operations were understood, the military intelligence task-organized its collection, analysis and production to respond. The U.S. or the UN developed the mechanisms to process the information. However, more serious problems have emerged, related to the sometimes obscure missions defined by Security Council mandates. The inherent contradiction between humanitarian assistance and intervention is reflected in the need to define the intelligence mission as overt and impartial fact finding, whereas obtaining intelligence on the intentions of hostile parties whose interests are threatened by a coalition or by a UN mission call for more traditional intelligence methods. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR PEACE OPERATIONS Robert J. Allen [A]ny form of covert intelligence is liable to create prejudice and suspicion.... The UN has therefore resolutely refused to countenance intelligence systems as a part of its peacekeeping operations; intelligence, having covert connections, is a dirty word (IPA b: 39). I was also upset that I had to get my intelligence from the BBC. The UN was still following its outdated rules that precluded our even saying the word "intelligence," let alone producing it. Here we were, almost 300 kilometers from the nearest semi-secure border, and we scarcely had the foggiest notion what was going on around us (MacKenzie: 284-285). INTRODUCTION Overt intelligence collection operations that peacekeepers conduct have been cloaked in the guise of "public information" efforts, "civil affairs," and "military observer" duties (Berdal b: 44). “Military information gathering" and "military information officers" (MIOS) have served as non-provocative labels for collection and collectors of overt intelligence. MIOS in traditional peacekeeping operations have relied upon reports from non-threatening sources such as observation posts, patrols, visual sightings, UN Military Observers, conversations with local parties, host governments, the media, and, in some cases, aerial reconnaissance for intelligence reporting. Observer duties include investigating cease-fire violations, conducting liaison visits to military formations, monitoring military forces, maintaining an accurate order of battle, and visiting forward positions to report on the disposition of forces. Reporting Peacekeeping forces in the field and UN Military Observers are regarded as the best source of tactical intelligence reporting by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It is viewed as the MIO's responsibility to compile information summaries to support UN Headquarters (IPA b: 60). MIOS in the field produce two types of reports: Information Reports (INREPS) and Information Summaries (INFSUMs). INREPS contain operational information that requires immediate attention while INFSUMS support trend analysis and are produced on a weekly basis. Intelligence contained in the INREP is included in the Force Commander's daily Situation Report which is seen along with the weekly INFSUMs by subordinate units and UN Headquarters. Expanding Support Requirements A change in the operational environment of post-Cold War peace operations is prompting recognition within the UN that an intelligence collection and analysis capability in the field and at the Secretariat (at least within the DPKO) is a necessity (Best: 12). Peace missions within the context of civil wars where "peacekeepers" do not enjoy the consent of all the concerned parties or are outgunned by belligerents, at a minimum demand an intelligence collection and processing capability for the safety and security of troops. The wide scope of activities conducted in peace operations produces a number of requirements for information critical to mission success. At the Secretariat, information is required to implement the Agenda for Peace, monitor and assess current peace operations, provide a strategic outlook for deployed peacekeepers, and predict and plan future operations. Field Collection Requirements Traditional peacekeeping operations between states required information concerning adjustment to belligerent deployments, changes in belligerent military strength, preparation of defensive positions, location and types of minefields, changes in order of battle and equipment, changes in civilian behavior, changes in attitudes of the belligerent parties, and imposition of restrictions upon force movement ("Army-Air Force": 56). Multicomponent operations and those in peace enforcement or quasi-combat situations have added further to these intelligence requirements. Verification of combatant demobilization and disarmament was necessary in Nicaragua (ONUCA), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Angola (UNAVEM II), and Mozambique (UNOMOZ). Location, inventory, and tracking of heavy weapons. were intelligence taskings in Croatia, Bosnia (UNPROFOR and NATO artillery exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde in 1994) and Somalia (UNOSOM II). UNPROFOR Sarajevo Sector Commander Major General Lewis MacKenzie felt "Sarajevo cried out for things like satellite imagery and counter-battery radar" to monitor cease-fire violations (Saracino: 370). Detection of arms caches and the cross-border movements of insurgents were intelligence problems confronted by UN peacekeepers in Cambodia (UNTAC). UN troops taking part in the preventive deployment to Macedonia have sanctions monitoring as one of their duties. Indications and Warning: The Human Factor Early warning of hostile action has become a paramount concern to forces deployed in de facto peace enforcement situations such as Bosnia (UNPROFOR) or Somalia (UNOSOM II). Discerning intentions is the key to avoiding casualties in civil war scenarios where conventional military forces and their attendant indicators of impending action are absent. The importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) in meeting this requirement cannot be over-emphasized. Richard Best, a national defense analyst with the Congressional Research Service, explains why human resources intelligence plays such a critical role in peace operations: Peacekeeping depends upon at least tacit support from the local population; perceiving shifts in local public opinion from support to disinterest or outright hostility can be a matter of fundamental importance to a peacekeeping mission . . . [T]here may also be armed elements determined to frustrate the peacekeeping effort and foreknowledge of their capabilities and intentions can save lives. Intelligence officers assessing subtle changes in public opinion and the goals of dissident groups will probably depend as much upon human agents as ... sophisticated technological capabilities (Best: 1). Non-military Intelligence Requirements UN peacekeeping officials point out that many intelligence requirements of peace operations, like the operations themselves, are not military in nature. The military intelligence requirements derive from the need for a military component to facilitate and coordinate the other processes in the peace missions, such as political, diplomatic, humanitarian and economic elements. The breakdown of the Angolan (UNAVEM II) peace process illustrates the value (by its absence) of this military intelligence mission of coordination. In Angola, the UN proceeded with elections before confirming that insurgents were completely disarmed and demobilized. In contrast, the UN waited to administer elections in Mozambique until verifying the disarmament of insurgents. "A knowledge of local geography and economic infrastructure, the politics of the region, social and economic factors, and religious traditions will often be more important than the order of battle" for peace operations (Best: 3). Field operations therefore may require information on topics as diverse as political parties, belligerent negotiating positions, terrain, refugees, prices, roads, health, and customs for their success. SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS Assessment and Analysis Intelligence requirements of the Secretariat to support policy are generally much less detailed than those in the field. The Secretariat's peace support activities are primarily concerned with mediation, anticipation and resolution of conflicts. An Agenda for Peace outlines some of the requirements associated with these tasks: Preventive diplomacy necessitates "timely and accurate knowledge of the facts" and "an understanding of developments and global trends, based on sound analysis." Early warning of threats to peace is expected to be gained by a synthesis of political indicators with information supplied by the UN's existing network of early warning resources. This network warns of environmental threats, nuclear accidents, natural disasters, mass human migrations, famine and disease. This will permit preventive diplomacy and peacemaking to be applied to the disputes (Boutros-Ghali a: 7). An independent intelligence assessment and analysis capability is required at the Secretariat if it is to fulfill its preventive diplomacy and peacemaking roles. Currently, the UN can be forced to action by media. coverage of a crisis or through manipulation by belligerent parties. Media attention can precipitate UN action where more sober analysis would argue for non-intervention - Somalia and Rwanda are examples. Media attention can place a situation in global context: otherwise conflicts as vicious as Bosnia and Somalia might not have qualified for UN intervention. An |