INTELLIGENCE AND NONPROLIFERATION

Audrey D. Hudgins
Captain, U.S. Army
August 1992

The very idea of change . . . will dominate international life . . . the unthinkable and the not-even-thought-about will be commonplace. .. we have an opportunity to ... redefine the very mission of intelligence in the new world which we face (Quoted in Weiser: A14).

DCI Robert Gates

Nuclear proliferation has been a concern since the world entered the nuclear age. Early international efforts to operate and control nuclear fuel cycles, envisaged in the Baruch Plan, met with failure. In the years following, the use of atomic energy became a national rather than international endeavor. To aid the spread of peaceful nuclear technology and to prevent its diversion to military use, in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created. Some characteristics of this international inspectorate were appropriate only to the time in which it originated. Former World War II enemies of the Allied victors were the targets of the safeguards regime. Following ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA safeguarded nuclear cycles the world over.

By design, the agency's mission was strictly one of inspection and verification, as reflected in the safeguards agreements. The detection of clandestine nuclear activities was a mission of the major powers. Disclosure of the extent and complexity of Iraq's nuclear weapons program eroded the level of confidence that the international community had in the nuclear inspection and regulatory abilities of the IAEA.

But Iraq was a failure of far greater proportions. Although the agency might be faulted for its lack of an aggressive approach to inspections, safeguards are simply one component of a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iraq violated all relevant aspects of this regime. Through its accession to the NPT, Iraq pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq subverted the export control regime by clandestinely obtaining nuclear equipment and material. Finally, Iraq violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Iraqi nuclear weapons program showed that a signatory to the NPT could evade the IAEA, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and all other international scrutiny. As a result of this experience, all of these parties now realize the importance of global cooperation in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

Time has been the ultimate arbiter for international cooperation. Old enemies of World War II are now friends and allies. The Berlin Wall has fallen and the two Germanies are now one. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have formed a new global environment. Bilateral arms control and disarmament treaties evolved into multilateral confidence and security building measures. The United Nations has finally emerged as a more effective promoter of international peace and security.

The IAEA, an organization under the auspices of the United Nations, has reaped the benefits of enhanced cooperation. In 1991, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the IAEA, and the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) joined forces to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Despite its failure in some areas, intelligence has been the key to success. The U.S. Intelligence Community must now further define its role in a new international security environment. In order to ensure its continued effectiveness, the Intelligence Community must protect its sources and methods. But the Intelligence Community serves the policymaker, who in turn serves the national interest. The U.S. National Security Strategy defines nuclear proliferation as one of those interests. In order for U.S. and global concern over proliferation to be addressed, countries must choose to give the IAEA the tools it needs to do its job. Intelligence is one of these tools.

The Problem of National Interest

Nuclear proliferation presents a great threat to U.S. national security. Regional arms races can be destabilizing, potentially causing major shifts in

the strategic power balance. Gaps in the export control regime and the threat of Soviet nuclear scientist emigration only accelerate this dangerous nuclear timeline. The United States and its Intelligence Community must display vigilance and resolve. Unfortunately, nuclear proliferation does not compete successfully with other national priorities, as was the case with Pakistan in the 1980s. The U.S. must carefully weigh a myriad of factors when making short- and long-term policy decisions. The U.S. inability to certify Pakistan's peaceful nuclear intentions and its involvement in the Iraq problem indicate that nuclear proliferation is a continuing policy concern.

The Problems of the IAEA

Conflicting national interests have plagued states throughout history. The IAEA, representing over 116 countries, has had its share of conflicting "international interests."

Safeguards Effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness has been debated at the IAEA since its creation. Concerns over sovereignty and divergent views on the role of safeguards have contributed to diplomatic and political stalemate. The Iraq issue focused new attention on this issue. For example, the IAEA followed a routine, predictable inspection schedule. States pursuing clandestine development of a nuclear weapons program could clean up their operation prior to inspection and thus give the appearance of compliance with applicable safeguards. Iraq is a recent, yet classic example of this evasive strategy.

