Security is paramount when sharing intelligence among coalition forces, yet the sharing of intelligence is critical to the success of UN peace operations. In a multilateral environment, security concerns are always present, and downgrading intelligence information to protect sources, without neutralizing the value of the information, is a strenuous task. This problem is compounded when coalition partners have their own agendas and may not trust each other.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Great political sensitivity is required to deal with individuals and organizations during UN peace operations, especially where a legitimate government does not exist. On 7 and 8 December 1992, the President's Special Envoy for Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, met separately in Mogadishu with the two most powerful Somali faction leaders, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, to enlist their cooperation in assuring the arrival of U.S. forces (UNITAF) would go without incident. During the meeting, the U.S. indicated that it would not tolerate violence from faction leaders similar to that imposed upon the 500 Pakistani troops a few months earlier (Oakley: 46). But, more importantly, the meeting sent a message to the other clans/ militia, clan elders, civilian leaders, and the rest of the population in Somalia, that Aideed and Mahdi were considered the most powerful men in the war-torn country. As a result, the U.S. had legitimized the leading warlords in Somalia and planted the seeds for future confrontations when the UN would attempt to rehabilitate the country.

UNITAF accommodated the Somali warlords by allowing them to store weapons and ammunition in warehouses outside of Mogadishu as long as the material was not used against the peacekeeping force or against those who were delivering relief supplies. The UNITAF strategy used a hands-off approach with the Somali warlords, to eliminate any hostilities with them, especially General Aideed. Because of this approach, UNITAF, when necessary, negotiated with the Somali warlords. The Americans attempted to appease the warlords, and failed to take advantage of the influence of clan elders and women.

General Aideed became UNOSOM II's worst enemy as it attempted to plan and execute its objectives. He never intended to cooperate with the UN's efforts to disarm the warring factions and establish a new government unless he controlled it. UN civilian officials took initiatives such as

installing a new judicial system and local government councils without consulting Aideed. General Aideed launched propaganda attacks against the UN, accusing the organization of attempting to colonialize Somalia ("Somalia: Warlord": 48).

UNOSOM II's objectives seemed clear at the beginning of the mission. But UNITAF was not able to develop sufficient situational awareness to allow UNISOM II to proceed confidently (Allard: 74-76). The lead intelligence element of UNITAF had only seven weeks of training (only three intheater), only five human intelligence collectors and no significant signals intelligence assets. The intelligence requirements were not sufficiently detailed to address intentions and capabilities, amount of weapons and ammunition, troop strength, organizational structure, command and control, or order of battle on the various Somali factions. The lead intelligence element had the added responsibility of disseminating intelligence to the United Nations and coalition partners under demanding security restrictions. In sum, the intelligence apparatus suffered from major handicaps.2

2 Editor's note: This excerpt from Payton A. Flynn's thesis is a brief summary of his findings. Information for his thesis was gathered from a variety of DIA, CIA and Pentagon intelligence analysts. The author also benefited from the personal experiences of his thesis chair, John A. Wahlquist, Col, USAF, who was Military Advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia in support of operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in 1993 and 1994.

Chapter 4

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

It is tempting to view the enhanced role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War world solely from an American perspective. In fact, many countries consider the commitment of forces to the UN an essential and non-controversial component of their foreign policies. At the same time, some countries have for 50 years refused to participate. Both ends of the spectrum are illustrated by Sub-Saharan Africa and Japan. For Africans the difficulties of UN nation-building in Somalia hardly came as a surprise. The Congo crisis in the 1960s shaped the African perception of the dangers of UN and great-power intervention in civil war, but they still contributed as part of their role in African regional affairs and on the broader stage of world politics. Japan, on the other hand, used the no-war clause in their post-war constitution to avoid any hint of a return to a power projection capability. Now, attempting to put both World War II and the Cold War behind them, the Japanese see the Security Council and the UN collective security system as a means to attain their proper status in the world community. Involvement in UN peace operations is the first tentative step.

Captain John W. Loffert Jr. takes a broad historical view of Sub-Saharan participation in UN peacekeeping. He evaluates the performance of African military contingents and specific African commanders of peacekeeping operations. He addresses the domestic political and economic motives of the African countries and examines how UN peacekeeping relates to international politics in the region, including the move to obtain influence in the UN Secretariat. Finally, he assesses the capability and prospects for SubSaharan contributions to UN peacekeeping in the future.

Second Lieutenant Fae M. Crissman reviews the Japanese quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, an attempt to obtain political status in world politics commensurate with their economic power. Internationalist

Japanese see a seat on the Security Council as a way to put World War II and dependence on the U.S. Security Treaty behind them and assume greatpower status. Lieutenant Crissman notes that several obstacles remain in Japan's path: a reluctance of the Japanese public to support the use of force for UN collective security, UN procedural hurdles, and complex group dynamics in the General Assembly.

Second Lieutenant Steven E. Maceda looks at the peacekeeping mission of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Created to provide rear-area security for Americans fighting the Korean War, the constitutional validity of the Japanese military has been challenged from the start. The Soviet threat was its primary justification. With the end of the Cold War, its raison d'etre collapsed. The government's first attempts to contribute Self-Defense Forces to UN peacekeeping met with a political firestorm from the left. Over time, with careful selection of low-risk missions, the Self-Defense Forces have built political support for service outside Japan in a UN context.