northern

The cafe was much the fame with the northern powers, Geo. I and its was ftill more difficult for king George to manage 1716. them, fo as to draw none of them upon himself. Denmark and Sweden were at war: The czar had entered into a con- Negotiation federacy, which had taken from the Swede his German do- with the minions: The princes of the empire beheld with regret the princes. Ruffians in their country. It was the business of those who called them in, and made ufe of them, to fend them away. The acquifition of the duchies of Bremen and Verden, which king George had gained as elector of Hanover, had enraged king Charles of Sweden. He durft not, as king of GreatBritain, declare war against him (though he had done it as elector of Hanover) nor could he be reconciled with him, unless he restored the two duchies. The only way therefore was to compel that warlike prince to make peace. In this fituation, it was neceflary for king George to make alliances, and unite with those who could moft annoy him, in cafe they became his enemies. Being fure of the good difpofition of the regent of France, he trufted to his minifters the negotiation with that prince, and undertook himself the affairs of the north, where, it is plain, he knew fome enterprize was contriving in favour of the pretender.

States,

The negotiation with France fucceeded to his wifh. The WithFrance duke of Orleans, who had ftill more need of a support to and the mount the throne, in case of a vacancy, than the king had to maintain himself on that of Great-Britain, granted all that was defired. The States-General, who only aimed at peace and fecurity, readily came into a treaty, which embroiled them with no power they were concerned to manage, and which laid upon them fcarce any fresh obligation. General Cadogan, the abbot du Bois, and penfionary Heinfius, negotiated this affair with fo much fecrecy, that the treaty was finished almost before it was known to be in hand.

By this treaty, the pretender, that his near abode might The treaty not encourage commotions in Great-Britain, was to depart with France, immediately from Avignon, and go beyond the Alps; nor was he to be fuffered at any time to come or return thither, or to pass through the French Territories, under pretence of going to Lorrain, or even to fet his foot in any place within the dominions of France, much lefs to ftay there on any pretence whatsoever. This was accompanied with the renewing of the promises made at Utrecht, of abfolutely refufing protection to the chevalier de St. George, and of affifting him in any manner directly or indirectly. No refuge was to be given to the fubjects of either party, who should be de

clared

Geo. I. clared rebels. All that had been formerly agreed, concern1716. ing Dunkirk, was to be fully executed, and nothing was to be omitted that the king of Great Britain fhould think neceflary for the intire demolition of the harbour, and for the removing all fufpicion that a new harbour was intended to be made on the canal of Mardyke. This treaty referred to a memorial figned at London, in September, by monfieur Iberville, refident of France, and the lord Townshend and Mr. Methuen, fecretaries of ftate, containing the particulars required by king George to make him eafy and cure his fufpicions.

After these preliminaries (which might be confidered as the purchace given by France for this alliance) it was added, that, the true defign of this treaty being to ftrengthen the friendship established by the late treaties at Utrecht, the articles of those treaties, as far as they concerned the contracting parties, were confirmed and ratified, particularly, that the fucceffion to the crown of Great Britain in the Proteftant line, and to the crown of France in the family of Orleans, exclufive of the house of Anjou, should remain in full force. A mutual guarantee was alfo given for the performance of these, and all the other articles, and for the defence of the dominions poffeffed by the three powers at the time of figning the treaty, Then was fettled the fuccours each fhould give the party attacked, after fair means had been used to induce the aggreffor to defift from his enterprise. France and England were to furnish each eight thousand foot, and two thousand horse; and the States half that number. It was free to demand fhips or money inftead of troops; and, to prevent all occafion of difpute, it was agreed, that a thousand foot should be valued at ten thousand Dutch florins a month, and a thousand horse at 30,000. The fuccours at fea were to be valued in the fame proportion.

The chief end of this treaty being to support the fucceffions to the two crowns, that article was very largely explained. It was agreed, that, if the kingdoms, countries, or provinces of any of the allies were disturbed with inteftine divifions, or by rebellions, on account of thefe fucceffions, or any other pretence, the ally fo difturbed fhould have a right to demand aid, as in cafe of being attacked by a foreign power; that this aid fhould be fent within two months after demand, and the neceffary expences advanced by those of whom it was demanded, and no repayment to be required till a year after the troubles fhould cease. In cafe this aid fhould not be fufficient, it was added, the whole forces of

the

1716.

Murmur

ings against the treaty.

the other parties fhould be employed, and if occafion re- Geo. I. quired, war fhould be declared against the aggreffors. As foon as this treary was made public, it raised great murmurings, especially in France, where it was openly faid, the regent facrificed to his ambitious views the honour and advantage of the nation: The condefcenfion hitherto fhewn for England on account of the chevalier de St. George, had been too great, but the prefent proceedings were fhameful and mean: The demolition of Mardyke would be an eternal monument of the fubjection of France to England: Lewis XIV. would never have confented to it, and the unfettled ftate of Great-Britain did not put her in a condition to impofe laws: A prince, who had no other interest but that of his people, would have taken the opportunity to finish a work fo important and neceffary: The expreffions in the treaty, of doing whatever the king of Great-Britain shall judge neceffary to remove his fufpicions,' were of a very high ftrain, and derogatory to the fovereignty of the crown of France.

