INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO REFUGEE

OPERATIONS: WHO'S THE EXPERT?

James D. Edwards
Captain, U.S. Army
August 1996

INTRODUCTION

Increased U.S. military participation in refugee operations highlights the need for a better understanding of intelligence in these nontraditional missions. While skeptics assert that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does not produce intelligence, it does collect, analyze, and disseminate "information" - a term which has become a euphemism for intelligence within the United Nations. Because the UNHCR is a professional refugee protection and assistance organization with a worldwide presence in the field, its operational elements typically have better intelligence than an ad hoc, U.S. military joint task force. Consequently, the U.S. military can improve its intelligence in refugee operations by studying the UNHCR.

The UNHCR's intelligence-gathering system is specifically designed for refugee crises, while U.S. military intelligence organizations focus on an enemy or threat. As a result, operational elements within the UNHCR have more warning that they will be involved in an impending refugee crisis than their counterparts in the U.S. military, and the UNHCR has better intelligence to plan its response. Because of its technical collection capabilities and its emphasis on threats, however, the U.S. military is better at force protection during an ongoing refugee operation.

The lessons the military should draw from the UNHCR include: (1) NonGovernmental Organizations, and other organizations with a presence in the

crisis area, are usually the best sources of information in a refugee emergency; (2) an infatuation with "threats" to the relief force should not inhibit the intelligence staff's ability to assess the political, economic, and social aspects of the situation; (3) clandestine human intelligence will probably not be effective; and (4) unclassified intelligence products are essential.

REFUGEES IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Massive flows of refugees and displaced persons have become the central feature of most humanitarian emergencies (Eliasson: 185).

Jan Eliasson

former Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

This essay compares intelligence in U.S. military “refugee operations” with a similar function in the world's leading refugee organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).' After establishing the context for the study, the paper addresses the issues of intelligence in the United Nations (UN) and how intelligence differs from information. Then, it analyzes the intelligence functions of the U.S. military and the UNHCR by comparing strategic warning and the planning and conduct of refugee relief operations in each organization.

The end of the Cold War brought profound changes to the international security environment. Today, there is a paradox that while there is less threat of global war, there is also less peace in the world. Armed conflicts have increased dramatically since 1989, but the fighting is not between states; it is within them.2 The result has been a proliferation of complex humanitarian emergencies which "combine internal conflicts with largescale displacements of people, mass famine, and fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions" (U.S. Mission to the UN a: 1). The accompanying map depicts areas in which the U.S. Government assesses there is an ongoing complex humanitarian emergency.

2

In keeping with common practice, the term UNHCR refers to the institution known as the Office of the UNHCR. The term High Commissioner refers to the individual occupying this office.

According to the UN, "of the 82 armed conflicts in the world between 1989 and 1992, only three flared up between countries. The rest occurred internally..." See Hal Kane, The Hour of Departure: Forces That Create Refugees and Migrants (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1995), 21.

Estimated Number of the World's People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance,

International organizations are poorly equipped to handle the victims of these intrastate problems. Their assistance, or intervention, causes the state to assert the prerogatives of sovereignty, limiting the international organizations' capacity to act under international law (Loescher b: 141). Taken collectively, the rapid growth of complex humanitarian emergencies has overwhelmed the international community's capability to respond.3

While refugee statistics are often a contentious political issue, there is a consensus that the world's refugee population grew rapidly following the end of the Cold War. According to the UNHCR, the number of "persons of concern" to its organization almost doubled during this period.4

Who Is a Refugee?

The difficulty of determining just who is a refugee-and is therefore entitled to protection and assistance under international law—contributes to the international community's dilemma in responding to complex humanitarian emergencies. The most widely accepted definition of a refugee is any person

who is outside the country of his nationality. . . because . . . [of a] well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion (UNHCR c: 6, 11).

As a result of intrastate conflict, however, millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) now find themselves in refugee-like situations without ever having crossed a border. In many cases, the UN has responded by

In commenting on the 17 operations the UN was involved in during mid-1994, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali noted the UN was at "system overload." See Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, eds., Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, 1995), 164.

While most governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) accept the UNHCR's refugee statistics as authoritative, UNHCR estimates do not include the vast majority of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. In 1995, for example, the UNHCR acknowledged there were some 20 million additional IDPs not included in its numbers, placing the total number of people who had fled their homes at almost 50 million. (UNHCR, Brochure, UNHCR by Numbers, January 1995, 2.) A 1996 U.S. Government study reached similar conclusions, noting there were some 16 million refugees and an additional 22-24 million IDPs in the world. U.S. Mission to the UN, Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996 (New York: U.S. Mission to the UN, February 1996), 3-4.

authorizing the UNHCR to assist these IDPs as if they were actually refugees (Boutros-Ghali c: 268).

In practice, the lines between refugees, IDPs, and migrants have become increasingly blurred and subject to political manipulation. During the Cold War, Western governments encouraged refugees to flee from repressive regimes because their flight undermined the legitimacy of communist governments. Now, Western governments are tightening their immigration policies and strictly interpreting their obligations to provide asylum to refugees under international law (UNHCR g: 35-37).

This study takes a traditional view of the term refugee (Gorman: 15-20). It considers a refugee to be any person who has fled persecution or is the victim of forced migration. This determination facilitates a comparison of UNHCR and U.S. military operations in the field without cluttering the issue with the subtleties of international law. It also recognizes that the distinction between a refugee and an IDP is largely insignificant to an ongoing relief effort because the humanitarian support requirements are the same in either case. Thus, this study uses the term refugee in a much broader sense than most legal definitions of the word.

Refugees, U.S. National Interests, and the Military

Large population movements are inherently destabilizing influences on global and regional security structures. When the populations on the move are refugees, they are also symptomatic of an underlying political crisis that frequently involves U.S. national interests. The U.S. national security strategy implicitly recognizes this connection by stating, "transnational problems... like... refugee flows... have security implications for both present and long term American policy" (U.S. President b: 1). While many people view refugee assistance as a humanitarian obligation, the U.S. often has political, economic, or security concerns in a refugee emergency.

Of course population movements have always been a part of the “strategic landscape" (Sarkesian: 549). But the refugee crises of recent years have increasingly involved militaries for two major reasons. First, the suddenness, severity, and frequency of refugee emergencies have strained the international relief community's capability to provide emergency assistance. Militaries have been the only organizations capable of mustering viable relief efforts on short notice. Second, because most refugees are