does not have an organized intelligence agency or permanently stationed ambassadors with a reporting function. Yet the requirement for and use of strategic intelligence are clear (Rivlin and Gordenker: 90). Simply speaking, the terms information and intelligence are interchangeable with respect to how decisions are made in the UN. Even U.S. military commanders assigned to UN operations are advised by the Joint Task Forces Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations to use the term information synonymously with and in place of intelligence (U.S. DoD m: 29). Information is arguably (in competition with funding) the most powerful single element in the political process in the UN. It is often the only tool available to a diplomat attempting to influence the actions of the UN or a member-state in crisis. It is also the element that brings the UN into action - the decision to actively address the crisis in Rwanda and not the crisis in Angola was largely a product of controlling (and emphasizing) information. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL The Secretary-General is charged with both administrative and political functions. The administrative role is specifically mentioned in the UN Charter. However, the political role of the Secretary-General depends largely on the incumbent's personality and the political climate of the international community. Although the Secretary-General is a member of the Secretariat, his office encompasses more than that organ. According to Article 97 of the Charter, the Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the UN (encompassing all five organs) and not just the administrative head of the Secretariat (Simma: 1023). The role of the SecretaryGeneral has been debated extensively since the creation of the UN in 1945. However, it is clear that the strength of the Secretary-General is based upon controlling (and reforming) the administrative functions of the Secretariat, including the management of information, and wielding political clout in the international community. Article 98 of the UN Charter describes the duties of the Secretary-General in generic terms; it states that the organs of the UN may entrust him with "other functions." These unspecified functions are manifest in three categories: functions relating to the compilation of information and the creation of studies; functions in connection with solving procedural problems; and functions in connection with addressing legal questions (Simma: 1042). Of these, the one that warrants the most attention by the Secretary-General involves the creation of studies and the gathering of information. The other functions are most often left to the discretion of the Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General. Since the Secretary-General is charged with administering the Secretariat, he therefore operationally controls the flow of information between the primary organs of the UN. The Secretary-General is the focal point for deciding when information must be sought and when and in what form it is released to the organs of the UN or the public. a request for the Secretary-General to make judgments. A Security Council request for information and advice from the Secretary-General demonstrates the importance of the perceived impartiality of the Secretary-General. But the impartiality of the office is a facade in these situations. When the Security Council asks the Secretary-General to gather information on a critical issue, the SecretaryGeneral will likely rely on the powerful member-states and an informal set of personal contacts for the information - albeit in a confidential fashion. The lack of an "in house" information-gathering system, and the quest for more influence in the decisionmaking cycle of the Security Council, are historically the primary concerns of the Secretary-General. 3 The term "call upon" is commonly used in UN Resolutions. It refers to a non-binding request for action. The term "good offices" is used to refer to the Office of the Secretary-General and includes individuals he appoints for a particular diplomatic mission. The authority of the Secretary-General to intervene in the political process of maintaining peace and security is codified by Article 99 of the UN Charter. It is almost always cited when the executive authority of the Secretary-General is questioned. Article 99 of the Charter states: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Although it has been used officially only twice (by Dag Hammarskjold in 1960 during the Congo crisis and by Kurt Waldheim in 1979 during the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran), it is often cited by the Secretary-General to add emphasis to his role as the head of the organization when there is a threat to the peace (Simma: 1051-1055). One of the most important concepts implied by Article 99 is that the Secretary-General is entitled to gather information for his own decisionmaking purposes versus responding to a request from the Security Council. The Article clearly implies that the Secretary-General has the right to conduct the necessary inquiries and investigations in order to decide whether there is a genuine threat to the peace and whether it should be brought to the attention of the Security Council (Simma: 1047). The impact of Article 99 on the desire to create an information-gathering system is demonstrated by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar: In order to avoid the [Security Council] becoming involved too late in critical situations, it may well be that the Secretary-General should play a more forthright role in bringing potentially dangerous situations to the attention of the Council within the general framework of Article 99 of the Charter. My predecessors have done this on a number of occasions, but I wonder if the time has come for a more systematic approach. Most potential conflict areas are well known. The Secretary-General has traditionally, if informally, tried to keep watch for problems likely to result in conflict and to do what he can to pre-empt them by quiet diplomacy. The Secretary-General's diplomatic means are, however, in themselves quite limited. In order to carry out effectively the preventive role foreseen for the Secretary-General under Article 99, I intend to develop a wider and more systematic capacity for fact-finding in potential conflict areas. Such efforts would naturally be undertaken in close coordination with the Council (UN m: 6). The importance placed on increasing the capability to gather and analyze information has led to numerous reforms in the past 50 years. The Secretary-General has increasingly sought to enhance his political influence in the UN, using his role as an information manager and his authority to reform the structure of the Secretariat. Beginning with the second UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, the reforms of the Secretariat structure reflect the concept that information is power for the Secretary-General. This power is vested in the ability to control the flow of valuable information, to insert emphasis in its content, and to distribute it among those who can approve action (Rivlin and Gordenker: 278). This power varies greatly among Secretaries-General, but there is no question that it exists. COLD WAR REFORM The Cold War greatly contributed to the growth and influence of the Secretariat and the office of the Secretary-General- especially in the realm of information gathering. The struggle between the superpowers unquestionably stifled the actions of the Security Council to collectively address threats to international peace. Between 1946 and 1970, the Soviet Union cast 103 vetoes to quell UN actions that it perceived as Western advances. Between 1970 and 1989, the United States cast 67 vetoes to stop actions that it perceived as supporting communist aggression (Rivlin and Gordenker: 8). This deadlock in the Security Council prompted numerous attempts by the Secretary-General to address international crises through the Secretariat and the General Assembly. These attempts required a mechanism to acquire, analyze, and manipulate information for the purpose of making (and promoting) decisions and creating operational plans. In these two decades, the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Office for Research and the Collection of Information were established in response to the Secretary-General's quest for information and a desire to extend his influence in the Security Council and in peacekeeping operations in general. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, responding to his involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in the Arab-Israeli conflict and what can be termed peace-enforcement operations during the Congo crisis, developed the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (PSCA). One of the primary functions of PSCA was to: "[A]ssist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his political responsibilities under the Charter and in pursuance of resolutions of United Nations organs" (UNSec c: 1). Although it does not refer directly to Article 99 of the Charter, that is clearly the basis for the existence of the organization. PSCA consisted of the Office of the Under-Secretary and four major subordinate divisions (see accompanying figure). Each subordinate department had three tasks in common: collect, analyze, and assess information; prepare reports; and provide secretariat services (i.e., administrative support) (UNSec c: 3-7). The organization was created to support the Secretary-General as well as the Security Council; however, it was the former who focused on the collection of information in order to better predict crises. Many of the Department's functions concerned the collection of information and provision of analysis (specifically, the Information and |