The king of Spain was highly offended at this alliance, and complained of it bitterly, affirming, it belonged to the ftates of the realm, not to foreigners, especially the English, perpetual enemies of France, to decide pretenfions to the throne, in cafe God fhould, in his anger, call the young king to himself: And from that time he took measures to difconcert this alliance.

This ftrict alliance with France was found fault with even in England, where it was pretended, that the fucceffion was fufficiently fecured by the treaty of Utrecht, and there was no occafion for fo many foreign troops, which might be called in on pretence of an invafion, and perhaps be used for different purposes. The king and regent difregarded these murmurs, being fatisfied that their mutual intereft would oblige them to an inviolable performance of their engagements. The character of these two princes had a great refemblance in many particulars. They had both great talents for government, and may be faid to have equally had an occafion for them in their respective circumftances, which were much the fame. Alike diflatisfied with the late adminiftration of affairs, they obferved the fame conduct. None of the friends and creatures of Lewis XIV. were in favour with the duke of Orleans; as none of the friends and creatures of queen Anne were in favour with king George. The difference, in their manner of treating them, entirely flowed from the different ufages of the nations they governed.

Geo. 1. King George delivered himself up to the Whigs, who had 1716. been perfecuted in the late reign: The duke of Orleans feemed to give himself up to the Janfenifts, whom Lewis XIV. had conftantly ill ufed: They changed minifters almost as often one as the other: Their competitors inspired them with the fame views, and almoft the fame precautions: They were alike even in their death, for both died fuddenly. The duke of Orleans is faid to have had a more prompt and ready genius: The multitude and difficulty of his affairs never hindered him from purfuing his pleafures; whereas king George was always attentive, always ferious, and feemed an enemy to all amusements: and therefore he was, beyond comparifon, more regular in his manners and conduct; befides, he was more conftantly attached to the party he had efpoufed, and was never feen to waver between the Whigs and Tories, as did the duke of Orleans between the Janfenifts and Molinifts.

Negotiations in the

north almoft fruitless.

General Cadogan had much better fuccefs in his negotiations with France, than the king had in his with the northern powers. Notwithstanding all his endeavours, he could engage them neither to be reconciled, nor even to fufpend their refentments. He feemed, however, to have fucceeded in fpite of the king of Denmark's defire to preferve his advantages, and the king of Sweden's eagerness to revenge and repair his loffes. His Swedish majefty had prefented to the emperor and the diet pacific memorials, and even fent plenipotentiaries to affift at the congrefs of Brunswick; but all these hopes quickly vanished. King George had, however, made that prince all the advances imaginable: Had ftrongly preffed the emperor, the kings of Denmark and Pruffia, and even the czar himself, that the Ruffians might march out of the empire: Nay, it is faid, he had proceeded fo far towards a feparate peace with the king of Sweden, as to offer to join with him against the Mufcovite, on condition only that he would renounce all pretenfions to the dutchies of Bremen and Verden. King Charles XII. was intractable; incenfed at the war made against him, when he could not defend himfelf; and still more at the peace, which they would compel him to make, on conditions, as he thought, both dishonourable and hard, he breathed nothing but revenge, and was as much offended with the king of Great-Britain, as with the czar and the king of Denmark.

As king George could not obtain the ceffion he defired, he took the best measures to fecure his new acquifitions, and compel the king of Sweden to remain quiet. It was given

out

out, that the confederacy he had entered into, was formed Geo. I. purely for the fake of peace. It was agreed by the con- 1716. federates, that each fhould furnish a certain number of forces and fhips, not to make new conquefts upon Sweden, but to oblige his Swedish majefty to fit easy under his loffes, and not endeavour to recover them. This rupture with Sweden was not only detrimental to the trade of Great-Britain, but had like to have proved fatal to the king; for, whilst he was labouring for a peace in the north, in order to secure his German poffeffions, a scheme was contriving to deprive him of his British dominions.

The difaffected in England, ftill purfuing their defigns in favour of the pretender, turned their eyes on the king of Sweden to accomplish it. They knew how exasperated he was against king George, and how glad he would be of a revenge: Count Gyllenburgh was the Swedish refident at London. The count was applied to, or perhaps made the firft overtures. The affair was carried on not only at London, but by baron Gortz, the Swedish ambassador at the Hague, and by baron Sparre at Paris, with the English Jacobites there, and other friends of the pretender. Baron Gortz, who was the projector of this plot, went to France, in order to bring things to the point he defired, and because the fecret could be kept better at Paris than at the Hague. The czar was also treated with, who was known to be offended with king George.

These Negotiations could not be fo privately managed, but that they were fufpected by the court of England. In April, when the feptennial bill was in hand, intimations had been given that a fecond invafion was to be feared, and this apprehenfion was made one of the motives for continuing a house of commons, in which the king had fo much reafon to confide. These fufpicions were indeed not very clear, but, in the fituation of Europe at that time, it was not difficult to guess from what quarter the danger was to come. The good difpofition of the duke of Orleans had removed all uneafinefs with respect to France. The king of Spain, wholly intent on his projects against the emperor, could not be fufpected of quarrelling with England. The north therefore was the only place from whence the ftorm could be thought to proceed: This conjecture, the only reasonable one that could be formed, determined king George to repair to Hanover, where he could best discover the intentions of his enemies. He fucceeded in his design; at least the public was, in a few days

after