Security of Information

The UN's lack of any adequate security system fostered concerns over leaks of information in Mogadishu just as it had in New York. In the case of Somalia, it has been charged that the "intelligence network set up for the United Nations and the United States was rife with double agents" (Lorch: A5). Infiltration of UN operations by sympathizers of Somali warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed was seen as responsible for the compromise of military plans and lost opportunities to capture Aideed and his key lieutenants (Richburg d: A1). Security concerns were not limited to Somali citizens employed as contractors by the UN. Certain national contingents were alleged to be particularly unreliable at protecting information (Fineman: A2).

A former National Security Council official's appraisal of the security problem presented by the U.S. intelligence sharing experience in Somalia was bleak:

I don't think we are close to working out the operational security aspects when our [U.S.] forces are involved outside the well-honed NATO apparatus. . . Frankly, I think that our security is almost certainly being compromised by the multi-lateral aspect of the operation[.] (Kraemer: A1).

Information Exchange

In the atmosphere of suspicion and recrimination that prevailed in Somalia, international intelligence exchange was severely curtailed and all sensitive information was subject to undue compartmentation. The resulting “breakdown in intelligence between various armies" was blamed by many UN commanders for causing major operational problems (Fineman: A2). In some instances, sensitive documents passed to the UN Information Center were spirited away to the U.S. Intelligence Support Element for protection before the information ever entered suspect UN channels. This perceived need to maintain excessive secrecy for any type of information, including operational, is thought to have contributed to delays surrounding the rescue of U.S. Army Special Forces trapped in Mogadishu during the 3-4 October 1993 firefight (Timms: 1).

Effects of Institutional Inertia

Conduct of intelligence operations by the U.S. and the multinational coalition in Somalia underscored the difficulties inherent in dealing with a UN environment. According to Congressman Jack Reed, a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence member who twice visited Somalia during 1993, despite the establishment of the UNOSOM Information Center, UN field operations still reflected a UN culture that "abhors the concept of intelligence" (Sanai). The consequent lack of UN leadership and direction for intelligence operations forced each national contingent to fend for itself without regard for international cooperation. Congressman Reed described the results: “As each subordinate commander scramble[d] to call his home ministry of defense to assemble a picture of the battlefield, coherence and unity of command suffer[ed].” (R. Smith f: A19).

U.S. INTELLIGENCE LIMITATIONS

Transfer of command to the UN and a drawdown of U.S. intelligence assets affected overall intelligence capabilities in Somalia, leading to subsequent UN difficulties during the manhunt for Aideed. Senator Dennis DeConcini, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, found the U.S. intelligence operation praiseworthy during a visit in the spring of 1993 before the withdrawal of most U.S. forces. But a decision to pull out U.S. intelligence personnel along with the combat forces in May 1993 contributed to his later evaluation that

the intelligence operation deteriorated following the assumption of UN command (R. Smith f: A19).

Technical Assets

Sophisticated U.S. national intelligence collection systems (U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, electronic eavesdropping systems, and spy satellites) proved to be of marginal utility during UNOSOM II's hunt for General Aideed (Sanai). Technical capabilities available to U.S. forces in Somalia (tactical reconnaissance aircraft and various communications intercept systems) fared no better against a low-tech enemy in an urban landscape. Aideed's movements or location produced no discernible visual or electronic signature. He traveled frequently, alone and on foot (Scarborough and Gertz: A1). Antique low-powered walkie-talkies were used for communication. Operating in a crowded low frequency spectrum, they were extremely difficult to detect in an urban environment. The Somalis also used frequency switching and burst transmissions to thwart interception (Sanai). Those communications intercepted revealed few intentions. One Department of Defense official remarked: "You don't pick up any communication by his people talking about what their next move is" (Scarborough and Gertz: A1).

Human Intelligence

Without input from U.S. technical intelligence collection assets, UNOSOM II was heavily reliant upon human intelligence of dubious credibility. Once the UN targeted Aideed, the impartiality of the peacekeepers was lost and they were perceived as another belligerent in Somalia's ancient clan warfare. Clan loyalty prevailed over U.S.-sponsored intelligence collection operations. Suspected informants among Aideed's faction were assassinated and those recruited from rival clans dared not enter south Mogadishu for fear of suffering a similar fate (Richburg d: A1; C. Baker: 18). Former National Security Agency Director Lieutenant General William Odom speculated it would take years to penetrate the clans ("Aideed Hunt": A7). Consequently, the CIA was forced to rely upon newly recruited, untested and often unreliable informants (C. Baker: 18). Afraid to operate at night in Mogadishu, they provided little valuable intelligence (Atkinson: A1). Further complicating matters, the UN was fed disinformation by Aideed sympathizers to frustrate efforts to locate him.

UNOSOM II faced a scenario similar to that encountered during the U.S. pursuit of Manuel Noriega. But unlike Panama, there was no significant U.S. human resource intelligence infrastructure in Somalia. Furthermore, the U.S. Special Forces dispatched to Somalia in August 1993 to capture Aideed were completely unfamiliar with the labyrinth presented by Mogadishu. Countries without strong intelligence collection operations were reluctant to share information for security reasons (Sanai).

Representative Dan Glickman, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, criticized the UNOSOM II intelligence operation during September 1993 for insufficient development of a human resources intelligence collection capability (R. Smith f: A19). Because of this shortfall, U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos depended on estimates produced by the UNOSOM IC or on their own visual reconnaissance to locate and track Aideed. Reliance on these intelligence sources resulted in the embarrassing 30 August 1993 raid on the UN Development Program Office and the 14 September 1993 arrest of a key Aideed opponent and UN ally (Atkinson: A1).

Doctrinal Conflicts

The UNOSOM II intelligence performance in Somalia violated six of seven principles promulgated by U.S. intelligence doctrine for multinational

operations (U.S. DoD b: VIII, 3-5). The principle of Adjustment [of Intelligence Concepts] to Differences among Nations was impeded by the general lack of participation by national contingents in the UN intelligence process. Full Exchange of Intelligence was prevented by a reluctance to compromise sensitive sources or materials. Complementary [that is, Coordinated] Intelligence Operations were not practiced due to the necessity for each contingent to meet its own intelligence needs. A Multinational Intelligence Center's efforts to acquire and fuse information were thwarted by a poor information flow. Unity of Effort Against a Common Threat was never achieved because of animosities among national contingents. Determining and Planning Intelligence requirements, production, and use in advance was made impossible by the rapid turnover of the operation from the U.S. to the UN and the ad hoc assembly of its multinational components. It should be clear from UNOSOM II that the principles of U.S. multinational intelligence doctrine are nearly impossible to attain in a UN peace operation.

QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Overall, there appears to be little dispute that intelligence the U.S. provided to UN troops in the field was useful (Best: 15). U.S. personnel considered threat warning information as one of the more vital items shared