Never before had a country been found in violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Board of Governors came to the realization that IAEA safeguards are only as good as their implementation. This convergence of opinion has resulted in positive changes in the inspection process to ensure stricter compliance. The IAEA Board has implemented a short-notice, random inspection methodology and will soon adopt safeguards measures designed to detect clandestine activity.

Export Controls. Export control groups, and their member states, have expressed a traditional reluctance to provide export information to the IAEA because of its proprietary, commercially sensitive nature. During the inspections in Iraq, however, this information was essential in uncovering the depth of the clandestine nuclear program. The IAEA's handling of export information was very successful.

Iraq showed that many gaps exist in the field of export controls. The export control groups, one of the three pillars of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, have taken steps to enhance the comprehensiveness of export control guidelines. The inspections in Iraq also proved that greater cooperation between these groups and the IAEA produces a synergistic effect, making the regime as a whole stronger. Greater understanding and appreciation have developed between the two groups that will likely continue into the future.

A Lack of Aggressiveness. Historic evolution has framed the Agency's safeguards approach. Until very recently, aggressive application of safeguards was deemed prejudicial to a member state's sovereign interests. The absence of an aggressive approach perhaps allowed Iraq to proceed unencumbered with its weapons development program. The agency has since realized the benefit of a more aggressive attitude. Recently, IAEA inspectors have requested access to a number of suspected Iranian and North Korean nuclear facilities not declared by those countries in their safeguards agreements. This trend will likely continue as the IAEA strives to deter proliferation.

Counterintelligence. The IAEA is responsible for safeguarding the peaceful use of the atom, but is also the international purveyor of nuclear technology. With 85 percent of inspection personnel from non-nuclear weapons states, the IAEA must balance its approach; a lack of balance might actually make the IAEA a proliferant, as was the case with the director of the Iraqi national safeguards program. Nonetheless, this example has raised the IAEA's awareness of the dangerous potential of proliferation.

The IAEA and Nuclear Proliferation

The IAEA is a unique organization. Its role as the purveyor of peaceful nuclear energy gives the agency an understanding of global nuclear activity and allows unparalleled insight into the prospects for illegal nuclear activity. Its staff of scientists and technicians are able to evaluate information available through the open press, scientific and technical journals, and a number of in-house and other information sources to enhance this understanding. Finally, through its safeguards system, the IAEA has the authority to question or perform inspections to determine the purpose of suspected nuclear activity. No other organization, national or international, has the authority or the ability to perform all these tasks.

The IAEA safeguards system has three components: 1) to deter diversion, 2) to detect diversion, and 3) to confirm by inspection that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful use. The last two components are adequately addressed through the current safeguards approach. The first component has two implied tasks, the detection and deterrence of clandestine nuclear facilities, which have received new attention since Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program was revealed. It is now understood that the current safeguards system does not adequately address the issue of deterrence.

Deterrence is the key to a successful nuclear nonproliferation regime. A myriad of factors enable deterrence to be effective. First, and perhaps foremost, is the ability of intelligence to detect clandestine nuclear activity. No country can be fully confident that such activity will go undetected. Second, the political and economic impact of illegal proliferation can be a significant deterrent. When international concern is raised, political isolation and economic sanctions might persuade a proliferant to cease nuclear activity. Finally, the destabilizing effects of regional nuclear proliferation are a viable deterrent. Conventional military and nuclear arms races flourish at the cost of economic progress, a price many states cannot afford.

The IAEA's central role in the nuclear nonproliferation regime has continued relevancy despite missteps in handling the problem of Iraq. In order to ensure an effective regime, the IAEA must be empowered with the ability to deter illicit activity. The use of intelligence by the IAEA will provide this deterrent capability.

The Future of Intelligence and the IAEA

The IAEA safeguards system is simply not designed to detect diversions such as Iraq's and the IAEA is not in a position to develop an organic intelligence collection capability. The agency does not possess the resources for such a venture, and the great majority of member states would not support its creation. Moreover, member states already have a formidable intelligence capability in place. The IAEA must therefore rely on member states to provide intelligence information. The experience in Iraq has proved that intelligence is a useful and necessary complement to a successful IAEA safeguards regime.