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WHAT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
CAN DO

HE words spoken, on May 19, on the Capitoline Hill in Rome, in the historic Campidoglio, by Signor Tommaso Tittoni, president of the Council of the League of Nations, voice an aspiration which we may hope is not a vain one. At the outset he sounded the keynote of his theme:

From this sacred hill up which in Roman times ascended those to whom the honor of a triumph had been decreed, amid the plaudits of the people, and followed by a cortege of fettered prisoners and the trophies of conquered nations, there are uttered to-day words of peace and of the brotherhood of nations. Never perhaps has the demand for peace and justice been more powerfully made than at the present time, after a war which has destroyed so many lives and so much wealth; which has enriched certain nations and impoverished others; which has distributed unequally burdens and advantages among the countries, and which has intensified in the popular heart the sense of the inequalities and the social conflicts that have profoundly disturbed the economic fabric. We shall learn in time whether our work will prove as fruitful as many hope, or as sterile as others fear. Certainly it is undertaken at an opportune moment, and there has never been a higher, a more apostolic, or a nobler mission than ours.

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The speaker asserted that international arbitration was practical for the first time in modern history among the free Italian communities, as early as the dawn of the Renaissance, and he recognized in Alberico Gentile (1552-1608) the precursor of the doctrine of international law, and international law has for a prerequisite a league of nations.

Signor Tittoni admitted that the early sessions of the Council could only serve as an indication of what would be accomplished later on. In the same degree as the sphere of work became enlarged, the guarantees of peace would be strengthened; indeed, this would be a natural result of the progressive elimination of exclusively national antagonisms in the performance of the common task. He believes that the doubts regarding the success of the League, doubts arising from the suspicions born of past conflicts, will die out, just as will the opposition of militarists and imperialists, sometimes openly expressed, at other times hypocritically insinuated. The same will be true of the germs of future wars contained in the recent peace treaties, of the selfishness in the economic field on the the part of the richest nations, and of the

justifiable anxiety on the part of nations lacking raw materials, and which must be dependent on countries having a monopoly of such materials.

The basic idea of the League of Nations. is substantially the same as that which inspired The Hague conference and governed the development of its activity. This relationship of the League to the older Conference was affirmed by M. Léon Bourgeois during the preparation of the Treaty of Versailles; but what distinguishes the League from all other similar agreements that have preceded it, is the complexity and the variety of the aims it is expected to realize. Up to this time the almost exclusive object has been the avoidance of armed conflicts, by offering to the nations a means of solving all kinds of disputes peacefully and in a spirit of justice. To-day, however, more than this is attempted, an effort is to be made to organize among all civilized states the degree of coöperation needed for the attainment of certain common ends, for the increase of the common prosperity by bringing them into a kind of corporate unity.

In the political field, taking into account the universal condemnation of secret diplomacy by international public opinion, an effort has been made to protect the peoples against being pledged to any court or policy without their knowledge. To this end all the states belonging to the new federation are to register before the League all treaties entered into by them. Any treaty which has not been so registered will not be recognized, and its clauses will be denied support.

In the economic field, the League has determined a course of proceedings for the coming financial conference at Brussels. This action demonstrates to all the spirit of intimate union and international agreement which it proposed to display at this conference. The proposed plan clearly indicates the right way to overcome the world's economic crisis, namely, by common action. Finally, in the field of sociology, individuality has been given to an institution closely attached to the League, the International Bureau of Labor, in which sit representatives of the governments, of the capitalists, and of the workingmen, and to which have adhered the great industrial associations and the great labor confederations of the leading states.

SWITZERLAND JOINS THE LEAGUE

N the Paris Correspondant (Paris) of June 10, pp. 916-934, is a full and illuminating account of the process by which Switzerland has finally determined her entrance into the League of Nations. To our own coincident action-or rather, inactionthere is little direct allusion. The Swiss originally proposed to wait until at least the five great powers who won the war had first signed the compact of peace. The accession even of Japan being early put beyond doubt, this was generally dubbed "the American clause." Later, however, it was effectively argued that "Switzerland, an European state, had no concern with the Monroe Doctrine, by the terms of which the United States disclaimed all interest in the affairs of Europe." But even when we are not named, Greater Americans will find food for earnest thought on every page.

