of permanent membership. In that context, we would support the permanent membership of Japan and Germany" (UNGA A/49/PV.31: 4).

United States

In its written response to the General Assembly resolution, the U.S. asserted the status of the five current permanent members "should remain unaltered" and yet supported permanent membership for Japan and Germany. The U.S. was prepared to consider a modest number of additional seats (UNGA A/48/264: 91-92). In 1994, the U.S. explicitly endorsed permanent membership for Japan and Germany and an increase of 3 nonpermanent seats for a total membership of 20, allowing immediate reelection of non-permanent members (UNGA A/49/PV.29: 23-24).

Ratification takes place in the legislative branch. In July 1994, the U.S. Senate attached an amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations FY 1995 Bill, asking that "Japan take whatever steps are necessary to enable it to fully engage in any form of UN peacekeeping or peacemaking operation" and "the U.S. should actively support Japan's efforts to gain permanent membership only after Japan takes such steps" (H.R. 4426). Although Japan feels the use of force abroad is a different issue than permanent membership on the Security Council, this clearly is not the feeling in the U.S. Congress. Even though Japan feels the Congressional language is not binding, one of the requirements for amendment to the Charter is ratification by each of the permanent members in their constitutional processes, that is, the U.S. Senate. In general, Japanese trade policies are not well-regarded, especially in the U.S., but it is difficult to tell if this will become an obstacle in the campaign for a permanent seat (Lincoln b). The current trade tensions could cause the economic relationship between the U.S. and Japan to boil over into the security arena.

In summary, diplomats from France, the UK and the U.S. have given qualified endorsement of Japan's membership; however, there may be significant opposition within the U.S. Congress and other legislatures. Russia's dispute over the Northern territories may prevent ratification. The people of the UK and France still remember World War II well, and there is a longstanding animosity between China and Japan. Accordingly, an amendment may be blocked from coming into effect if the legislature of any permanent member does not ratify. The ratification phase could take many years and

the legislature of a permanent member could simply do nothing, thereby blocking it without directly opposing it.

JAPAN'S PROSPECTS

This issue is an issue which has the conclusion at the beginning.

Shinnichi Yoshida, Deputy Editor, Asahi Shimbun

The Search for a Suitable Package

Japan's success is dependent upon a multitude of variables. The necessary first step is the political process in the UN. Many proposals have been put forth by member states. There are several possible outcomes for this issue in the UN:

1. No amendment of the Charter;

2. Amendment with a new category of seats;

3. Amendment increasing non-permanent members;

4. Amendment including additional permanent seats with veto; and 5. Amendment for fundamental reform of the Council.

Non-amendment reform requires the least amount of change and is the most likely to occur. Each of the following options requires more complex amendments to the Charter and is progressively less likely to occur. The final option, fundamental reform, is the least likely because it requires such radical change.

No Amendment: Most Likely

Due to the enormity of the task of reforming the Security Council, one possible outcome is much debate without change. There are so many issues, it will be difficult to obtain a consensus. However, reform is possible without requiring an amendment. One example is Professor Louis Sohn's proposal of "dual seating." Two non-permanent seats would be given to Africa, Asia, Central and South America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Western Europe and the remaining states. One of these seats would be given "semi-permanent" status and would rotate every two years. The alternate semi-permanent member would be able to participate in the discussion without vote in the period the other semi-permanent member held the seat (Hoffmann: 49).

1

This proposal requires no amendment to the Charter and merely amends the procedures of the Council. It gives the larger states in each region more recognition, but reduces the smaller states' chances of being elected to the Council. It is criticized as being unfair to the South, since it gives greater weight to European countries like Poland, Italy and Ukraine than might otherwise be the case. It also ignores the problem of the permanent seat distribution (Hoffmann: 50). Although it has disadvantages, some change in Council procedure is likely since it does not involve the complex process of amending the Charter.

Amendment with a New Category of Seats: Possible

There have been many proposals for variations of the current structure of Security Council membership. Australia proposes allowing successive terms for non-permanent members and the creation of eight quasipermanent seats, allocated among regional groups, together with 10 rotating non-permanent seats which would account for a total membership of 23. In addition to keeping the number of permanent members at five, Italy proposes increasing the number of non-permanent members from 10 to 20. The 10 new seats would be allotted, in turn, to a group of 20 or eventually 30 Member States. This guarantees the continuous presence in the Council of current permanent members and at the same time allows a more frequent presence for 20 to 30 mid-size to large-size countries. The plan also provides more access for the smaller states to the 10 non-permanent seats (UNGA A/49/PV.29: 8-9).

