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THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION OF

JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Steven E. Maceda

Second Lieutenant, U.S. Air Force
August 1996

JAPANESE PEACEKEEPING

Japan has created the second-most powerful economy in the world from the ashes of its World War II defeat. Along the way, it established a small but effective military to counter the threat of Soviet invasion. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) lost this Cold War focus in the early 1990s and experienced a downturn in popularity. Diminished public support resulted in lower quality recruits and a corresponding drop in morale. The SDF and its parent organization, the Japan Defense Agency, had long been secondclass citizens in the Japanese government. The removal of the SDF's raison d'etre caught the SDF in a vicious cycle of apathy and neglect. Recently, though, Japan's international aspirations have given the SDF a new mission: peacekeeping. Although controversial, peacekeeping is now an appropriate and beneficial mission for the SDF.

The United Nations (UN) has become a shaping force in the so-called new world order, and peacekeeping operations (PKO) are an important tool in the UN's international security kit. Japan has adopted an increasing PKO role since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, reversing the SDF's downward spiral. Public support has rebounded, and SDF is now even more proficient than it was during the Cold War. This rebirth has had its price, however. Domestic political concerns over the legality of Japanese participation in PKO, an underdeveloped command and control structure, resource limitations, and debate within the SDF have limited the extent of Japanese involvement in UN operations. Although barriers to an expanded PKO arrangement still

exist inside and outside the military, it is in the SDF's interest that Japan aggressively pursue additional PKO responsibilities.

YESTERDAY'S POLITICS

Following World War II, Japan focused its national energy on economic and commercial growth while keeping itself out of international security affairs. American military strength sheltered Japan from outside aggression. This “neo-mercantilist, neo-isolationist, low profile, low risk strategy” came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine, after former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (Yasutomo: 323). Without distractions, Japan became the economic power the world knows today.

Japan satisfied its security needs with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, signed in 1952 and revised in 1960. This treaty continues to be the backbone of Japan's national security policy. The treaty guarantees American aid should a foreign power attack Japan. Japan needs to commit its own military force only if American bases in Japan fall under direct attack. In addition to the promise of U.S. conventional military force, Japan also nestled snugly under America's nuclear umbrella. The security granted by America led some to argue against the need for the SDF, if not its legality: What purpose did the tiny SDF serve if the U.S. would defend Japan?

Japan's insular view of the world also grew from the belief that regional and global international organizations make effective security instruments. Japan has long allied itself with the UN, proclaiming a UN-centric foreign policy in 1957 (Ueki: 348). Although Japan continued to rely on the U.S. for its security needs, Japan felt that the UN was the proper forum for its diplomatic activity. Japan wanted to maintain friendly relationships across the world to further its own commercial interests. As Japan's economic power grew, so did its interests on the international stage and its responsibilities to the world community. International consideration of Japan's desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) reflects its growing role in world events.

In 1992, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa specifically stated Japan's intention of gaining permanent UNSC membership (Inoguchi a: 336). Ryutaro Hashimoto, who replaced Socialist Tomiichi Murayama as prime minister in January 1996, also believes that the UN structure needs updating. In his inaugural address, he spoke of gaining a permanent UNSC seat “on the

basis of reforms achieved in the United Nations"-reforms guided by Japan's "crucial role" (Hashimoto: 23). To accomplish its goal, Japan is portraying itself as a leader in international affairs and as a nation capable of carrying out the duties of a great power. Only of late, however, with the institutionalization of PKO, has Japan taken its first small step toward fulfilling its responsibility.

Japan began to address the PKO issue in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Its failure to provide troops to the international coalition arrayed against Iraq earned it criticism from many nations, including the United States. The 100-member medical team promised by Japan never fully arrived, with only 17 people mustering for duty (Blaker: 22). Although Japan did send a minesweeping contingent to the Gulf, this flotilla did not deploy until after the cessation of hostilities. Rather than send armed forces to the desert, Japan opted to shoulder a large portion of the warfighting bill, contributing some $13 billion to the UN coalition (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Sec. 1/2). It soon found, however, that financial contributions to the "new world order" were not enough, especially considering Japan's reliance on Persian Gulf oil. Former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) General Secretary and reform leader Ichiro Ozawa addressed this in Blueprint for a New Japan, arguing that both monetary and personnel contributions toward international peace and stability are in Japan's best interest (Ozawa: 94).