Thus an obstacle that might have been fatal was the prospect of required military intervention, shared by the Swiss, outside their mountain borders. Since 1815, especially, the inviolable character of their land, their secure neutrality, has been assured by all the European powers. The inconsistency seemed glaring. The difficulty was frankly laid by the Swiss envoys before the Council of the Society of Nations in London last February. The assurance was promptly given that no foreign troops will ever cross the Swiss borders, nor will the Swiss themselves be asked to join in any military action outside them. All laws passed by the Swiss Congress are subject to popular referendum. Treaties

are not so included, but an initiative has been recently approved, and will doubtless presently be valid, requiring the vote of the whole people on any such pact affecting their interests for a period longer than fifteen years. Furthermore, as a defense for the rights of the lesser states, constitutional changes require the endorsement by popular vote in a majority of the twenty-five cantons. Though it was finally decided not to incorporate the league membership formally in the constitution itself, it was felt to be requisite that so vital a change should receive both forms of ratification. This proviso made the recent popular vote a most critical and perilous incident in Helvetian history.

The League came into actual existence when four of the chief powers formally accepted its terms, on January 10, last. Neutral powers, to count as "original" members,

must have requested admission within two months thereafter. But since the plebiscite could not be held so hastily and in winter, the application of the Swiss Government itself was accepted as valid, in case the referendum should eventually prove favorable.

The result was doubtful to the last. Apart from the lesser areas where Italian or French is spoken, the major portion of the Alpine republic is German in stock, language, commercial relations and, naturally, also in its sympathies. It was possible for many in that section to believe that their French-speaking compatriots were altogether too enamored of a covert scheme for world empire, devised and centered in Paris. Even now it is regarded, by the essayist at least, as a grave error that the choice of Geneva as the permanent seat of the League is again questioned.

Two other special circumstances worked against approval. Despite Pope Benedict's own warm commendation, some two-fifths of the 160,000 Catholics disavowed the League as a covenant "largely devised by Masons, with no representation accorded to the Holy See." And the leaders of the Socialist Party promptly enjoined on their followers a vigorous opposition to a world-state which might in each and every land delay, or even block permanently, their own anti-capitalistic revolution. Even the single-handed and panicky seizure of Frankfort by the French was adverse. Tens of thousands of Conservatives, chiefly in Teutonic Helvetia, who vacillated from day to day and finally voted No, might have swelled the majority had the order of evacuation been published in the week before instead of a few days after the vote on the referendum.

The favoring majority was above 90,000 in a vote of nearly 740,000-decisive, therefore, but by no means overwhelming. Furthermore, Teutonic Switzerland, with about three-fourths of the total voting force, gave an adverse majority of 40,000. The scale was more than turned, to be sure, by the Romance cantons (French, Italian, and Rumansh), where the approving votes. about six to one.

The result has been loyally accepted by practically all except the more violent So cialists. But the vote by cantons was car ried by the least possible majority, of 13 t 12. There must have been several of th former in which a very few votes woul have turned the scale. That might hav

produced a crisis threatening civil war, or actual disruption of the long-lived Alpine democratic state. It seems to illustrate the endless perils in keeping alive any lesser sovereignty, within the national unity, capable of making any citizen question which is his true and vital allegiance and patriotic duty.

The closing paragraph is especially satisfying, if it comes from a Frenchman's pen:

Switzerland, which was the birthplace of the Red Cross, has succeeded for generations, despite many obstacles, in realizing, among peoples diverse in race, language and religion, a Society of Nations in miniature, and seems to us admirably suited, morally and politically, to shelter the complex and delicate international organism from which we expect the higher justice among men and among governments. In no land could there be found traditions, usages, and ideas better suited to the ideals of the signatories to the Pact of Versailles.

THE FRENCH CLAIM TO REPARATION

A

RTICLES published in the Round Table undertake to describe conditions in France and Germany as seen by authoritative correspondents in each country. The French correspondent summarizes the arguments used in support of France's claim to come first in the payment of the German indemnities. It is represented that 1,350,000 French soldiers were killed during the war, 400,000 others were permanently maimed or injured, and another 200,000 were partially disabled. A statistical comparison shows that whereas America lost one in every 2000 of her population, Italy one in 79, and the British Empire one in 66, France lost one in every 28.

According to this writer, the question now is not who won the war, but whose wounds are the deepest. In France the small landowners and peasants had to bear a disproportionate share of war losses. Since France depends primarily on agriculture for her prosperity, her stable industry was severely crippled by loss of labor. But in other industries than farming the shortage, not only of labor, but of raw materials, continues after the war:

For the revival of industries cheap coal and iron are essential. Our deficit of coal is, however, at present between 45,000,000 and 50,000,000 tons, as compared with 24,000,000 tons before the war. For want of coal most of our industries, and among them our metallurgical industries, are today producing only one-third of their normal capacity. German iron and steel works, on the other hand, are producing about two-thirds of theirs. For want of coal it is impossible to export steel. Even our internal needs cannot be

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A third and worse difficulty is the shortage of merchant shipping. We were unable to build ships during the war. We know that England lost 7,759,000 tons gross as against 900,000 tons lost by us, but proportionately our losses were the higher of the two, being 34.52 per cent., as against 30.56 per cent. of the total shipping of the country. Japan and the United States, it must be remembered, have doubled, or more than doubled, their tonnage during the war, and Great Britain has facilities for building quickly, which we do not possess. Only 24 per cent. of our trade at present sails under our own flag, whereas Japan carries 46 per cent. of hers, and Great Britain more than 60 per cent. of hers.

