quotas called for were, in all probability, substantially filled, but after January of that year, many were never fully answered. With one or two exceptions and excluding men for the Continental line, the militia officers were, up to that date, directed to enlist the men; later they were directed to enlist or draft; and in the last years of the struggle were ordered peremptorily to draft or detach, which is the same thing. In truth the men were beginning to weary of the war. The calls for soldiers came every month, sometimes three or four in a month. Usually the demand was for voluntary enlistment but after the beginning of 1777 a threat of conscription was attached to the call accompanied by heavy penalties, not only upon men disobeying but also upon officers, civil authorities, and towns for neglect or refusal to carry out the law. The effect of all this was discouraging. By 1778 most of the men had had a taste of military service, and many of them did not like it.. Large numbers of the militia were men of mature years, owning farms and having dependent families. The calls often came in the busiest season, planting or harvesting time, when their presence at home was absolutely necessary to keep their wives and children from want.

One

of General Stark's most trusted officers and one who commanded the escort of the Burgoyne prisoners to Boston, was obliged to go without leave to New Hampshire to save his crops. He states in his excuse to the authorities that his family was then sick; that his fields lay exposed to ruin; and that it was impossible to hire a person capable of taking care of his sick family and crops, though he used his utmost endeavor so to do. This is probably a fair statement of the situation with many of the men called to service. The laws, especially those relating to the recruiting of the eighty-eight bat

talions, were very severe. Every man drafted had to go or furnish a substitute within twenty-four hours, or pay a penalty of ten pounds or more. These harsh terms did not increase the popularity of the service.

Under all these conditions men were slow to enlist and if they did so, it was to avoid conscription. When their terms were out they insisted on immediate discharge, regardless of what the military situation was at the time. "I have had my term," the man would say. "I have fought bravely. Let my neighbor do likewise." Perhaps the neighbor, from patriotic motives and anxious for a chance to fight the enemy, enlisted, but the battle he enlisted to fight did not come off in a month, two months, or three months. His ardor cooled; he grew homesick to see his wife and children. Then he would be sent to the hospital. From this the road to desertion was broad and straight, and he often took it.

Washington repeatedly urged upon Congress the futility of relying on the militia. "The soldier being told of the greatness of the cause he was engaged in replied that it was of no more importance to him than to others; that his pay would not support him and he could not ruin himself and his family." "Men," Washington continued, “just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, were not accustomed to the din of arms and every kind of military skill. When opposed by veteran troops they were ready to fly from their own shadows. The soldier's change in manner of living and lodging brought sickness to many, and impatience to all, and such unconquerable desires as to produce shameful and scandalous desertion among themselves, that inspired the same spirit in others. Men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control, cannot stand the restraint necessary to good disci

pline. If I were called upon to declare on oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or most harmful, I should subscribe to the latter."

In

And then too, both militia officers and the Selectmen and Committees of towns were not only slow but negligent in filling the calls. The State passed Statutes remonstrating with them, and demanding that they complete their quotas forthwith. some cases heavy penalties were imposed upon towns and officers if they neglected to fill their call within a certain date, and fines were assessed upon them for each soldier deficient in the number required to fill the quota. Desertion was a terrible evil and the army suffered severely on account of it. The militia would sometimes march off home in squads and companies without leave or license.

The currency condition intensified the difficulty. The pay of the soldiers was originally fixed in 1775 and 1776 when paper money was on a par with silver. In January. 1777, it took one and one-fourth in bills to equal one in silver. January, 1778, the ratio was four to one. It steadily declined till 1780, when for a few months, it stood sixty to one, and in November of the same year, one hundred to one. In May, 1781, the currency had become entirely worthless and ceased to circulate. It is hard now to imagine the chaos which ensued and the dissatisfaction, varying from bitter remonstrance to open mutiny, which this bred in the army. Men who had early enlisted into the Continental line, in the earlier years of the war deserted in numbers; went home and re-enlisted on the quota of some other town for the sake of the large bounties offered. From the close of 1778, the men were virtually serving without pay and all the while as they well knew, their families were in danger of destitution. They

were

compelled to to run heavily in debt. The State struggled with the problem the best it was able, but could not afford much relief. Things eventually came to such a condition in consequence, that open riots and blood-shed occurred in New Hampshire; and in Massachusetts the troubles developed into Shay's rebellion.