The differentiation in permanent status will be a major factor in the rejection of Italy's proposal. Australia's model gives consideration to maintaining an appropriate balance between permanent to quasi-permanent or non-permanent members and allows rotation of membership of large and small countries (UNGA A/49/PV.31: 12). This proposal is more realistic, but the "second-class" status will not be acceptable for African and Latin American countries who want the same status enjoyed by the current permanent members.

Australia alternatively proposes the creation of five new permanent seats without veto, allocated with three new permanent members coming from Africa and Asia, one from the Group of Western European and Other States, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean. Yozo Yokota, Professor of Law at Tokyo University, says a compromise, even though not

satisfying all needs, may be a starting point. The current permanent members would retain their veto status. An intermediate category would be introduced allowing five permanent seats without veto or seats that would be elected for a longer term of five years with the possibility of re-election. The non-permanent seats would be increased by 5 to allow better regional representation for a total Council size of 25 (Yokota). Although this proposal is not the perfect solution, this plan includes the greatest amount of compromise for everyone involved. A package such as the one suggested by Yozo Yokota may have a chance, since it accommodates the regional groups. Even though Japan may not be as happy with this scenario, it will give Japan the permanent status it wants. It also protects the veto power of the current permanent members.

Amendment Increasing Non-permanent Members: Unlikely

Another option is expansion similar to what took place in 1965. The current permanent members would keep their status, and the number of nonpermanent seats would be increased to allow more equitable representation. Although this option appeals to the current permanent members, this scenario is unlikely, since it does not satisfy any of the major regional powers. Africa and Latin America will settle for no less than permanent seats in any reform.

Expansion with Additional Permanent Seats with Veto: Unlikely

The U.S. endorses an increase of two permanent seats for Japan and Germany with veto. Furthermore, the U.S. supports 3 non-permanent seats for a total Council membership of 20. The U.S. proposal of adding Japan and Germany alone as permanent members will not be acceptable to countries in Africa or Latin America, since they will still have no permanent representation. Additionally, the U.S. proposal still does not answer the question of involving developing countries in the decisionmaking process.

Fundamental Reform: Least Likely

One academic proposal is a weighted system of voting for the election of all Security Council members. Another fundamental reform proposes the creation of quasi-permanent seats with 10-year renewable terms using UN financial contributions and regional population ranking for selection (Hoffmann: 51-63). Although these proposals provide rational ways for the

election of members of the Security Council, they are probably too big a leap from the present system. The renewable-term system allows for future economic and population changes, so that the Charter does not have to be amended every time the international atmosphere shifts. Although this proposal is certainly credible, it is also asking the permanent members to relinquish their power if they cease to satisfy the criteria, which is asking the impossible.

There is no quick-fix answer that will satisfy the desires of the entire General Assembly. The package should increase non-permanent seats for regional representation. The number of permanent seats needs to be kept to a minimum to keep the Security Council effective. Although the permanent members agree to a very limited increase, they will not go along with some of the proposals due to the dilution of their power. On the other hand, the developing countries will not be content with a limited increase by giving Japan and Germany permanent seats. Because of this quandary, it is unlikely that a compromise package will be reached soon.

JAPAN'S DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL TASK

Japan's Assets

Japan has many things to offer the UN. It is an economic power to be reckoned with and has the largest foreign aid program. Additionally, Japan is the second-largest financial contributor to the UN budget and has many ways of furthering UN goals. A highly professional diplomatic corps with world-wide representation for Japan also supports large permanent missions at the UN. Japan has extensive trade relationships with private contacts in most countries. Finally, Japan has been carefully building up political capital in the UN.

Japan's Liabilities

The Prime Minister and Cabinet must be enthusiastic campaigners to win support from the public and from UN members. They are riding the fence on this issue. There is a need for a domestic political consensus. The public is actually ambivalent. The working level in the Foreign Ministry is engaged in the campaigning, but this will not be effective without the support and lobbying efforts of the top-level officials. Additionally, Japan lacks an extensive personnel presence in the UN Secretariat to lobby. Although