to conduct limited and fragmented training in preparation for peacekeeping operations. Some peacekeeping units have had only one week to prepare for a mission. As a result, training and doctrine received a value of 3 (sufficient) and 1 (deficient), respectively.

Except for the MFO Sinai, U.S. military forces have limited experience in a peacekeeping environment. The two most current operations are PROVIDE COMFORT and UNOSOM I/II. UNOSOM I was actually a peace-enforcement mission. However, many of the functions performed during UNOSOM I overlap with peacekeeping and serve as a good analytical tool to evaluate the U.S. military. Consequently, experience received a value of 2 (deficient). The bottom-line assessment summarizes all of these factors.

Is the U.S. military prepared to conduct future peacekeeping operations? The U.S. has the tools to succeed in peacekeeping. However, the Department of Defense and the services lack clear doctrine and experience, resulting in the fragmented system that exists today. The U.S. military is partially prepared for future peacekeeping operations based on the limited successes of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq and UNOSOM I in Somalia. However, there are still a number of command, control and communications, intelligence, force structure, and training issues that must be resolved before the U.S. military can say it is fully prepared for future peacekeeping operations.

TOWARD A PEACEKEEPING DECISION MATRIX

It is imperative that military leaders and policymakers weigh all the possible ramifications of employing U.S. troops on international peacekeeping missions. There are numerous factors that can cause a peacekeeping mission to either fail or succeed. Some of these factors are fairly static, while others, because of their dependence on world events, may be quite dynamic. The size and commitment level of a U.S. force will usually be quite stable, while the political consensus that originally fostered the deployment of the force may change considerably, depending upon world events.

While there exist many variables in the peacekeeping environment, three main principles consistently present themselves: 1) the requirement for host country support, 2) the maintenance of peacekeeper neutrality, and 3) the minimum use of coercive force. While many other conditions, factors,

variables, and tenets are prescribed and written about, these three are the overwhelmingly basic common factors involved in the conduct of successful peacekeeping operations.

It is not easy to take the measure of the numerous variables that will contribute to the successful completion of any peacekeeping operation. Each mission is unique. It is risky to judge a dynamic situation in terms of unqualified yes or no answers. Because deploying peacekeeping forces is a political decision, it is subject to the vagaries and whims of any political process. However, some organized and objective decisionmaking process should be employed when trying to evaluate the viability of a given peacekeeping operation. By considering eight interdependent variables and applying relative weights to each variable, the three previous U.S. experiences can be systematically examined. The resulting peacekeeping assessment matrix can be used a tool for decisionmaking. The eight variables that will be individually assessed below for each case study are:

1. U.S. political controversy

2. World level of support

3. Complexity level of the operation

4. Host-country support

5. Neutrality

6. Use of force

7. U.S. troop participation

8. Level of force training.

ASSESSING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The three case studies evaluated in this paper are the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon, and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula. These three case studies span the spectrum of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations, from providing unarmed military observers to monitor a cease-fire (UNTSO) to providing a large conventional military unit that is interposed between two or more belligerents (MFO and MNF).

All of these cases involve peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, and there is some political overlap between them. The UNTSO operation provides support to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights.

Observers from UNTSO, members of UNIFIL, and the MNF all coordinated their efforts from 1982 to 1983. The UNIFIL mandate attempted to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon, and to restore control of that area to the Lebanese government.

These three examples provide a sampling of political diversity. UNTSO is a peacekeeping operation under UN auspices. Though the UN tried to establish peacekeeping forces in both the Sinai in 1980 and in Lebanon in 1983, for political reasons they were unable to do so. Therefore, the other two examples of U.S. peacekeeping missions were conducted outside of UN control. The MFO and the MNF were established under a political coalition. The MNF included peacekeepers from Italy, France, the U.S. and Great Britain. The MFO is a heterogeneous organization combining military and civilian members from Fiji, Colombia, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, and the United States.

A great deal of political controversy may surround the deployment or even proposed deployment of a peacekeeping force. Internal U.S. political controversy can derive from many factors: the host country's attitude, U.S. public opinion, UN backing which can represent world opinion, the level of U.S. troop participation, and the current policies of both the executive branch and Congress. These three case studies include operations which generated very little political controversy (UNTSO), through operations that instigated some controversy (MFO), all the way to an operation that catalyzed a great debate on U.S. peacekeeping and foreign policy (MNF). They have succeeded, failed, or are inconclusive. The MFO has been lauded as one of the most successful peacekeeping operations ever undertaken (McDermott: 114). The MNF, on the other hand, has been called "America's Greatest Peacekeeping Disaster" (Shuger: 40). UNTSO, a supposedly temporary peacekeeping operation, has met with mixed success (UN e).

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISORY
ORGANIZATION (UNTSO)

The UNTSO mission, beginning in 1948 and continuing to the present, did not create undue political controversy when it was initiated. As tensions grew in the Middle East, and UNTSO took on more diverse responsibilities, some criticism of its effectiveness arose. The greatest amount of internal U.S. controversy concerning UNTSO was sparked with the kidnapping

of Marine Lieutenant Colonel William R. Higgins in 1988 (Watson: 33). Yet, the U.S. continued to support UNTSO with military observers.

UN and world support for UNTSO has been fairly high, but at the same time a larger, more ambitious mission has not been undertaken. In the UN there is some criticism of this longest running peacekeeping operation (UN e). Israel does not particularly welcome UNTSO (Horn: 128). For these reasons, UN, host-country and world support of UNTSO is considered neutral.

UNTSO is a fairly complicated peacekeeping mission. Some of its elements operate in an urban environment, cooperation is mixed, and a significant number of casualties have been incurred by UNTSO observers. Altogether, the level of complication of the entire UNTSO mission is high.

The Israeli government and many Arab factions do not really trust UNTSO. Further, there is widespread mistrust of the UN, which is sometimes perceived as an American political tool. The high number of UNTSO casualties is testament to the fact that the peacekeepers are not viewed with complete neutrality by either side (Wood: 14).

The UNTSO mission is only an unarmed observer mission. The mission itself, though working closely with UNDOF and UNIFIL, uses little coercive force. This is a very positive aspect of the UNTSO mission. While the UNTSO observers may not be able to enforce some of their mandate, by using only unarmed observers they can establish their neutrality in a better manner, and therefore gain more host country support.

The U.S. deploys only a handful of military personnel to UNTSO. Because of this, little political controversy has been raised in the U.S., and the overall UNTSO mission is not perceived to be dominated by any particular world power.

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photo used with permission

U.S. military observers that participate in UNTSO are all commissioned officers. They have each received at least two weeks of specific training, in addition to their normal qualifications as U.S. military professionals (USA c: 13). Their training level is fairly high, even considering the many difficulties of the UNTSO mission.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)

The MFO, begun in 1981 and ongoing, shares many similarities with UNTSO, yet when examined using these eight variables produces different results. The MFO's employment did not cause a contentious political debate in the U.S., and Congress approved the mission, both as a treaty and under the War Powers Resolution (U.S. Cong b: 3). The majority of the international community supported the MFO's employment. The UN could not employ its own peacekeepers because of an anticipated Soviet veto, but widespread support did exist for this particular mission, even