The German correspondent, on his part, paints a picture of economic ruin hardly less effective.

The paying of the first 20,000,000,000 marks in gold is depriving Germany of her ships, her cables, her assets in the Allied countries and the assets due to her from her former allies. All this is private property and is the working capital of German business men and of German corporations. They have to be compensated by the government. A sum of 20,000,000 marks gold is worth at least 200,000,000,000 marks paper. It cannot be raised from taxation; it must be met by the contraction of a new debt, which will very nearly double the public debt. Each German man, woman, or child would then be responsible for a debt of at least 6000 marks per head.

Germany can only be made solvent if she can work at top speed. She can only do so if her people are fed, if her factories are started. Credit, not in cash, but in food or in raw materials, is what is wanted. She must be able to use her coal for herself and for the Allies. Her people must not be irritated continually, and her government must not be held up to ignominy.

Yet there are signs of recovery, in spite of the wear and tear that German industries suffered during the war. The financial situation, however, could hardly be worse. Inflation of the currency is unavoidable in Germany as long as the deficit in the budget cannot be met.

A "LOST" PORTRAIT OF LINCOLN

B. M. Feldman

A NEWLY DISCOVERED PORTRAIT OF LINCOLN BY AN UNKNOWN ARTIST

N UNUSUAL and extremely interest

Α
Aing contribution to

ing contribution to the annals of American art appears in the June number of the International Studio (New York) in the form of an article by Samuel McCoy on the discovery of a hitherto unknown portrait of Abraham Lincoln, painted during Lincoln's lifetime. This work is an oil painting, twenty-five by thirty inches in size, which was rescued several years ago from a pile of supposedly worthless furniture taken from the old Red Lion Inn in Philadelphia.

Mr. McCoy relates for the first time the complete story of the finding of this portrait. Passing over details, it is sufficient for our present purpose to note that the painting was removed from the attic of the old inn about twenty years ago. It was hung on the wall of a private house in Philadelphia, where a young Philadelphia painter, Baruch M. Feldman, happened upon it in January, 1917. Mr. Feldman purchased the painting, and at once set about its restoration or, it may be said, reclamation. He was an adept at such work, and in course of time, after layer upon layer of varnish and dirt had been removed, the portrait stood out, clear and well-defined in all its features. But now that we have the portrait in its original form, what do we now of its history? Mr. McCoy says:

Complete mystery surrounds the portrait, in spite of indefatigable efforts, extending over the past two years, by its new owner, to ascertain its exact history. Authorities on historic American portraits and artists who have seen it are agreed that the canvas was painted during Lincoln's lifetime and that Lincoln sat for the portrait. But the exact date of the portrait; who painted it; who was the first owner-all these things stubbornly refuse to be disclosed.

Connoisseurs who have viewed the canvas are equally positive that it is the work of no "journeyman" painter. It is painted with a breadth and power which would lift it into the field of noteworthy portraits, even if it were not a portrait of so great a statesman.

The portrait is of the head and bust of Lincoln, the head turned three-quarters toward the spectator. Lincoln is-shown wearing a beard; the portrait, therefore, cannot antedate his Presidency, because he wore no beard up to 1861.

The hair and beard are very dark, almost black-and far more luxurious than as shown in any photograph of Lincoln-and their rich coloring sets off the flesh-color of the face as in a cameo. The chair in which Lincoln is seated is upholstered in crimson, setting off the sombre blackness of his coat, and, in turn, the whiteness of his shirt-bosom. The rich lustrous blackness of his hair and beard is treated like a silhouette, against the background of olive. This treatment is one of the characteristics of the portrait. The unknown artist seems to have made of the dark tumbled mass an arabesque, so to speak.

The distinguished feeling of the portrait is that of great dignity. Though it may be an idealized portrait-the heavily massed hair, thicker than in life, hints that such may be the case-it is by no means "sugary." Strikingly, the portrait retains the virility of Lincoln's head.

Artists who have seen the painting are agreed that the character of the picture is such that the suggestion that it might have been painted from a photograph is rendered absurd. It is wholly free, triumphantly free, from any trace of the spiritless presentation that results from the copying of a photograph. Here the general lines of the design, the robust modeling of the contours in shadow, the construction, the intimate characterization, the delicate half-tones in light, the pervading melancholy of the eyes, all tend to convince anyone who looks at the portrait that it is Lincoln: the Lincoln that guided a nation through its greatest anguish.

