them fome day the next week; and then your excellency may expect their scheme: In the mean time, I should be of opinion, that, if the bufinefs could be done, without making ufe of a great many English, there would be the lefs rifque run; for I do not know whether I ought to touch upon what the king must have further; for, although they will endeavour to do every thing that I afk, yet, as it must be by a contribution raifed among a great many, it may happen, that there may be a falfe brother. Our men once landed, I answer for the reft. In the mean time, I beg you would remember what I had the honour to write to you, laft fummer, concerning one N. No body knows the fea and the coafts better than he, and he is a brave and honeft man. In Bort it will be a glorious enterprife, which will put an end to all our misfortunes, by ruining those who are the authors of them. As to what I have to fay of the time, the fooner the better, after the trade to Gotten burg is ended, or before it be gins.'

The next letter is from count Gyllenburg, to his brother Guftavus Gyllenburg, fecretary to baron de Gortz, dated at London, October 16-27, 1716; in which the poftfcript to baron Gortz, is only material, which is as follows:

I have fince spoken with two of the principals, who have afired me, that there thall be

given

fixty thousand pounds fterling, ready, as foon as I fhall fhew them a line from the king, with affurances under his own hand, that he will affift them. As for the scheme, I fhall have it within a few days. One of them, who is the chief promoter of the affair, affured me, that we had nothing to apprehend from the regent on this occafion.'

By a letter dated at the Hague, November 3, 1716. M. Guftavus Gyllenburg acquaints his brother, the count, that he has given baron Gortz his letter of the 16-27 of October, to read, as well as the note therein inclosed; to which he made him the following answer: It is my repeated advice, to forbear speaking any thing at all of money; but to hear people only, so as to learn clearly what they are able and difpofed to do, and to acquaint me with it, without opening yourself to them.'

The next letter is from count Gyllenburg to baron Gortz, dated at London, November 4, 1716, as follows: In answer to what your excellency has done me the honour to write to me in the poftfcript to your letter of the 16-27 paft, I grant there will be no harm in hearing the infinuations of this court, if they were made not only without my promifing to make report of them to his majesty, but alío my giving them hopes of his majesty's being resolved to be reconciled to the Hanorerians, and to facrifice Bremen to them for fome equivalent on

the

the part of the czar. But as, without that, they will make no overtures, for fear we should make use of them to increase ftill more the distrust, which is between the northern allies, and fo make an advantage of them; it is not in my power to get any thing particular out of them; nor am I able to fay of what fervice to us their affiitance against the czar would be; but if I were to guess by their discourse, who have been talking with me about it, as from themselves, though I eafily perceived it was by order of the minifters, I fhould believe, that, if the preliminary concerning Bremen was fettled, the English minifters would be very well pleafed to retrieve the false step they have made, by talking loudly of the defenfive treaty between us, and by perfuading the nation to give us the fuccours therein ftipulated, either in money or fhips. I fhouid fancy alfo, that we might come to an agreement in relation to what they ought to help us to take from the czar, by way of reprifal for our loffes in Germany. On the other hand, and if we do not fubmit to them, your excellency may be affured, that, as well to juftify their past actions, as to force us to a compliance, they will prevail upon the mercenary parliament, which they have at prefent, to take vigorous refolutions, and even to declare war against us. This is what we muft expect. The English minifters do not mince the matter;

and they have already made it appear, that they will stick at nothing. They are all furious perfons. Sunderland, who is, in a manner, at the head of affairs, and who has got all the interest he has with the king of England, by having confented to what has been done against us (being befides our enemy) is at prefent at Hanover, to take his inftructions from the Germans, and your excellency may depend upon it, he will execute them with all the boldness [Effronterie] imaginable. Your excellency will therefore find, we ought to make use of this opportunity to enter into meafures against people, who certainly will not do things by halves. We must either ruin them, or be undone ourselves, that is, if it be in their power to bring it to pafs.

Poftfcript. My friends are now in town. An exprefs, which came to them yesterday from the pretender, will put them in a better condition for forming a plan. To-day they are going about it. There are only five or fix of the most confiderable perfons confulted. They would know, in case we agree, whether the money muft be paid here or elsewhere, or if it must be fent over to Sweden. They have also asked me, if we had any occafion for fea-officers, for then they could furnish us with good ones.'

In another letter at London, November 13, 1716, count Gyllenburg made good his pro

mife to baron Gortz, about giving him his fentiments about the business contained in the baron's laft poftfcript. The fum thereof (fays the count) is what I have already hinted, that we must determine one way or o ther, and that very speedily: We have not, in my humble opinion, any time to lofe in confultations. If we do not take advantage of their prefent animofity, it will cool; for the court, that is to fay, the prince's party, does all that is poffible to gain them. With the moft confiderable, it would perhaps be neceffary to go on roundly. They run the hazard of their lives and fortunes in declaring themselves, fo that they will not fpeak but upon good fecurity, And as to the people of the fecond rank, befides that it would perhaps be dangerous fo much as to hearken to their propotals, these proposals of theirs are of fo little confequence, and fo confused, that we should not be able from them to form any idea of the affair. I thould likewife be of opinion, that, till I receive fresh orders from your excellency, the fated way will be to avoid all conversations of that kind.”