During the last years of the war it will be observed the State heavily increased the pay and bounties offered the men. While in part, this was due to the depreciation of the currency, still in part the increase was offered to stimulate enlistments; yet it failed to bring the hoped-for results, and did not attract men to the army. These things, well known to everyone familiar with the history of the war, bring into clear relief the defects of the militia system as a method to fight a great war.

The weakness of the militia as a fighting force, hardly needs restating. It will fight bravely behind breastworks. General Putnam said of it at Bunker Hill that "the Americans are not afraid of their heads but only think of their legs." It will also stand for a time against an enemy in front, but it cannot be depended upon under a flank or rear movement of the enemy. When it breaks it generally throws away its arms and accoutrements and cannot be relied upon to take further part in the action. While a well disciplined regiment will often break under a prolonged or overwhelming front fire, or by an attack upon its flank or rear, yet it can be rallied again and brought back into the battle; its organization is never lost. This was demonstrated on many fields during the Revolutionary and the Civil wars. At Bunker Hill, Saratoga and Bennington the militia fought creditably, but it was either behind breastworks or the foe was in front of it. Yet at Camden

and in many other battles it broke at the first fire and was not again an effective force on that field.

Why the colonies should have continued to employ such a feeble instrument is not far to seek. The dread of a standing army was ingrained in the very nature of the people. They not only feared it, but would not adopt any policy which looked towards its establishment. The Continental Congress had no authority over the States. Each colony was not only independent but jealous of it. While Congress could recommend and express a desire, the States would fill their quota in their own way and on terms of pay and length of service to suit their own convenience. The men of the Continental line which was enlisted for three years or the war, were the backbone of the army and Washington's main support throughout the conflict. It was the staying force in every battle, and always gave a good account of itself. It fought the veteran soldiers of England as bravely as men could, and showed all the courage and stubborn qualities of the best American troops, exemplified so many times in the battles of the Civil war, and in the recent struggle in France.

In the Civil war the main reliance for the first year and a half was on the volunteer system, but after the autumn of 1862, when patriotic enthusiasm had somewhat cooled, it was found necessary that a resort should be had to some other method. The Conscription Act of that year was designed to supplement the volunteer policy As a matter of fact, while it was vigorously enforced in the summer of 1863, in later years it was little employed. When calls for men were issued and the quotas assigned to the different towns, were hired to fill the quotas. Citizens, both those liable.

men

to draft and many also beyond military age, would engage a substitute to take their places in the army. If there was still a deficiency the towns would hire men enough to complete their quotas, so that conscription was not necessary. The men hired by the citizens were often from the vicinity, but usually were obtained through bounty brokers. The towns generally went to these brokers for recruits. These so furnished were the very scum and off-scourings of our large cities. The brokers would hire them for what they were. willing to accept, and the brokers got the bounty offered by the National Government, by the State and by the town. The substitutes themselves were professional bounty jumpers and usually deserted at the first opportunity. As soon as they could get away, they would go to some other town, enlist under another name, and so continue to do as long as they could find brokers to hire them, until the war closed. Very few of them ever did any military duty, and the custom was the great scandal and disgrace of the war. It was not so during the Revolution because that class of men did not exist; and while during the last years of the conflict the towns filled their quotas by hiring recruits, they were men from the vicinity, and were as good material for soldiers as could be found. The experience of the United States in the three great wars in which it has taken part, has justified the policy adopted in the World war of raising men by draft under a well-considered and carefully guarded conscription act. It is the most equitable and most democratic method to fill the armies of a Republic. It is very unlikely that in any future war the country will raise its armies by any other method.