Rationality and the Analysis of International ConflictCambridge University Press, 1992年3月27日 - 259 頁 This book is both an exposition and a defence of a social scientific approach to conflict in international relations. Professor Nicholson addresses two central questions. To what extent can we usefully discuss behaviour in violent or potentially violent international conflict as rational? How do we formulate and test theories in international relations so that we can rationally believe in them? After outlining social scientific approaches to international relations, the author describes the problems of rational decision making in conflict situations. He shows how rationality is in many strategic situations hard to define and often leads to paradoxes such as the prisoners' dilemma. Psychological stress can further result in the distortion of decision processes in times of crisis. Professor Nicholson pays particular attention to such distortions and also analyses how unconscious motivation relates to the rational choice framework. In the following part, the author explores rational beliefs about the international system. He examines theories of arms races, alliances and the international problems of ecology. Here he is critical of the classical school of international relations for a lack of rigour in dealing with the problems of evidence and belief. Finally, he discusses the philosophy of science, policy and ethics. With its emphasis on social scientific approaches, theory building and testing--and above all its clarity and accessibility--Rationality and the analysis of international conflict provides students with a key to understanding the complex field of conflict analysis. This book will therefore be core reading for courses on international relations, and it will also be read by students and specialists of political science and economics. |
內容
CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT | 11 |
2 Deadly quarrels | 14 |
3 Violence and structural violence | 17 |
4 Conflict analysis and its relatives | 22 |
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF CONFLICT | 25 |
2 The level of analysis | 26 |
3 A preliminary view of scientific development | 30 |
4 Facts and evidence | 34 |
6 Crisis and rationality | 135 |
AN ASSESSMENT | 138 |
RATIONAL BELIEF SOME TOPICS IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS | 143 |
THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF WARLIKE PHENOMENA | 145 |
2 The quantity of violence | 148 |
3 The analysis of statistical hypotheses | 152 |
4 The frequency of wars | 158 |
ARMS AND ARMS RACES | 164 |
scientific research programmers and paradigms | 36 |
6 Theories of human beings | 39 |
RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR | 43 |
RATIONALITY AND CONFLICT | 45 |
2 Simple rationality | 48 |
3 Decision taking as a group process | 52 |
4 The theory of games | 57 |
CONFLICT AND THE PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY | 63 |
some tentative approaches | 66 |
3 Games of disarmament | 72 |
4 The game of chicken | 75 |
5 Another look at nuclear deterrence | 82 |
THE ZEROSUM GAME SOLUTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS | 89 |
2 Hostility and the structure of games | 95 |
3 Games of distribution | 99 |
mixed strategies | 100 |
EMOTION AND RATIONALITY | 104 |
2 The uses and abuses of aggression | 105 |
3 Ambivalence and violence | 108 |
4 A model of the mind | 112 |
the definition of identity | 115 |
6 Justification of this analysis | 116 |
7 The relation to rational choice | 117 |
INTERNATIONAL CRISES THE WARPING OF RATIONALITY | 120 |
2 Definitions and attributes | 121 |
3 Adjustment to overload | 124 |
4 The individuals responses to crisis | 127 |
5 The groups responses to crisis | 133 |
2 The Richardson theory of arms races | 166 |
3 Some implications of the Richardson Theory | 175 |
4 Difficulties and extensions | 177 |
5 Arms races and war | 179 |
6 Alternatives and tests | 184 |
ECOLOGY AND THE FREERIDER | 187 |
2 The limits to growth and global modeling | 189 |
3 The social mechanisms of pollution | 193 |
4 The freerider | 199 |
5 Conclusions | 204 |
THE THEORY OF ALLIANCES | 208 |
2 The balance of power | 211 |
3 The statistical testing of the alliance theories | 215 |
4 Alliances and war | 219 |
CONCLUSION | 221 |
THE CRITICS | 223 |
2 The aping of the natural sciences | 225 |
3 Some supposed sins of the social scientist | 227 |
4 Contradictions and the coyness of critics | 231 |
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND VALUES | 235 |
2 Policy science and values | 237 |
3 Conflict and violence | 239 |
4 Some further problems of policy advice | 240 |
5 Conclusion | 242 |
References | 243 |
251 | |
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action actors Albert alliance Alpha appear argue argument armaments arms level arms race assume balance of power basic behaviour Billy black balls chapter chicken chicken game complex concept concerned conflict analysis consequences consider countries cows crises crisis Cuban Missile Crisis deaths decision makers decision-making defect definition deterrence deterrence theory dilemma discussed distribution effect equilibrium example farmers figure game theory generalisations global goals groupthink Hedley Bull human individual international relations international system involved issues large number Limits to Growth London means mixed strategy moral move normally nuclear particular pay-off matrix play players political possible preferences principle prisoners problem psychoanalysis rational belief rational choice rational choice theory reason relationship result Richardson saddle point scientific sense significant simple situation social sciences social scientist solution sort statistical strategy structure superego Suppose theory of games University Press violence wars World3 zero-sum game
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