Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). The CGDK was a government-in-exile that retained international recognition throughout the 1980s, including membership in the UN (Curtis: 2). This recognition in the UN was seen as an effort to keep the UN seat from falling into Soviet hands via the Vietnamese client regime in Phnom Penh. Furthermore, the CGDK received material support and political backing from the U.S. and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations countries.

The last faction, bringing the total to three, in the struggle against the Phnom Penh regime, was the smaller non-communist party led by former prime minister Son Sann. This party was known as the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and it formed a loose alliance with Prince Sihanouk to establish the CGDK.

During the 1980s the Cambodian conflict was seen by many as a struggle between China and Vietnam for hegemony over Indochina (Heininger: 10). China backed the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam backed the Phnom Penh regime. The U.S. backed the non-communist resistance forces of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, with a determination to oppose Soviet influence in Indochina by stemming Vietnamese aggression. According to reports from a UN fact-finding team sent to Cambodia in 1991, the four factions consisted of more than 200,000 regular soldiers deployed in some 650 locations. Additionally, militias totaling more than 250,000 personnel operated throughout the countryside with over 300,000 weapons of all types and some 80 million rounds of ammunition (UN h: 13).

UN INVOLVEMENT

Cambodia was in a state of deep internal conflict and relative isolation from the rest of the world. However, the UN did make attempts to intervene in the Cambodian conflict many years before the Paris Peace Agreements were signed on 23 October 1991. The Security Council first considered the issue in 1979, following Vietnam's December 1978 attack, but lack of unanimity among its five permanent members prevented it from taking any action (UN h: 5).

Waning support from both the USSR and China improved the political climate that paved the way for the UN-brokered peace agreement in Cambodia. China's Deng Xiaoping wanted to clean the slate with Vietnam and remove any lingering animosity from the international community toward China. Specifically, he wanted to rectify the loss of face incurred by his

humiliating defeat when China invaded Vietnam early in 1979 to "teach Vietnam a lesson" for its invasion of Cambodia (Heininger: 20). Using the Khmer Rouge as a weapon against Vietnam in Cambodia had not worked, nor was there any prospect for success. China was seeking international acceptance, in the wake of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and a settlement in Cambodia could go a long way toward restoring China's image.

In contrast, Vietnamese support for its client regime remained bogged down, largely because Chinese military assistance enabled the Khmer Rouge to keep pressure on the Phnom Penh regime. The Soviet Union's support for Vietnam was predicated on its own competition with China. Support to Vietnam was expensive-both monetarily and politically and Mikhail Gorbachev's disenchantment with the costs permitted movement toward peace in Cambodia. Gorbachev considered the estimated $3 billion annually to Vietnam as a drain on precious Soviet resources. The battlefield situation in Cambodia was at a stalemate and Vietnam's economy was deteriorating (Heininger: 11).

Finally, in 1989 the path was cleared for a diplomatic settlement in Cambodia. An initiative by the five permanent members of the Security Council led to the brokered Paris Conference on Cambodia, which led to UNTAC's authorization. The negotiations began in July 1989 and culminated with the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on 23 October 1991, where the four factions agreed to establish the Supreme National Council which would assume the sovereign powers of Cambodia through the transition period. To ensure implementation of the accords, the SNC would delegate "all necessary powers" to the UN for the transitional period, lasting from signing the agreements through the creation of a new government following the elections. The final Paris Agreement consisted of three instruments: the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict; the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (UN h: 8-9). On 31 October 1991, in Resolution 718, the Security Council expressed its full support for the Paris Peace Plan, called on all Cambodian factions to comply with the cease-fire, and called on the SNC and all Cambodians to cooperate fully with the UN.

The agreements authorized the Security Council to establish UNTAC. Under the agreements UNTAC's mandate (mission) was to accomplish the following:

Organize and conduct free and fair elections; coordinate the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons; coordinate a major program of economic and financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction; supervise or control the existing administrative structures in Cambodia; supervise, monitor, and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, the cease-fire, the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian factions and the demobilization of at least 70 percent of the military forces of each faction; coordinate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees; and foster an environment of peace and stability in which all Cambodians could enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments (UN h: 9).