The next letter is from M. Gafares Gyllenberg to the count his brother, cited at the Hagat, November 15, 115, the fechance of which is as follows: On Torida lat zwei here a letter from baron Sparre, importing. That he had hopes of succeeding in licitation,

have

to have M. Lench fent to the king. In his letter was inclosed one from the duke of Ormond to baron Gortz, in which the duke fays, That the king his matter had ordered him to let him (Gortz] know, that he expects shortly a fupply of money; that he will then remit fixty thoufand pounds fterling to his Swedish majefty, leaving the difpofal of it to him; and that he begs him to look upon this as an earneft of his good will to him. The bearer of this letter added, that the remittances might be made, either to, or toM. Sparre has fince told the baron, in confidence, of the men of war that we have bought in France, which will be ready and delivered. And that we are folliciting the court of France to send a person to the czar, to make advantage of the pacifc difponition he is now in. But as this follicitation meets with many obstacles, and that, befides, France does not appear over forward to do any thing for us, unless it be in concert with England, M Sparre takes notice, that my lord Mar has a contin-german, named Erkine, with the crar, who is phyścian and privy-counselor to that prince; which faverine has wrote letters to my lord Mar, giving a very particular secount of the car, v The the car will not attare any thing more gand the king of Sweden; that he has fallen out with his ahes; that he can never be friends with king George; that

be

he hates him mortally; that he is fenfible of the juft caufe of the pretender; that he wishes for nothing more than a conjuncture, in which he may be able to restore him to his dominions; that the czar, having the advantage wholly on his fide, cannot make the firft ftep; but, if the king would make the least advance, there would be very foon an accommodation between them. The pretender has fent to defire baron Sparre to procure him leave to retire to Stockholm. M. Sparre has returned anfwer, that, as this would be the fame thing as declaring war by found of trumpet, it would abfolutely fpoil the business in hand.'

In this letter, M. Guftavus Gyllenburg inclofed the copy of another letter from baron Gortz to baron Sparre, dated Novemb. 12, 1716, as follows: I ftill look upon the fending M.Lench as very uncertain, because, I am perfuaded, that France will not take any step, that may give the leaft fufpicion, or by which they may difguft England, before they had finished the treaty of alliance, that is now depending. Yet methinks they might venture to intimate to the court of England, that they have a mind to fend a perfon to the king, to found his Majefty's intentions more thoroughly touching a reconciliation, and in order to qualify themselves the better to do good offices.

As to the affair of England, and the duke of Ormond's letter to me, of which you have fent

we

me a copy, I cannot forbear telling you frankly, Sir, that, if my scheme upon it be not approved and complied with, I cannot enter at all into that affair. It is upon the foundation of my scheme, that I have actually opened the matter to the king; and it would be directly to spoil all to make me depart from it. Any reasonable man will eafily comprehend the impoffibility, in this cafe, of fettling a treaty in form. Doubtlefs it would be running too great a hazard on both fides to depend upon its being kept fecret. The best way is, to prepare on each fide the materials neceffary for the work before us. When all is ready for execution, it will then be time enough to make treaties, if it be judged requifite.

I do not know, even whether it would be right to do what is defired under the name of lending affiftance; and I am very much inclined to think, that it would be better to avow openly our own intereft, and the concern we have for maintaining the English liberties.

Your friends must place fo much confidence in us, as to furnish us with what we want, to put ourselves into a condition of becoming ufeful to them. The fum required is not exorbitant: Three hundred thousand crowns may fatisfy us at prefent, for we want nothing but to augment our naval force at Gottenburg.

I do not fee what hazards your

your

friends can run in this. I will give them fufficient fecurity; and, from the humour all the world knows the king to be of, they may very fafely conclude, that if his majesty should not be able to fatisfy this loan by a real affiftance, he would do all he poffibly could to reimburse our friends, the rather, because his majefty would not have it known, that he had touched any money for fuch a purpofe as this is lent.

Thefe gentlemen might, however, the more to engage the king's affection, give their offer the turn expreffed in my fcheme; though, for my part, I will not accept it, on any conditions, that may diftinguish it from a common loan. But all depends upon their determining speedily, and beginning forthwith, by furnishing the three hundred thousand crowns for the men of war, without which they muft not flatter themselves that any thing can be done. I am upon the fcent of getting a fourth hundred thousand even in England.

France cannot reproach us with this agreement, while no treaty or convention can be produced to prove it. What 1 faid above of the cautious behaviour of the court of France towards England, is no doubt applicable likewife to the nego tiating of an accommodation with the czar. It is probable, the court of France would not proceed in a negotiation of that kind, but by concert with Eng.

land; and you will grant me, that this would not by any means fuit our intereft, This reflection leads me into an opinion, that the canal of France is not at prefent the moft commodious for us. It may fuffice therefore to have offered to make use of that canal without preffing the matter further. Nor can M. Lench be the manager of this negotiation. For going to, and coming from Sweden at the season of the year we are now in, requires time; and, if we come to any agreement with the czar, we ought to conclude it within three months at the very fartheft. The canal of my lord Mar feems to be alike inconvenient and impracticable, because of the length of time, which that circulation of correfpondence would unavoidably take up. Yet I cannot but think, that, by the canal of the favourite phyfician, the good difpofitions of the czar might be improved, if they are indeed fuch as have been reprefented. If the czar comes hither, and one can get a private conversation with the favourite, we might certainly carry things on far, fuppofing, as I faid, that what the favourite has written be well founded. In the mean while I am contriving some other way.

If we fix upon a project, that is in any tolerable degree promifing, I fhall not be withheld by the difficulties and hardships of the voyage from being the bearer of it myself.

If in the mean time your friends