success of Najin-Sonbong can lead the North Koreans to expand or establish additional FETZ's in other parts of the country. The North Korean experience may be similar to that of the Chinese and Vietnamese governments as Communist Party elite gain wealth and independent ideas from foreigners.

Accepting capitalistic practices raises questions in North Korea about the raison d'etre of the communist political system. The Korean Workers Party's job is to protect the workers from exploitation by the "imperialists" and their "running dogs" (Lee a: 15). These concerns must of necessity be downplayed, as they were in China and Vietnam, when the immediate need to feed the people takes precedence. The official propaganda reflects plenty of room for maneuver for the North Koreans to save face by claiming they are self-reliantly caring for all Koreans.

A gradual reunification process could continue as the economic cooperation between North and South Korea increases, lessening the impact of the political differences. On the other hand, Chinese communists have felt no need to yield political power despite their adoption of capitalistic cooperation with Hong Kong and Taiwan. North Korea could remain a separate political entity for a very long time and maintain close economic relationships to South Korea, the other TREDA nations, Japan, and the United States that will reduce the possibility of war.

TREDA does not have to succeed to the optimistic levels envisioned by the UN and the TREDA participants to have a positive impact. The TREDA participants and Japan will gain comparative advantages over other developing areas if they cooperate to maximize the resources of each TREDA country. Utilizing Najin-Sonbong as a transportation hub is the major contribution to simplifying the logistics of trade between the countries of Northeast Asia.

The implications for a successful TREDA and North Korean FETZ for the United States can be good both economically and politically. As TREDA becomes a hub of trade in Northeast Asia, American corporations will have easier and cheaper access to the area. Economic cooperation among the TREDA countries and Japan will lessen the possibility of conflict. If the United States does not support TREDA's efforts, a reduced economic and security role in Northeast Asia will result.

CONCLUSION

North Korea's participation in the TREDA is a watershed change in economic policy, not a short-term defense measure due to shortages of food and fuel. Its goals of obtaining sufficient food and fuel and learning the lessons of controlled market economics will be reached with or without U.S. assistance. In North Korea, security policy and foreign trade policy are interlinked. In North Korean's eyes, the country has made security changes and concessions to the international community in order to revive its economy. North Korea has also made significant economic and policy changes and shifted its propaganda line. Kim Chong Il must now deal with his own hard-liners, who complain about appeasing enemies and lost sovereignty because of compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, UN Food Aid, and TREDA cooperation with the UN and South Korea.

The North Korean military is spearheading the reforms, based on Chinese, Vietnamese and Laotian models, to help them maintain political control while meeting economic needs (Zumwalt: B4). This may lead to additional FETZs being established and the eventual spread of market reforms beyond the barracks and the FETZ to the rest of the economy as benefits become more visible. Selected communications, computer, and chemical technologies will be imported, allowing North Korean military modernization on the pattern of Deng Xiaoping's "four modernizations." Profit will trickle down to the party and population. Improved living standards for all will protect Kim Chong Il and be impossible to retreat from, thus institutionalizing limited capitalism.

The North Korean leaders face a dilemma. Whether they succeed or fail at keeping the loyalty of the army and attracting foreign investment, they will eventually lose their absolute control over the people. To succeed economically, there must be increased access to information. If they do not allow access to information, their economy cannot grow. If they allow the freedoms necessary for a healthy economy, their people will not trust them any longer. The North Korean regime loses control either if they succeed too well in their TREDA cooperation or because they do not cooperate with TREDA enough.

The TREDA market is potentially as large as the European Union. TREDA and North Korea's FETZ may succeed with or without U.S.

participation. By supporting TREDA and North Korea's participation. U.S. foreign policy goals can be met. The Clinton administration's national security policy of "engagement and enlargement,” the nuclear nonproliferation agreement negotiations, the proposal for "four-way talks" between North and South Korea, China and the United States (R. Smith a: A25), the agreement on a U.S./DPRK joint search for servicemen missing in action, and the proposal to end sanctions against North Korea in exchange for a halt to Pyongyang's sales of ballistic missiles are starting points for continued negotiations with the North Koreans (Gertz c: A20). Allowing U.S. business to gradually increase participation in North Korea's Najin-Sonbong FETZ would give the United States some access and influence in North Korea.

A foundation for greater U.S. influence in Northeast Asia, based on mutual economic and political interests, could be established if eventual Korean reunification lessens our military role. Encouraging the North Korean FETZ may have the additional benefit of weaning the North Koreans from dependence on weapons sales to gain hard currency. The North Koreans may also find that the political costs of maintaining a nuclear power program are prohibitive if they can meet their energy and security needs through trade.

Chapter 7

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

The lack of a domestic consensus on U.S. participation in world government is nothing new. In negotiating the Treaty of Versailles, President Wilson was unable to build the domestic political consensus necessary to obtain ratification. A joke that circulated in Geneva went that the two great American inventions during World War I were the League of Nations and the cocktail, and that the U.S. Congress proceeded to outlaw both. The balance of powers in the U.S. Constitution means there is inherent tension between the executive and legislative branches whenever the issue of allocation of decisionmaking power arises. It mattered little that the shift to an emphasis on multilateral diplomacy came gradually in the Reagan and Bush Administrations, as the U.S. moved toward cooperation with the Russians in the UN. The Clinton Administration faced the traditional balance of powers debate as it contributed to the UN's enhanced role in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Placing U.S. soldiers under UN operational command and sharing intelligence with the UN were the key issues in this round of the ongoing debate.

William O'Hara traces the evolution of President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25) on reforming multilateral peace operations. He sets the context with a review of constitutional provisions on the conduct of foreign affairs and the controversy concerning joining the League of Nations and the UN. The War Powers act is analyzed because UN peace operations may place U.S. troops in a combat situation. For example, a domestic political crisis erupted as U.S. Rangers under UN command were killed in the streets of Mogadishu. While the Congress has given explicit approval and tacit consent to various U.S. deployments in UN peace operations, there is a lack of consensus in Congress on a general policy and any Administration would have a

very thin base of domestic political support for putting Americans at risk in UN operations.

Joseph Hays focuses on one key provision of PDD-25 that authorized enhanced information support to the UN. Although the idea was first proposed by President Bush in the UN General Assembly, there was resistance even then in Congress and the U.S. Intelligence Community. Many in Congress felt that intelligence sharing with the UN, a multilateral institution. risked exposing sources and methods. As part of the debate on the balance of powers, the issue of intelligence sharing became an election-year political football when sensitive U.S. documents were found abandoned by the UN unit as it evacuated its headquarters in Somalia. After a highly partisan debate, no action was taken. It appears that the Congress sees some positives in intelligence sharing with the UN if it is handled in a professional manner. As with the issue of U.S. troops under UN command, the base of support for the policy is thin.