of force; host-country permission is not necessarily obtained in advance (often because there are competing authorities, which are part of the problem); and it is impossible to remain neutral when, in order to carry out the UN's mandate, force must be used against one or more of the parties to the conflict.

This study concludes that the way the UN so far has authorized humanitarian interventions is not effective because:

1. It is easy for the UN to lose its neutrality and become part of the problem;

2. Neutrality cannot be maintained if using force, but offensive use of force is necessary, at least initially;

3. By compromising their neutrality, the UN forces can become legitimate targets;

4. The types of humanitarian crises that require military force are manmade and therefore cannot be resolved just with the provision of humanitarian aid.

Motive

UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA

Heavy loss of human life

Widespread material damage

Threat to stability and peace in the region

Protection for organizations providing humanitarian assistance
UNSC "deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering"
Provision of secure environment for humanitarian relief operations

Mandate

UNOSOM was authorized to assist the Secretary-General in obtaining and maintaining a cease-fire and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance. Six months after UNOSOM's establishment in April 1992, the Secretary-General and Security Council decided more aggressive action was needed and, acting under Chapter VII authority, authorized a U.S.-led coalition (UNITAF) to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The transfer of authority in May 1993 from UNITAF to UNOSOM II led to a much broader mandate, also under Chapter VII authority. This mandate basically called for the UN forces to try to stop the civil war and also to continue humanitarian relief operations. In February 1994, under UNSC Res 897, the mandate was revised, the main difference being that UN forces would not use coercive measures but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties.

RWANDA

Motive

■ Hutu forces rampage, massacre hundreds of thousands of Tutsis Humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions

■Deep concern about systematic and widespread killings

Security and support needed for humanitarian operations

Mandate

UNAMIR I was initially established at the request of the warring parties to monitor compliance with the Arusha Accords. A secondary part of the mandate was to assist in coordination of humanitarian relief operations. Non-compliance by the parties to the accords led to a delay in the full deployment of UNAMIR. When the April 1994 mass genocide began, UNAMIR was ill-prepared to assist. The French were authorized in June 1994, acting under Chapter VII authority, to conduct a strictly humanitarian operation (Operation Turquoise), protecting refugees and displaced persons and allowing the distribution of humanitarian relief. This two-month operation served as a transitional force until UNAMIR II contingents could be deployed.

Conclusion

The UN deployed to Rwanda in an attempt to help with the provision of humanitarian assistance and the security and protection of refugees, but it was not an operation that combined elements of Chapter VI and VII. Operation Turquoise was authorized under Chapter VII because the French would not conduct the mission otherwise. The UN is currently confronted with a situation that cannot be handled without massive resources, both financial and personnel, and without a great deal of international political will.

UNAMIR I was to be an observer group that would facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The rapid escalation of violence following the deaths of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi caught the UN off-guard and quickly overwhelmed the small UN contingent in the country. Operation Turquoise was only able to provide assistance and security for those already in refugee camps.

Use of force in Rwanda was not seriously considered. The Rwandan crisis reflected a lack of will on the part of the UN to use the necessary means required to take control of the situation. Even had the UN decided to use the overwhelming force that would have been necessary to quell the violence, the massacre would have been over long before most troops had arrived. There would have been little left to do beyond protecting the fleeing refugees. Peacekeeping forces in Rwanda could only have operated under Chapter VII guidelines because the only way to stop the crisis would have been with force, had the UN been able to deploy rapidly.

Motive

UN PROTECTION FORCE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

■ Heavy loss of life, refugees, displaced persons, urgent humanitarian needs ■ Deliberate armed attacks by the Bosnian Serbs against civilians

Widespread rape of women

■ Detention camps for civilians reminiscent of Nazi concentration camps.

Mandate

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was mandated to escort humanitarian convoys, protect designated "safe areas," and monitor compliance with cease-fires and the military flight ban. Regional organizations—particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use "all necessary means" to support UNPROFOR in performance of its mandate.

Conclusion

The original mandate of UNPROFOR was to create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. The mission quickly developed a large humanitarian component to deal with predominantly man-made, often deliberate, crises. UNPROFOR quickly became a hostage to the whims of warring factions. The UNPROFOR operation was the first post-Cold War mission in which the UN tried to conduct a Chapter VI operation using elements of Chapter VII. It became clear very quickly that this would not work.

In an early example of the UN forces' hands being tied, in 1992 a UN convoy carrying a Bosnian government official was stopped by Bosnian Serb soldiers. While checking the UN forces' papers, a Bosnian Serb soldier leaned into the UN vehicle and shot the government official. The UN did nothing because they were not directly attacked; the Bosnian Serbs later said the soldier had been disciplined. When NATO forces conducted bombing runs (until August 1995), the targets were selected so as to make a point with the combatants, but were intended not to antagonize them (for example, hitting an airfield runway but not going after the aircraft). In these and other cases the UN was seeking to preserve its role as a neutral mediator and (unintentionally) allowed the Bosnian Serbs to capitalize on this effort.

The Bosnian Serbs quickly figured out how to get what they wanted from the UN – aid convoys were frequently stopped, delayed, or turned back by the Serbs. When it appeared NATO was serious about conducting air strikes, UN forces were taken hostage and sometimes handcuffed to potential military targets in the area the strikes were to take place.

photo used with permission

So far the most effective humanitarian interventions have been UNauthorized, but led by Great Powers. Humanitarian interventions are timeconsuming and expensive operations, best handled, at least initially, by a force willing to be aggressive and to risk casualties. Once a situation is stabilized, then a UN operation could take over. However, the UN and the international community must realize that neither can respond equally well everywhere, every time.

Examining the topic of humanitarian intervention today is important because technological advancements and global interdependence have made the world a much smaller place and have led to higher visibility of crises. The Intelligence Community should be concerned with this issue because by understanding the problems that peacekeeping forces can encounter when trying to conduct a humanitarian intervention, analysts can provide a more refined assessment to policymakers. Policymakers benefit as well because they can better appreciate what to