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houses of Congress passed legislation which would require the President to lift the Bosnian arms embargo. In spite of presidential lobbying, the bills passed overwhelmingly in both Houses (Cooper and Devroy: A1).

Although not as dramatic, there has also been a gradual erosion of the war powers of the executive branch. In 1993, Congress, for the first time in 20 years, used its "power of the purse" to cut off funds for an overseas military mission, effectively killing U.S. participation in the UN peacekeeping effort in Somalia. Additionally, the House's National Security Revitalization Act and the Senate's Peace Powers Act of 1995, if passed into law, would prohibit the President from placing U.S. troops under a foreign UN commander unless the President declares the UN deployment vital to U.S. national security interests. These examples show an increasingly assertive Congress using its constitutional power to restrain the war powers of the President. These actions however, have not constrained the President from exercising his power as Commander in Chief. The most recent example has been President Clinton's deployment of troops to Haiti without first receiving congressional approval.

Implications

The assertion and then retraction of the Clinton administration's policy of "assertive multilateralism" will have long-term effects on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The President has lost some of his prerogative for unilateral action, and Congress has gained influence in the conduct of foreign affairs. As may be seen in the debate over funding the Bosnia rapid reaction force, the executive branch is no longer the sole spokesperson for U.S. foreign policy. Foreign leaders now visit the Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House (Devroy and Swardson: A29). If this trend continues. there is a danger that allies may not trust the U.S. President's word, and enemies may disregard the threat of any U.S. retribution.

U.S. influence in the UN will surely decline. Proposals in Congress to reduce U.S. payments to the UN, put restrictions on UN command of U.S. troops, and to limit intelligence sharing, all show a Congress increasingly skeptical of the UN. This attitude of mistrust makes it all the more likely that Congress will try to reduce the current level of support. Additionally, it is probable that Congress will try to impose firm limitations on any future U.S. military participation in UN operations.

These actions may hamper the ability of the President to use the UN as an instrument for peacekeeping and peacemaking. If U.S. support for the UN declines, so will its ability to influence the UN in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. President Bush used the UN masterfully to get the international community behind the effort to expel Iraq from Kuwait. President Clinton also used the UN Security Council to get a resolution allowing the use of force to install President Aristide in Haiti. As Congress reduces funding for the UN, the President may find it more difficult to gather support for resolutions and other UN actions beneficial to U.S. foreign policy.

The final implication is the possible reduction of U.S. leadership, not only in the UN, but also in the world. As has been demonstrated in Bosnia, if the U.S. does not take a leadership role across the whole spectrum of support to UN operations, such as placing troops on the ground, its influence on the other participants, allies and enemies alike, is greatly reduced. Some countries may view the lack of support for the UN as a sign of isolationism. If countries believe the U.S. is withdrawing somewhat from the international stage, other nations will fill the perceived vacuum and the U.S. could lose some of its leadership in the world.

OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Joseph G. Hays III
U.S.Department of State
August 1996

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts between the Congress and the executive branch on foreign policy issues have their basis in the U.S. Constitution. The separation of powers, established by the Constitution, makes the President Commander in Chief and gives him the authority to speak for the nation on foreign policy issues, while giving to the Congress the power to fund U.S. Government programs, regulate trade, confirm ambassadorial nominees, approve treaties, and declare war.

This division of foreign policy responsibility results in a tug-of-war between the Congress and the executive over foreign policy issues. The over-arching Soviet strategic threat faced by the U.S. following the Second World War tended to lessen this conflict. While there were certainly foreign policy confrontations between the Congress and the executive during the Cold War, most notably as a result of the war in Vietnam, the perceived threat of global Communism and the very real threat of nuclear annihilation tended to create a bipartisan consensus on a general foreign policy framework, obscuring the constitutionally inherent friction between the Congress and the executive on foreign policy issues. The shared perception of the Congress, the executive, and the public that there was indeed an over-arching threat to U.S. security, enhanced the power of the executive relative to the Congress, reduced friction between the Congress and the executive, and muted partisan foreign policy debate.

The end of the Cold War eliminated not only this perception of a strategic threat to the U.S., but also made much of the existing foreign policy framework irrelevant, and eliminated the impetus for a consensus on foreign policy issues between the Congress and the executive as well as between the two major political parties. The result has been a reappearance of the historic conflict between the executive and the Congress over foreign policy issues. The lack of an over-arching threat to national security has resulted in a Congress more willing to challenge the executive on foreign policy issues, and an increase in the partisan nature of the foreign policy debate.

However, this congressional assertiveness is uneven and inconsistent, with the Congress apparently willing to defer to the executive on issues which have traditional Cold War overtones and clear strategic national interests, such as relations with Russia and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, while asserting itself on other issues such as U.S. involvement in Somalia and support for UN peacekeeping operations. where U.S. interests seem less clear.

Peacekeeping has in fact become the single most contentious foreign policy issue between the Congress and the executive. It is not only the prime example of the resurgence of conflict over foreign policy between the Congress and the executive, but also an example of the partisanship that now increasingly characterizes congressional debate on foreign policy issues (Rosner: 66).

Two bills to restrict intelligence sharing with the UN, the International Peacekeeping Policy Act of 1993 and a provision contained in the Peace Powers Act of 1994, were introduced following the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993. While neither bill moved beyond the committee stage, they nevertheless represent the beginnings of congressional assertiveness on the issue of intelligence sharing with the UN, and an indication of increasing partisan alignment on the whole issue of U.S. involvement with the UN. Following the 1994 congressional elections, the new Republican majority in the Congress introduced two bills to restrict the ability of the executive to share intelligence with the UN: a provision contained in the Contract With America and the International Peacekeeping Policy Act of 1995.

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