the case of Schenectady Railway Co. vs. Whitmyer, 199 New York Supplement, 827:

"It is the duty of the police and the department of public safety to preserve order and protect the property of the citizens, individual and corporate. It is their duty to protect the railway company in running its cars, just as it is their duty to protect the people of the city in their rights to drive upon the streets and to walk peacefully upon the sidewalks. lf any one attempts to interfere with the railway company in operating its cars, the police authorities must invoke the strong arm of the law to suppress such interference, just as they would if the rights of citizens to walk or drive lawfully upon the streets were being interfered with."

City Held Not Liable for Accident Caused by Traffic Marker in Street

A city is not liable for injury to a traveler in a street, resulting from collision between him, while riding in an automobile, and the projecting arm of a guide-post, on a theory of maintaining an improper obstruction in the street, held the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in the late case of Clark vs. City of Athens, 253 Southwestern Reporter, 574. The Court said:

"This guide-post or traffic marker had been placed where it was for the very purpose of regulating and directing traffic upon the public street and as a means of precaution and safety to the public in the ordinary and proper use of the street; and there was no evidence, as we have stated, showing the width of the streets at that point in question, nor was there any tending to show that there was not ample accommodation of the ordinary traffic upon the street. This being so, we are of the opinion

that the issue of negligence tendered by the special issue was not raised. Municipalities must, of necessity, be permitted reasonable latitude in the exercise of their police powers, one of which is the power to prescribe and enforce such rules and means touching the control and regulation of traffic upon their public streets as in the judgment of the municipal authorities are reasonable, calculated to advance and protect the interests and welfare of the public in the proper use of the streets.

"It is true that municipalities are required to use ordinary care in the construction and maintenance of their public streets, to the end that the public in making ordinary use of the streets may not be exposed to dangers that the municipality may obviate by the use of such care, but they are not required to use any higher degree of care, nor to anticipate or foresee dangers that are not threatened to those making proper and ordinary use of the streets."

City Permitting Wooden Awnings Over Sidewalks Must Supervise Them to Avoid Accidents to Pedestrians

Affirming judgment in favor of plaintiff on account of injury sustained on a public sidewalk through collapse of a wooden awning when a support was pulled out by a horse hitched to it, the Florida Supreme Court said in the case of Hawes vs. City of Tallahassee, 87 Southern Reporter, 765:

"The defendant's duty was to take due care that the awning and the posts supporting it were so constructed and maintained that in their ordinary, usual, or customary uses they would not injure pedestrians properly passing along the sidewalk. The defendant's liability in damages covers injuries caused in the ordinary, usual, or customary use of the posts supporting the awnings, where such injuries reasonably may have been contemplated as a proximate result of negligence in the erection and maintenance of the awning and posts on or over the sidewalk, whether such result was actually contemplated or not."

City May Not Maintain a Sewage Disposal Plant Constituting a Nuisance

From the opinion of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in the case of City of Pittsburg vs. Smith, 230 Southwestern Reporter, 1113, we quote:

"Can a municipal corporation be enjoined, as here, from maintaining and operating a sewage disposal plant or tank too small to accommodate the number of water-closets connected with it, as pleaded by the plaintiff? We think the question must be answered in the affirmative. In operating a sewer the city exercised a corporate power, as distinguished from a governmental function. Therefore the fact that the public uses the sewer is not legally sufficient to exempt the city from restraint against committing a nuisance in the manner and mode of operation of the sewer."

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