Professor Yokota of Tokyo University argues that if Japan wishes to be viewed as a respected international player, it must avoid hiding behind the constitution. No one can pretend that Japan does not have military capability to offer the UN (Yokota). Japanese use of force abroad is not a constitutional question, but a political question. If Japan is to continue advocating a non-military role in the UN, it will have to legitimize that course and demonstrate how it is in the world's interest as well as Japan's rather than simply explain how the country is constrained by constitutional limits and other special circumstances. However generous Japan might be, other countries will inevitably distrust Japan if it has no intention of getting in harm's way (Schwartz: 26).

Manpower then becomes a fundamental issue. Although the SelfDefense Forces (SDF), previously ignored by the public, has raised its credibility lately, it does not have full trust of the public because of Japan's military past. Shinnichi Yoshida advocates a separate force for peace enforcement operations, a sort of Japanese special forces. However, there has been little public support for this notion, and most from the SDF are against it (Yoshida).

Non-Military Contributions

Sending soldiers is not the only way to cooperate with the UN. Japan's non-military contributions also offer a measure of political commitment. Involvement in humanitarian activities is a crucial aspect of non-military contributions. Dr. Edward Lincoln argues that if Japan really wants to

contribute, then the government should get its citizens into the front lines of humanitarian work. He cites examples such as giving medical care and food to Kurds in Iraq or ministering to the victims of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines as ways Japan can demonstrate its commitment to the UN's goals (Lincoln a: 259).

The appointment of Sadako Ogata to be UN High Commissioner for Refugees is a practical step toward a more positive image. She has provided an important positive role model of an involved person dealing with difficult world issues with which Japanese have been relatively uninvolved in the past. Yasushi Akashi has held very high visibility positions as head of the successful UN mission in Cambodia, but has been severely criticized as head of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia.

Yet Japan's tentative commitment to the UN is reflected through a lack of personnel presence in the UN Secretariat. All multilateral organizations have at least informal geographical quotas which determine how many nationals they will accept from a country, but in 1994 Japan was listed as one of 25 underrepresented Member States in the UN Secretariat, filling only 91 of its 223 slots (UNGA A/49/527: 34). The extremely low level of personnel involvement in the UN leaves the impression that commitment to the goals and work of these organizations is superficial.

According to Mr. Naoki Ito of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, international civil service is not considered prestigious for Japanese school graduates. Since the salary is low, working for the UN is secondary to government positions or private industry. He further argues that if Japan becomes a permanent member, the Japanese government will increase its interest in the UN. Accordingly, graduates may decide to pursue international organization careers (Ito).

Domestic Environment

Although polls indicate public support for the UN, there has been no significant Japanese domestic debate regarding the issue of a permanent seat. The Foreign Ministry is actively working to shift public opinion and is conducting polls to measure public attitudes ("Yomiuri Shimbun": 2-2). The results reflect gradual movement toward greater support for a permanent seat. In January 1994, 53 percent of those who gave valid responses to the survey favored the bid, while in October 1994, following Foreign Minister Kono's speech to the UN, those favoring Japan's campaign increased to 56 percent. However, those opposing Japan's bid also increased from 14.8 percent to 18 percent. Of the 18 percent opposed to a permanent seat in October, 31 percent felt permanent membership would oblige Japan to take part in military activities. However, those who opposed any form of Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations were drastically down from 38.8 percent in January to 8.6 percent in October ("UNSC Seat": 16). These results show a gradual shift toward favorable attitudes to the UN, however, there is still a growing negative opinion on peacekeeping operations. The lack of consensus in the Japanese public leads to caution in Japanese politics. Most politicians agree that Japan should have the permanent seat, but do not agree on what level of contributions to the UN Japan should provide to obtain it (Yoshida). The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has doubts about the cost of global responsibility. The Socialists are leery of the use of force under any circumstances.

The use of Self-Defense Forces for UN operations is often a source of friction between the ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs advocates peacekeeping involvement, since it would lead to elevation of Japan's international standing. The Ministry of Finance emphasizes the domestic economy, and fears increased demands for Japanese contributions to the UN budget. This conflict was revealed in preparations for Prime Minister

Hosokawa's speech to the UN General Assembly in 1993. He planned to voice Japan's desire to become a permanent member, but the final speech only referred to "a reformed United Nations" (UNGA A/48/PV.4).

There was a similar confrontation in 1995. The Prime Minister planned to voice his support for Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to the national Diet on 20 January. However, Finance Minister Takemura demanded the sentence supporting the bid for a permanent seat be removed from the speech. Takemura felt that Japan needed to support UN reform, and through that process build support for permanent membership in the Security Council. Kono, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wanted to seek permanent membership directly, while at the same time supporting UN reform. In the end, Prime Minister Murayama's speech omitted mention of permanent membership in favor of reiterating Japan's commitment to UN reform, while Kono's speech retained a statement that Japan sought a permanent seat on the Security Council, as well as pledging Japanese support for Security Council reform ("Murayama”: 11).

The competing interests among the ministries have root in party politics. The current government is an uneasy coalition between the LDP conservatives, headed by Foreign Minister Kono; the socialists, represented by Prime Minister Murayama; and the Sakigake, led by Finance Minister Takemura. The dynamics of this leadership "pit[s] traditional enemies against each other as the heads of competing bureaucracies, causing clashes and power struggles among ministries" (Pickert: 58).

REVISION OF THE UN CHARTER

Japan may wish to be added as a permanent member but any change in the membership of the United Nations Security Council requires an amendment of the UN Charter. In considering the amendment of the Charter, both the explicit requirements in the Charter and the procedural obstacles which are not a matter of treaty language must be considered. The original Charter, signed in 1945, provided for five permanent members, the U.S., the Soviet Union, the UK, France and China, and six non-permanent members elected by two-thirds of the General Assembly for two-year terms, and not eligible for immediate re-election (Simma: 395). Decolonization in the 1950's brought a great increase in UN membership, resulting in amendment of the Charter in 1965 to increase the number of non-permanent members from 6 to 10, and producing the current 15-member Security Council. A review of the 1965 amendment process provides the best indication of the procedural obstacles which Japan will face in an attempt to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council.

The first proposal to increase the size of the Council was formally introduced by a group of Latin American states at the 1956 session of the General Assembly. The proposal did not pass the General Assembly until 1963 (Goodrich: 195). The ratification process took two more years and the amendment came into force on 1 September 1965.

The UN Charter specifies the amendment procedure. According to Article 108:

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.