tive. They serve best in the austere African environment. They excel in civil affairs operations. They do well in the limited combat operations sometimes experienced in peacekeeping.

Because of the lack of wealth in Sub-Saharan African countries, it is essential that the UN provide adequate funding for the force prior to its deployment. This ensures that the unit takes up its peacekeeping duties fully outfitted. If not, soldiers will often deploy without essential individual equipment. The next challenge is to get the force to the desired location in a timely manner and with its equipment. The lack of strategic-lift assets in Sub-Saharan African militaries means that this support will have to be provided by the UN or a reliable donor country like the U.S. Sub-Saharan African countries have been successful in deploying their troops aboard domestic airlines, but this means that the equipment cannot accompany them. If African domestic airlines are used, the troops on arrival will not be prepared to conduct operations. External strategic lift is still needed to move their equipment. The only alternative is to have the equipment already in theater for their use upon arrival. Sub-Saharan African forces lack the logistical sustainability to conduct long-term operations. This support must be provided by third-country UN logistical units. To ensure success, the logistical mechanisms must be in place before the Sub-Saharan African force arrives.

JAPAN'S ASPIRATION FOR INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL STATUS: A BID FOR A PERMANENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT

Fae Marie Crissman

Second Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force

August 1995

Japan is prepared, with the endorsement of many countries, to discharge its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono

As a major economic power and the second largest financial contributor to the United Nations, Japan desires a commensurate political role (Woodall: 30). Japan wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as the symbol of its new status. Although there had been much talk, Japan's campaign was not formal. On 27 September 1994, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono formally announced Japan's desire for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in the UN General Assembly (UNGA A/48/PV.7).

The question of equitable representation and expansion of the Security Council appeared on the agenda of the UN General Assembly from 1979 until 1990 without being debated (UN n: 211). The increasingly active role of the Security Council in the post-Cold War world has made the item more prominent. In 1991, Japan joined a joint commission with India to expand the Security Council. Together with other aspirants to the Council such as Nigeria and Brazil, they helped bring the issue of reform to the top of the UN agenda. On 11 December 1992 the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to invite member states to submit written comments

on a possible review of Security Council membership (UNGA Res 47/62). Eighty states responded. There was widespread agreement that the composition of the Security Council should be expanded, including the number of permanent seats.

THE CASE FOR A JAPANESE SEAT

Since World War II, Japan has not been proactive in international political affairs, but in the new international environment is prepared for greater involvement in the UN, including a UN permanent seat. Japan justifies its place on the Council on the basis of UN reform to enhance the UN's legitimacy in light of new realities. Japan asserts:

1. The emergence of new global powers, which prompts consideration of a limited increase in the number of permanent seats in addition to the current permanent members;

2. The drastic expansion of the UN membership, which requires consideration of an appropriate increase in the number of nonpermanent seats to improve the representativeness of the Security Council; and

3. The imbalance that has emerged in the geographical representation within the council, which suggests that we should redress the overall distribution of seats (UNGA A/49/PV.30: 15).

Enhanced legitimacy of the Security Council will be achieved only if the Council improves its effectiveness by inviting the major powers of the current world order to participate in decisions. Just as the absence of the U.S. contributed to the failure of the League of Nations, Japan feels it is time to reassess the realities in 1995 (Ito).

Permanent membership is a symbol of political power. Permanent members have direct influence on the selection of the Secretary-General, control several important posts in the UN Secretariat, enjoy membership in most key committees and prevent Security Council decisions adverse to their interests with the veto (Ueki: 365). Security Council sessions are often closed, and non-members of the debate get only second-hand information. Permanent membership in the Security Council tremendously increases a state's bargaining power in multilateral institutions in general (Pickert: 91).

Although Japan is a major financial contributor, it must run for a nonrenewable non-permanent seat without any guarantee of success. Japan

feels there should be "no taxation without representation" (Ueki: 365). Currently, Japan finds out about decisions after the fact and is asked to pay without prior consultation. The best way of obtaining information firsthand is by having a permanent seat on the Council. Further, as a major financial contributor to peacekeeping operations, Japan wants its views taken into consideration before decisions are made to assess the anticipated cost of a peacekeeping operation. It is necessary for Japan to help determine whether to send peacekeeping missions, including their deployment length, size and composition. Providing money without representation is not considered effective. Although Japan's contribution to the UN budget is growing, Japan is not able to take part in key UN decisionmaking (UNGA A/ C.5/49/L.30: 3).

Japan's absence from the decisionmaking process makes it difficult for the government to build a basis of support from the Japanese people. This complicates the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' efforts to get support from the Ministry of Finance in bureaucratic politics. The UN needs money from Japan, but the government and people are reluctant to provide funds if Japan has not participated in the decisionmaking process. Japan feels that the bid for a permanent seat is not only in Japan's interest, but necessary for the UN as a practical means of building the base of support to justify to the people payments to the UN (Yokota).

POLITICAL COMMITMENT

Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and internationalist Japanese leaders want Security Council membership, there is a lack of clear consensus in the bureaucracy, the Diet and among Japanese people. The recent debate in the Diet on the peacekeeping law, the reluctance of the political leadership to use the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad, and the lack of enthusiasm of Japanese to serve as international civil servants reflect an ambivalence toward the UN. Nonetheless, the Diet passed the Law Concerning Cooperation for UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) & Other Operations in June 1992 (Cho: 2). The PKO Law authorizes a deployment of up to 2,000 persons, including SDF troops, civilian police, and election observers in two broad categories of UN operations:

(1) potentially dangerous United Nations peacekeeping operations (Shinn: 1-3);

(2) supposedly less risky international humanitarian relief operations and logistical support (Yanai: 45-46).

The law was scheduled for parliamentary review in August 1995. The fragile coalition government deferred consideration, avoiding contentious debate on sensitive issues prior to general elections. Government officials say "it is better to wait till the right moment comes for a full revision of the law" (Hayashi and Hidaka: 16).

Beyond Peacekeeping to Collective Security

Member states are not legally obligated to provide forces, but the power structure of the UN as reflected in the responsibilities of the Security Council encourages it. Collective security functions of the Security Council have prompted considerable debate as to whether Japan should seek permanent membership. Yasuhiro Ueki points out:

A serious question for Japan is whether Japan can be an effective permanent member of the Council without the capability to enforce actions in the event of an aggression. The main function of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. Its duties may entail forcible actions, as is outlined in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. At present, Japan is not willing to use force except for the defense of Japan. Even the new peacekeeping legislation is not adequate to answer the question since it specifically prohibits the military personnel to use force or threaten use of force in carrying out their duties. The new legislation allows use of small firearms only in self-defense (Ueki: 366).

The internationalists in the Diet and elsewhere in the government argue that the Japanese Constitution allows enforcement of Security Council decisions. In August 1992, a majority-sponsored Diet research committee asserted that participation in a regular UN force is different from the threat or use of force renounced in Article 9 and hence it does not contravene the Constitution. The committee was established to study the future of Japanese foreign policy, and was headed by Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The committee comprised elite Diet members interested in defense issues (Pickert: 51-52). Not surprisingly, their report met sharp criticism, with several members complaining it provided a constitutional revision by interpretation (Cho: 10).