The heart of UNTAC's mandate was to take the structure laid out in the Paris Accords and give Cambodia a chance to establish a government that would be strong enough to prevent further civil war. Each mandated task was designed in some way to facilitate that outcome: 1) get the refugees home and reintegrate them into Cambodian society, so their camps would cease to be a staging area for armed insurgents; 2) disarm the factions; 3) keep the troops that were not demobilized in cantonment areas so they could not fight; 4) teach Cambodians not to abuse human rights; 5) develop a civilian police force to help dampen the level of violence; 6) build the structures of a civil society; and 7) get the international community to undertake a massive effort to rebuild Cambodia through economic assistance, liberalization, and investment in an effort to thwart a return to power by the Khmer Rouge.

UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION
IN CAMBODIA (UNAMIC)

Prior to the signing of the Paris Agreements that authorized the creation of UNTAC, several fact-finding missions were sent to Cambodia to survey the situation on the ground and make an assessment of what was needed to facilitate the implementation of an agreement. The UN fact-finding missions were sent to Cambodia, beginning in 1989 and continuing through

the summer of 1990, to study the communications and transportation infrastructure, water supply, sanitation, housing, modalities for repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, and the country's existing administrative structures (UN h: 7).

Following the fact-finding missions and the signing of the Paris Agreements, UNAMIC was established to bridge the gap between the signing of the peace agreement and the time it would take for UNTAC to fully deploy. UNAMIC, authorized by Security Council Resolution 717 (16 October 1991) became operational on 9 November 1991 and consisted of 268 personnel from 23 countries. UNAMIC was organized into a Civil/Military staff, a Military mine awareness unit, and both a logistics and a support unit (Curtis: 7).

The primary goal of UNAMIC was to assist in maintaining the ceasefire, but it was also expected to collect information regarding the number of personnel and equipment in the military elements of the Cambodian factions, to launch a military mine awareness program, and to obtain and provide other information that would help UNTAC (Farris: 42).

Amid an increasing awareness that a mine clearance program was becoming a growing priority, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 728 (8 January 1992), expanding UNAMIC by 1,100 personnel. This increase incorporated a 700-person field engineering battalion that would work with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to clear mines from repatriation routes, reception centers, and resettlement areas (UN h: 11). Additionally, the mine clearance team would resume its mine clearance training for the Cambodians with hopes they would continue the program once UNTAC departed in late 1993.

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY
IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC)

On 19 February 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report detailing the proposed implementation plan for UNTAC. The Security Council endorsed the report, and by its Resolution 745 (28 February 1992) established UNTAC for a period not to exceed 18 months. Upon becoming operational on 15 March 1992, UNTAC absorbed UNAMIC (Curtis: 11).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali's first tasks as the new Secretary-General

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of

name

was

Sec Akas

Yasushi Akashi to head UNTAC. Akashi was also named the

General's special representative for Cambodia. The choice of head UNTAC was made in recognition of Japan's growing importance in the region and in the UN. Furthermore, his selection was also

a less-than-discreet nudge for Japan to accept world responsibilities commensurate with its economic superpower status (Heininger: 35).

With the selection of Akashi, the international community wished to increase Japan's involvement in UN peacekeeping. Japan's involvement in UNTAC was to go further than it had in the Persian Gulf War, to which it contributed $13 billion but no troops. In its first deployment since World War II, Japan sent eight military observers and a 600-member unit to participate in UNTAC. Although this unit, an engineer battalion, was assigned to rebuild two major highways during a six-month tour and normally remained unarmed, its deployment sparked protests in the Philippines against renewed Japanese militarism. Japan also contributed 75 civilian police to UNTAC (Heininger: 36).

UNTAC Organization

The UNTAC mission was unique and diverse. In the broadest sense the UN mission was to create conditions that would foster the growth of a democratic nation and society in Cambodia. Because peacekeeping in Cambodia represented a new and greatly expanded mission for the UN, UNTAC's organization was also unique (Farris: 42). UNTAC was planned to have nearly 16,000 military, 5,800 international and local civilian staff, 3,600 civil police, and 62,000 Cambodians to help with the elections (Heininger: 41). It was composed of seven distinct operational elements — six civilian components and a military component. Each of these activities required the collection of information and the processing or analysis of that information, before some mission-related action could take place. The contributions of each component toward these activities are discussed below.

Electoral Component

This component was charged with carrying out UNTAC's principal task, holding national elections. The Electoral Component mounted a large-scale education program to inform the general public about the