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Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, March 1997. Source: Central Intelligence Angecy

ask of the Intelligence Community and how to allocate resources more effectively.

The explosion of ethnic conflicts has led to civil wars and massive refugee flows. Many of the new states created by the downfall of the Eastern Bloc and superpower patronage are calling for UN involvement in conflict mediation, humanitarian assistance, and border disputes. The droughts, famines, and civil wars of Africa, which pre-date the collapse of the Soviet Union, are also putting more demands on the UN. This, at least partially, is because mass media are able to give the world instantaneous pictures and reports of the devastation countries are suffering.

All of these global changes, together with the Secretary-General's more aggressive stance on UN security concerns, have led to a greater willingness on the part of the UN, the Security Council in particular, to become involved at many levels. It has also placed a greater emphasis on humanitarian issues and precipitated increased use of peacekeeping forces, particularly to conduct humanitarian interventions.

The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations derives from a combination of factors- the physical presence of armed soldiers who will return fire if they are fired upon, the moral authority of the UN, the pressures of world public opinion. These work together to deter the hostile parties from taking rash military action. If UN forces take the initiative in using force against any combatant who might be threatening the peace, they have violated the UN's most basic peacekeeping principle- to intervene only with the consent of the parties. When they shoot, the forces have clearly lost the consent of those at whom they are shooting (UN d: 7).

This statement reflects the UN's view of peacekeeping-neutral forces interposed between conflicting parties, with the consent of those parties, to help maintain peace. If the UN takes sides or uses force, it becomes part of the problem at the root of the dispute. Often those disputes lead to the humanitarian crises that have recently overwhelmed the UN.

The need for armed interference implies that consent from authorities within the country is lacking. Lack of consent and use of force lead to the assumption on the part of forces within the country that these outside parties are not neutral, or at least not necessarily supportive of "their" position. Any actions to aid one element are likely to be interpreted as opposition against other elements. An intervention does not mean commitment to full-scale war but, since the intervening forces are frequently going into countries experiencing civil wars, they must be able to conduct appropriate military operations as required by the situation.

Understanding the differences between the two types of missions, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, is a step toward establishing a viable method of humanitarian intervention. Based on actions by the Secretary-General and mandates authorized by the Security Council, the UN appears to think that it should be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian interventions.

If humanitarian interventions are to be effective, international contingents cannot abide by traditional peacekeeping guidelines. Chapter VI of the UN Charter was intended for pacific settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII for collective security. Combining the two has proven to be extremely difficult. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has said:

International problems cannot be solved quickly or within a limited time... Their resolution requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to long-standing differences . . . It is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up. Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defense) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other (UNGA A/47/277 Supplement: 9).

Several overall conclusions can be drawn. First and foremost, it is easy for the UN to lose its neutrality and become part of the problem. UN forces in Bosnia were eventually seen as part of the problem even though they were there to help provide humanitarian aid, using force if necessary. They rarely used force and were unable to stop or stem the violence causing the crisis. When they tried to use force, they encountered a second problem, namely, neutrality cannot be maintained if using force. By compromising their neutrality, the UN forces became legitimate targets of war. And without a credible threat to conduct offensive operations, international contingents can become hostages to the combatants. Another problem inherent in humanitarian crises of the kind that require military force is the fact that they are man-made. Merely providing humanitarian aid will not resolve the problem. Somalia illustrated the difficulty in providing humanitarian aid but not following through and dealing with the root causes of the crisis.

Finally, the most effective solution so far has been the use of a coalition/ multinational force such as UNITAF. This last is probably the most-telling conclusion about the future of humanitarian interventions: the UN is not currently capable of conducting an offensive military operation. Peacekeepers are “a military force that is not in the business of threatening or using weapons except for self-defense" (J. Goldman: 15-16). Once a situation is stabilized by a non-UN coalition force, it could then be turned over to a UN peacekeeping force.

Coalition operations are expensive, and unless the international community is willing to pay, in terms both of money and lives, it must carefully choose when, where, and how to get involved. In the long run, if humanitarian interventions only provide immediate relief to afflicted civilian populations, without leading to a peace agreement, these crises will keep recurring. Nothing is more dangerous to the credibility of the UN than to threaten the use of force and then fail to use it or use it ineffectively (Roper: 12). Further studies might look at the effectiveness of multinational coalition peacekeeping forces. In the Gulf War, the coalition was able to repel Iraqi troops from Kuwait, but how effective would such coalitions be at resolving humanitarian crises and their root causes? Thus far, the operations the UN has conducted have all been mixed UN and coalition operations. Another study might examine the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force conducting a full Chapter VII humanitarian intervention and the effect this could have on the UN's primary diplomatic objectives. Diplomacy is the first and favored role of the UN. The UN was created as a world organization of last resort to avoid war or conflict. How would the UN change if it became an agency able to conduct war as well as stop it? Is this feasible? Or would the nation-state system as we know it have to change in a radical fashion?

DRIFTNET FISHERY ENFORCEMENT:

A NEW INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

William J. Quigley

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard
August 1995

The more clearly we understand the complex interrelationships between the different parts of our world's environment, the better we can understand the regional and even global effects of local changes to the environment. Increasing competition for the dwindling reserves of uncontaminated air, arable land, fisheries and other food resources, and water, once considered "free" goods, is already a very real risk to regional stability around the world. The range of environmental risks serious enough to jeopardize international stability extends to massive population flight from manmade or natural catastrophes, such as Chernobyl or the East African drought, and to large-scale ecosystem damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, and ultimately climate change. Strategies dealing with environmental issues of this magnitude will require partnerships between governments and non-governmental organizations, cooperation between nations and regions, and a commitment to a strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging environmental risks (U.S. President a: 15).

President William Clinton

In A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, President Clinton concludes that the decisions made today on the environment will affect U.S. national interests in the next 20 to 30 years. One recent portentous decision was the adoption of a worldwide moratorium on

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