The issue of casualties is a frightening prospect for the SDF. In previous operations, Japan has not suffered any military casualties. Some think that had the policemen killed and wounded in Cambodia been SDF troops, public outcry against the SDF could have risen to a fever pitch. Lieutenant Colonel Hayashi expressed the military's reservations about taking casualties because the effect of SDF deaths on public opinion is unknown. The SDF fears a public backlash against overseas deployment would offset all the positive strides made by the SDF in recent years. The PKO law's fourth condition, which allows Japan to withdraw from UN operations unilaterally, would come into play following any hostile activity. The SDF does not want to be caught in an impossible situation between domestic politics and a deadly operation.

Issues that do not have a direct impact on events in Japan do not interest the Japanese public. The potential controversy surrounding Bosnian PKO participation muted any discussion of the subject. Such an operation promised no tangible benefit for Japan, while the mere act of studying military participation in a European issue was anathema to most Japanese politicians. However, Japan is warming to the prospect of maintaining peace far from its shores. Japan relies on the Middle East's oil, and has come to be more interested in preserving peace in the region. Israel in particular has aggressively pursued Japanese investment and economic participation. The deployment of SDF peacekeepers to the Golan Heights is a sign of Japanese commitment to stability in the region, and will enhance Japan-Israel relations. If Japan's presence there continues beyond the original two-year term and expands to include greater duties, Japan's influence in the region will increase.

LOOKING AHEAD

According to Professor Inoguchi, Japan's continued participation in PKO will take place in remote locations, including additional deployments to Africa and potentially South Asia. This is because such operations are less likely to arouse controversy. Small, isolated operations west of Bangladesh are not haunted by the specter of World War II, and therefore are more acceptable both in Japan and to Japan's neighbors.

Some work is being done to further U.S.-Japan combined PKO. Although the U.S. offered to work with the SDF on this topic years ago, only recently has the SDF undertaken a study. An operation using U.S.

combat troops and Japanese engineers and logistics would be “natural,” according to the Institute for International Policy Studies' Shimauchi. However, care must be taken to ensure that Japan and the U.S. do not appear too powerful, especially in the eyes of East Asian countries.

The military threat to Japan has all but disappeared, and increasingly close ties to the U.S. military provide a hedge against a resurgent danger. The post-Cold War world structure is fundamentally different than its bipolar antecedent. Guaranteeing peace and security in a new era requires that powerful nations, including Japan, engage in constructive measures to limit war and solve international disputes.

The SDF should be Japan's primary instrument for accomplishing this task, rather than "checkbook" diplomacy. Since the 1992 deployment to Cambodia, the SDF has seen its popularity and morale rebound from a post-Cold War low. The SDF, always a capable fighting force, never before had the opportunity to display its competence. PKO give Japan the chance to get a return on 50 years of defense spending. To maximize results, Japan needs to allow the SDF the latitude to conduct operations across the full spectrum of PKO. The SDF law, the PKO law, and the Constitution all are due for revision, or at least reinterpretation. Closer ties wrought by the April 1996 Japan-U.S. summit can also enhance Japanese PKO efforts. As the SDF becomes a more effective peacekeeping force, the Japanese public will be more accepting of Japan's limited military role in the world. In the consensus-based Japanese society, a broad base of popular support is essential for continuing success. PKO is a way for Japan to participate in the "new world order," and to develop a new mission for the SDF. Article 9 declares that Japan "aspires sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order." Peacekeeping gives Japan the perfect opportunity to live up to the ideals of its Constitution. The mission can only help the SDF to improve its own readiness and public image. With the Soviet nemesis gone. the SDF should concentrate its efforts on expanding participation in peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 5
NONPROLIFERATION

The UN Security Council resolutions authorizing the multilateral coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait were followed by UN action establishing the most comprehensive multilateral apparatus to enforce the peace since the occupation of Japan and Germany. Iraq was required to reveal and destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction, and the UN was empowered to monitor Iraqi compliance using an intrusive inspection regime. The role of intelligence in this process was crucial. Working from intelligence tips, the UN soon discovered a massive clandestine nuclear weapons program in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and undetected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. A fundamental reform of the IAEA safeguards system followed, establishing new procedures for the use of intelligence in international organizations.

Captain Hudgins traces the history of the IAEA and its role in nuclear nonproliferation. She outlines the legal structure and the inspection process to monitor peaceful use of nuclear energy and to prevent diversion to nuclear weapons. The disclosure of the Iraqi weapons program called into question the whole nonproliferation regime. The IAEA responded with a new set of procedures for safeguards and a willingness to insist on unannounced inspections of undisclosed facilities. Captain Hudgins shows the key role that intelligence played in the political process required to discover the Iraq nuclear program, and the evolution of procedures for the integration of intelligence input into safeguards inspections.

The first test of the new IAEA inspection regime came in North Korea. Master Sergeant Campbell reviews the history of North Korea's nuclear program and relationship with the IAEA. As part of diplomatic efforts to ease tension, on 10 April 1992 North Korea signed a safeguards agreement that included the intrusive inspection provisions implemented in the wake

of the Gulf War. Based on the results of inspections and intelligence reporting, the IAEA became suspicious and insisted on spot-inspections of sites which might have evidence of North Korean violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty. North Korea refused and the issue was brought to the UN Security Council, prompting a crisis that ended with the visit to Pyongyang by Former President Jimmy Carter and an agreement by the North to freeze its nuclear program. Sergeant Campbell shows the role of intelligence in the inspection process and the public diplomacy leading to the framework agreement, measures that have settled the crisis at least for the moment.

Overt intelligence sharing is a new way of doing business for the IAEA. Captain Hudgins considers the implications of the new arrangement for U.S. policy, for the U.S. Intelligence Community, and for the IAEA. Sergeant Campbell considers the role of intelligence in public diplomacy, and Theodore Wolff concludes that there is a new counterproliferation mindset in the U.S. Intelligence Community that sees U.S. national interests served by cooperation between the Community and the IAEA.

INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Audrey D. Hudgins

Captain, U.S. Army
September 1992

OVERVIEW

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the revelations of Iraq's extensive nuclear weapons program have far-reaching implications for the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation. During the Cold War, parity was the governing philosophy of the two great nuclear powers, the United States and the USSR. Deterrence, fostered by nuclear parity, provided an unusually stable global environment. This nuclear duality regulated the regional ambitions of technology-dependent countries, thus ensuring continued global stability. Further, both great powers generally supported the tenets of nuclear nonproliferation and related treaties, thereby controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a thoroughly multipolar world in strategic terms; the concept of deterrence effectively vanished.

Revelations of the Iraqi nuclear weapors development program also contributed to the global nuclear imbalance. The mere existence of that country's nuclear program removed any confidence the world had in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which consists of three major elements: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and a wide-ranging group of export controls.' Iraq proved that despite the existence of the NPT and the concerted efforts of the IAEA and multilateral export control groups, nuclear proliferation remains a serious global problem.