Political ambiguity left the Japanese government's hands tied in 1991. Lacking established procedures for aiding UN missions, the risk-averse bureaucracy reacted with characteristic hesitation (Blaker: 1-42). Japan's leaders, like America's, must consider public opinion when deciding their country's official response to any crisis. Just as U.S. politicians strive to gain public support for a decision to send troops to a hostile region, Japanese leaders must be cognizant of public opinion. Japan also faces the much more fundamental issue of the very legality of participation in an international military effort.

TODAY'S CONTROVERSY

Article 9 of Japan's constitution is at the core of Japan's domestic PKO debate. This section of the Constitution renounces war and the use of force to settle international disputes. It may also be interpreted as forbidding the very existence of the SDF. In this context, Japan's reluctance to send troops

to PKO is understandable. However, the radical shifts in international power structure since the end of the Cold War necessitate change if Japan is to continue as one of the world's most powerful countries.

The legal basis of continuing SDF participation in PKO and the problems inherent in today's world raise the issue of constitutional reform. Although Article 9 is not the only area of the Constitution discussed for possible amendment, it is the most contentious (Japan Echo). The idea of reform of some kind is becoming acceptable in Japan, as witnessed by the acknowledgment that the Constitution is not a perfect document and is subject to revision as situations change ("Yomiuri": 24). A poll by Japan's leading newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, showed that support for revision rose from 23 percent in 1986 to 50 percent in 1993. Those opposed to Constitutional amendment fell from 57 percent to 33 percent over the same period (Japan Echo: 6).

Ken Moroi outlines three prevailing schools of thought relating to the future security of Japan. The first calls for Japan to act autonomously with regard to its defense. The second wants a strengthened and updated Japan-U.S. alliance. The third is for a UN-centered strategy. Regardless of which path Japan chooses, Moroi feels that Article 9 must be addressed directly. Either it should be amended, or it should receive a new official interpretation. The status quo is simply too inefficient. For pragmatic reasons, he thinks that Japan should use the reinterpretation method. The amendment procedure required by the Constitution is too time-consuming. The world community, and the Japanese people, would like to see the issue resolved soon, but the government itself is holding up the process. Reinterpretation would take less time than an amendment and still address the problem created by the Constitution's ambiguous language. However, the nature of the controversial issue keeps the politicians from acting (Moroi: 15).

Such bureaucratic inertia caused Ichiro Ozawa, one-time Secretary General of the LDP, to press for reform within his party, and later to form his own group, the New Frontier Party. Ozawa wrote in Blueprint for a New Japan that the Constitution needed amendment. He wants to add a third paragraph to Article 9, explicitly stating that the renunciation of war and the prohibition on war potential does not ban participation in international operations such as PKO (Ozawa: 110).

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE MILITARY:

CREATING THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 9, Japanese Constitution

Japan must fight, or at least address, its own Constitution when attempting to send SDF personnel outside the country. Article 9, above, seemingly prohibits the existence of the SDF. The law remains open to interpretation, however, with strict constitutionalist opponents interpreting the document in the most idealistic sense, and arguing against the SDF and its mission since their inception in 1954. Proponents of the SDF argue that Japan, as a sovereign nation, maintains the right of self-defense, and therefore can possess armaments limited to the minimum necessary for such operations, including PKO. Left-of-center parties raised constitutionality questions about the small minesweeping contingent sent after the Gulf War. Such political haranguing has surrounded the article for decades.

Recipe for Ambiguity: Writing Article 9

Even under the pacifist Constitution, Japan has had a military force since 1950, when it was known as the National Police Reserve. Today, without formal amendment to the law, the SDF is among the most modern armed forces in the world. The post-World War II Constitution, especially Article 9, now shows signs of old age. Constitutional re-evaluation is necessary if Japan truly wants to assume the responsibilities of a great power, especially as UN-sponsored PKO become more important.

James Auer describes the writing of Japan's Constitution in his 1993 article "Article Nine: Renunciation of War." Following World War II, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, had his staff prepare a draft constitution for Japan. MacArthur originally intended Japan to have no military capability —even for self-defense. The staff guidance he presented for the first draft of the Constitution said, in

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