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OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

William S. Brei

Captain U.S. Air Force
July 1993

THE GENESIS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Four days before President Bush told a special 6 March 1991 joint session of Congress that "The war is over," another war in Iraq began (Bush d: 149). This new war consisted of Shi'a and Kurdish uprisings in response to Bush's repeated calls over the Voice of Free Iraq "for the people of Iraq to force Saddam Hussein to step aside" (Mortimer: 3). The Shi'a engaged Republican Guard forces and fought street-by-street in Basra and other southern Iraqi cities. Along Iraq's northern frontier, the Kurds rose up against 60,000 government troops and seized control of several cities and the northern oil production center of Kirkuk.

The Bush administration reacted to the sudden rebellion with ambivalence. Although Bush clearly wanted to see Saddam Hussein overthrown, he "was banking on the military or Baath leaders to pull [Saddam] out of power," according to an unidentified National Security Council (NSC) official (Robbins and others: 19). Indeed, another NSC official declared that "Our policy is to get rid of Saddam, not his regime” (Mylroie: 15).

President Bush was openly unsure of the manner in which to proceed. He waited until 13 March, two weeks after the start of the rebellion, to warn Saddam against using helicopters to deliver chemical weapons against the rebels. His next signals, moreover, were mixed. On 14 and 24 March, U.S. "heavy-armor units reoccupied positions deep in southern Iraq in what the U.S. press viewed as an effort to increase pressure on Saddam Hussein" (Mylroie: 17). Once in place, these soldiers witnessed Iraqi helicopters firing on Shi'a civilians with phosphorous rockets and

napalm bombs, and pleaded for permission to shoot down the helicopters - yet were ordered to hold their fire (Waller: 25). On 20 and 22 March, however, U.S. Air Force F-15C fighters shot down two Iraqi SU-22 fighters. U.S. military officials justified this action by declaring that Iraq's use of fixed-wing military planes posed a threat to coalition forces in the region and violated the provisional cease-fire. The Iraqi jets, however, were intercepted in the vicinity of the Kurdish city of Kirkuk, over 250 miles from the nearest U.S. or coalition forces (Robbins and others: 18).

On 26 March President Bush declared the U.S. would not act to support or protect rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Iraq. Two days after this announcement, the Iraqi Army launched a “major attack” against the Kurds and indiscriminately used armored and helicopter forces to destroy Kurdish cities, block-by-block (Budiansky: 27). The rebellion ended as millions of terrified Kurds fled before the onslaught.

On 26 March, President Bush called a meeting of his top advisors to formulate policy options. With the President as the chair, this group consisted of Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Jim Baker, White House Chief Of Staff John Sununu, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, and General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Waller: 16). General Norman Schwarzkopf, according to one press report, also contributed to this forum (Budiansky: 28). The participants discussed U.S. options regarding the rebellion in context of the two main objectives of the Operation DESERT STORM cease-fire: the preservation of an Iraq that would not threaten its neighbors, yet could defend itself from Iran; and Iraq's compliance with the United Nations cease-fire resolutions, especially those concerning the destruction of their weapons of mass destruction (Budiansky: 30).

President Bush debated the option of placing a ban on Iraq's use of helicopters, finally making the decision for non-intervention fully anticipating what would happen to the Kurds.

Ambiguity existed over whether the U.S. would shoot down Iraqi helicopters, as it had shot down fixed-wing aircraft that were flying in violation of the provisional cease-fire. When the administration announced on 26 March that the helicopters would not be touched,

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the Kurds became the first victims of Saddam's retaliation. Turkish President Turgut Ozal called the clarification a "big help to Saddam." And it was. With Iraqi gunships bearing down, firing phosphorous and napalm, the Kurds fled (Mylroie: 11).

As an unidentified administration official said after Bush's announcement to not interfere, "It is a somewhat painful acceptance of a certain reality. You manage it in as low-key a way as possible and hope you get through"

(Mylroie: 17). President Bush probably knew that doing nothing was going to raise a storm of protest. He also knew that the rebels did not have a hope of beating Saddam Hussein's Army. Bush wanted to see a military coup, and he believed, perhaps, that the rebellion was actually strengthening Saddam by forcing his defeated forces to reunite (Mylroie: 17).

As the televised images of dying Kurds drew increasing media focus toward and criticism of his non-intervention policy, President Bush reiterated his conviction that military intervention was beyond the United Nations mandate and that he did "not want to... get sucked into the internal civil war" (Bush e: 382). When asked why the U.S. permitted Iraq to use attack helicopters against the rebels in violation of the informal ceasefire, Bush replied:

I don't know whether technically, . . . it's in violation or not. It is in the fixed-wing planes to fly, but if it is a violation, that doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to commit our young men and our young women into further combat [sic] (Bush e: 382).

This statement came five days after the 26 March policy meeting, and Bush's response indicates that this issue had not been clarified before, during, or after that forum. Since Bush was in the position to dictate cease-fire terms, his statement indicates the political decision not to intervene, regardless of cease-fire violations.

The U.S. administration was unprepared for the outcome of the Persian Gulf War. It did not comprehend the depth of popular anger inside Iraq at Saddam Hussein and therefore did not anticipate the popular uprisings. In misjudging the rebels, the U.S. possibly lost an opportunity to overthrow Saddam Hussein in mid-March 1991. The administration was surprised by the rebellion it had called for, it did not anticipate the brutal nature of the Iraqi response, and it was unprepared to cope with the subsequent humanitarian crisis. These surprises could be directly traced to an outdated nocontact policy with the Iraqi opposition (U.S. Cong d: 13).

Partly due to the lack of intelligence information on the situation, and partly due to misperceptions and biases, President Bush and his senior advisors made significant tactical and strategic mistakes in formulating the policy of non-interference. Bush called for an uprising and then decided it was the wrong uprising. Finally, Bush and his advisors failed to foresee the tremendous impact that televised genocide would have on world and U.S. opinion.

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