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And still-who painted this "lost" Lincoln ? There is no answer. The portrait's profound dignity, its gentle yet firm look, its tenderness and its melancholy, its deep inscrutable eyes— these are as baffling as the smile of the Mona

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THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE-FOR AND AGAINST

THE

HE question of the renewal of the treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan is the subject of two important articles in the London Review of Reviews. The treaty now in existence was signed in July, 1911, its duration being fixed for a period of ten years from that date, and under the terms of the treaty either party to it is obliged to give a year's notice to the other of its intention either to renew or to terminate it.

It is admitted that there is strong opposition within the British Empire to the renewal of the treaty. But Professor J. H. Longford is convinced that there are positive advantages in such a renewal which far outweigh the objections. These are some of the continued benefits to Great Britain as he sees them:

She can continue to be satisfied with the skeleton fleet that now displays her flag in the Eastern Seas, and with the attenuated garrisons that are sufficient for the policing of her great and wealthy colonies at Hong Kong and Singapore, secure in the thought that the preservation of every direct material interest that she has in the Far Eastmilitary, political, and commercial-will be amply guaranteed. The peace and security of her Australian dominions and the tranquillity of India will be equally free from a threatening cloud that otherwise will ever be shadowing them. Militarism may be curtailed both at home and abroad. Valuable markets will continue to be found, enormously developed by peace and good government, in China for the products of Manchester and Sheffield, and the freedom of the China Seas will be maintained.

If the renewal fails, Japan can still pursue her policy of annexation in China, unhampered by the obligation of previous reference to Great Britain, and what can be done to prevent her? What power on earth will undertake a war with her for the mere sake of securing commercial potentialities? Certainly not Great Britain, warworn, financially exhausted, with her army already scrapped and her navy in process of scrapping.

Professor Longford argues that if Japan is not an ally of Britain, she may become a powerful enemy.

The case against the alliance is stated for the Review of Reviews by the Hon. Ernest G. Theodore, Premier of Queensland. The Australian point of view, as this gentleman. sets it forth, is wholly independent of the policy generally accepted in England herself. In dealing with Japan's present position in the Pacific, Mr. Theodore does not mince words. He says:

That a real menace to Australia from Japan does exist is no figment of the imagination, and the Land of the Southern Cross should accord

ingly be left unhampered by treaty obligations, be they never so alluring, particularly after her experience of Japan in the war.

The story of Japan's faithfulness to the Allies during hostilities has been praised from every platform in the country; but who has put the other side of the case, or told of the quid pro quo which she demanded; or, worse still, of her actual ultimatum to Australia, while the war was still in progress? This is a side of the story which history will tell more fully than can be stated at the present time.

Thousands of Japanese have gone to the mines of New Caledonia, but though assurance has been given that they are peaceful artisans, they are also reservists, veterans of the Manchurian War. New Caledonia is only two days' steam from the coast of Queensland, sparsely populated, but with rich resources, and with a climate congenial to the Asiatic. And, rightly or wrongly, the Australian people have felt that the Japanese penetration of the Pacific islands is a potential danger to the safety of their shores, a feeling that has not been removed by the Japanese mandate over certain of the islands of the Pacific, nor by the rumors of Japan's fortification of those islands.

The fact is that Japan possesses easy, comfortable stepping-stones from Tokio to Thursday Island, the northern gateway to Queensland, and the Achilles heel of Australia.

If the commonwealth cherishes one idea and emphasizes one sentiment more than another, it is the policy of a White Australia, a policy which has become a national institution and the accepted slogan of the Australian people. All parties are united on this point. For racial, economic, and industrial reasons Australia cannot tolerate a large immigration of cheap labor which would tend to lower the standard of living and produce a hybrid race. This would not be fair to the Australians, nor to the Japanese, nor, for that matter, to the world. Accordingly, the immigration of colored races into the country is prohibited, but under the alliance it is impossible to discriminate against Japanese nationals, and therefore anti-Asiatic legislation can only be made effective by a roundabout dictation test.

The democratic sentiment of Australia, too, has been outraged by the sense of injustice in Japan's treatment of China. Can Britain righteously renew a treaty that admits of a policy of spoliation of a defenseless people like the Chinese?

And finally my recent visit to America has convinced me of the fact that a lot of the regrettable misunderstanding between this country and the United States is due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The treaty will never be understood by our cousins across the Atlantic, who, with a weather eye to Japan, have adopted the maxim of "trusting in God and keeping their powder dry."

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