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[T]he UN should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of States and that it should, where necessary, continue peacekeeping operations of the traditional type under its Charter (“Somalia: UNOSOM”: 23).

The second recommendation underscored the difficulty inherent in intervening in internal affairs even if the UN had the international jurisdiction to supersede state sovereignty. The basis for the recommendation was the conclusion that "states are not prepared to accept substantial casualties for causes unrelated to their national interests." The "national interest" factor places severe practical limitations on the UN's ability to sponsor internal intervention. In future operations, the question of UN authority to intervene may become secondary to the larger practical issue of whether member states feel intervention is necessary for their own national interests.

The current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the present tension between the need for internal intervention and the will to intervene. Under the Reisman approach and Boutros-Ghali's vision, the UN probably has the authority to intervene in the internal affairs of Bosnia for humanitarian reasons. The documented plight of refugees and "ethnic cleansing" occurring in Bosnia give the UN a basis for intervention. The same internal conflicts are also threats to regional peace that would warrant an enforcement action under Chapter VII. The limited and wavering involvement in UN military operations by its member-states reflects, in part, the practical problem of getting states to accept substantial casualties for a cause that is unrelated to their national interests. Without a strong connection between the internal threat and national interests, states will continue to be reluctant to apply the jurisdiction of the UN in support of internal intervention enforcement operations.

CONCLUSION

The international system is operating under a set of international legal principles that have evolved over the past several hundred years. A principle undergoing reevaluation today is the doctrine of sovereignty and its relationship to the use of force. The social interdependence of states continues to drive changes in the doctrine of sovereignty, especially with the end of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, states appear willing to let the UN use the language in the UN Charter to further restrain the sovereign rights of states to use force. Secular principles will continue to drive the legal justifications for using force. The principles which form the emerging international system will include justifications for an expansion of the UN's international jurisdiction into the internal affairs of states to promote peace and for humanitarian purposes.

Although the UN will enjoy expanded jurisdiction under the emerging international system, state nationalism will continue to limit the UN's ability to successfully intervene in the internal affairs of a failed state or for a humanitarian purpose. Nationalism will cause states to consider whether their national interests are at stake before entering into any peacekeeping or enforcement action under the UN Charter. Nationalism will also continue to block attempts to establish a UN standing army. Although a lofty ideal, states are not prepared to completely cede their sovereign right of selfdefense to the UN. The UN, as a practical matter, does not possess the institutional ability to replace the state regarding all uses of force. Thus, the doctrine of nonintervention will continue to play a role in the emerging international system. The UN will begin looking to regional organizations to resolve international disputes as a substitute for the UN's inability to effectively intervene in all areas of the globe where threats exist to international peace and security.

Many of these regional organizations, however, are not organized to use force to restore or maintain peace in their regions. States that comprise these regional organizations also retain the same nationalistic policies that prevent the UN from garnering support for peacekeeping or enforcement operations. Limitations in the Charter language will continue to prevent regional organizations from conducting enforcement actions without Security Council approval.

The Security Council will continue to play a pivotal role in any UN peacekeeping or enforcement action. Under the present Charter, the UN is unlikely to restrain a state from using force unless the permanent members of the UN decide that UN action is in their own national interest. The present UN Charter also gives the permanent members of the Security Council the latitude to use force in violation of the UN Charter and purpose, since the UN is unable to effectively enforce sanctions or the use of

force without the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The UN Secretary-General will continue to explore new avenues for using the language under the UN Charter to restrain the right of a state to use force to resolve disputes. His efforts will continue to underscore the fact that the language in the UN Charter is the centerpiece for the evolving international system and the changing role of the state as a social institution. Nations, for their part, will continue to steer a course which promotes the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. But they will also retain sufficient sovereign rights to ensure they may take military action independent of the UN for self-defense and to maintain their own national security.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE USE OF

UN PEACEKEEPERS IN NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES

Margaret T. Mitchell

U.S. Department of State
April 1996

The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate.

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
January 1995

The role of the United Nations in the post-Cold War environment has changed significantly. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has advocated a more aggressive security role. This role includes the use of UN peacekeepers in non-traditional situations, such as humanitarian interventions. This study looks at how effective UN peacekeepers are when used as a humanitarian intervention force. For purposes of this paper, humanitarian intervention means interference in the internal affairs of another country, using force or threat of force, for humanitarian goals. It is the argument of this paper that, to be effective, UN peacekeepers cannot operate under traditional peacekeeping guidelines when conducting a humanitarian intervention. Case studies of UN missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia are used to examine the validity of this hypothesis.

Humanitarian intervention is incompatible with traditional peacekeeping. Under traditional peacekeeping guidelines, UN forces are in-country with the consent of the host government, they are neutral and impartial, and they use force only in self-defense. An intervention force, on the other hand, violates all of these guidelines: an intervention requires offensive use

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