and a U.S.-developed intelligence dissemination system. A small Information and Research Branch of four military intelligence personnel, known as “INR," provides intelligence support to UN peace operations in the field and at the Secretariat (U.S. DoD k).

Not all elements of the UN Secretariat support the concept of the Situation Center, but Major General Baril and Under-Secretary-General Annan are strong proponents (Best: 12). Even within the DPKO, the Center has met resistance. The civilian political officers in the Operations Office who are responsible for specific peace missions feel threatened that they will be “left out of the loop" by the Situation Center. Integration of political officers into the Center may diminish this prevailing "us and them" attitude, as well as broaden the exclusively military expertise at the Center to include diplomatic and humanitarian perspectives. Moving the Situation Center into the UN Secretariat Building (from its leased office space across the street) with other elements of the DPKO is also expected to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting.

Logistics & Administration

A persistent stumbling block in the management of peace operations, that of logistics, was addressed in the latest changes to the DPKO. The Field Administration and Logistics Division, formerly the Field Operations Division (FOD) of the Department of Administration and Management, was integrated into the DPKO during September 1993. The FOD had operated in a completely separate chain of command from its military counterparts in the field. It was a dual chain of command under which a Force Commander did not have control over his own logistics. Within the Secretariat, the FOD enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, being merely required to "consult" with the DPKO.

Such an arrangement was the outgrowth of many factors peculiar to the UN: It views peacekeepers as temporary "employees" and career civil servants as therefore necessary to ensure continuity in a mission; personnel who understand the byzantine UN procurement and finance system are essential to get even a modicum of logistics support; and the presence of a Chief Administrative Officer in the field is thought to demonstrate civil

Major General Lewis MacKenzie claims the Field Operations Division's Chief Administrative Officer in the field had the ability to thwart the Force Commander's direction if he so desired.

over military authority in the Third World. Lastly, and probably most importantly, the bureaucratic infighting which pervades the UN dissuaded the Department of Administration and Management from surrendering its powers represented in the Field Operations Division.

The Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) of the DPKO is now responsible for all budget, civil personnel and procurement aspects of peace operations. In mid-1993, a New York staff of 106 civilians and a small number of seconded military personnel provided support to all UN overseas offices, agencies and operations which then numbered 13,000 civilians and 75,000 troops and expended $3.3 billion (U.S. Cong e: 44). The FALD is divided into three services: The Finance Management and Support Service determines a mission's cost and produces the budget that is presented to the General Assembly for approval and financing by member states. The Personnel Management and Support Service is responsible for recruiting all civilian personnel who must also be approved by the Office of Human Resources Management. Human Resources Management often ignores suggested candidates and promotes its own based on political, geographic, or gender considerations. Prior peacekeeping experience is not a prerequisite for these positions, nor are they perceived as career-enhancing by UN civil servants; better personnel tend to remain in New York (U.S. Cong e: 45). Yasushi Akashi, commenting on his experience as UN Special Representative in Cambodia, summed up the results. "The quality of personnel was not uniformly outstanding" (Michaels: 66).

While Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) financing and staffing practices may be major sources of criticism, actual supply of forces in the field is its greatest shortcoming. A UN logistic network requires two to three months to establish and must contend with a UN procurement system that needs four months to obtain items that can be routinely supplied in the U.S. military in three to four weeks (Michaels: 66). The long lead times mean that troops who often arrive ill-equipped for their peacekeeping duties must beg, borrow, steal or go without. (Lack of flak vests is said to have contributed to the Pakistani death toll in the 5 June 1993 Mogadishu ambush) (Richburg b: A36). The General Assembly has rejected a proposal to establish a $15 million equipment stockpile at the UN depot in Pisa, Italy, to deal with such contingencies. Logistic management capability is so meager that the UN had to resort to Western contractors to provide services upon the departure of American logisticians from

Mogadishu in March 1993. Denis Beissel, Acting FALD Director in November 1993, recounted his problems: "When we start in a new place everything is wrong. I don't have enough of anything to respond quickly. No staff, no stock, no money" (Michaels: 66).

PERSISTENT PROBLEMS

The restructuring of the UN Secretariat, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in particular, has failed to address persistent problems of fielding peace operations in the 1990s. The organizational disconnect between "peacemakers" in the Department of Political Affairs and “peacekeepers" in DPKO remains. Despite the existence of interdepartmental task forces for planning, peace operations have a potential for failure due to a lack of management coordination among competing Secretariat bureaucracies.

The basic problem of command and control of military forces in peace operations remains unresolved. No organization within the DPKO provides strong direction; operational control of the force rests with the commander in the field. The services of the nascent Situation Center provide monitoring, information and 24-hour communications capability, but little else. Harsh criticism describing it as a joke — “officers sitting around watching CNN" ("General Boutros": 36) or a “dump-Bucharest Town Hall circa 1950" (Brooks: A4)- is unwarranted as it was never intended to be a command center. However, without a robust command and control capability, major powers will be understandably reluctant to place their troops under UN command for large-scale or dangerous peace operations.

The logistics problems endemic to UN peace operations are unlikely to be completely solved by the integration of the Field Operations Division into DPKO. UN financing, personnel and contractual practices will not be overcome by a simple structural reorganization. The Field Administration and Logistics Division may at least prove more accountable to the field and in DPKO than its predecessor. The ambitious agenda envisioned for peace operations in early 1993 had foundered upon UN management deficiencies by the end of the year. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was forced to admit:

The United Nations is not able to do a huge peace-enforcement operation.... If it is a traditional peacekeeping [operation) or something in between... we can do it. But if you move to a peace-enforcement operation-of tens of thousands, we don't have the capacity (Preston b: A24).

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan promised "[t]he days of gifted amateurism are over" in March 1993 as he outlined his goals for a 24-hour UN “war room," stand-by armed forces and an intelligence system to conduct peace operations (Lewis b: A10). But a frustrating year in Bosnia, Haiti, and especially Somalia proved this boast was premature. Somalia highlighted the critical shortcoming which prevents the world body from successfully conducting anything but a traditional peacekeeping operation: the lack of any kind of a military command structure at its headquarters in New York that could devise military plans and strategies and quickly approve proposed military operations (Richburg b: A36).

Chapter 3

PEACE OPERATIONS

At the very moment President Bush was promising augmented U.S. intelligence support to the General Assembly in New York, British, French and U.S. forces were assisting Kurds in Northern Iraq. At the same time, political disintegration in Yugoslavia and Somalia was increasing pressure for multilateral action. Within months the United States had over 20,000 troops on the ground in Somalia and had committed a similar number to enforce a peace settlement in the Balkans if it could be achieved. In Cambodia the UN had more than 20,000 personnel conducting the most comprehensive transitional regime in history to end the civil war. With U.S. soldiers involved in UN peace operations, it was time to deliver on the promises and turn theory into practice.

Lieutenant Robert J. Allen sets the stage by describing the evolution of intelligence procedures at UN Headquarters in New York to support peace operations in the field. He analyzes the requirements for intelligence and then outlines the procedures and organization that evolved to meet the need. Captains William S. Brei and William E. Whitney, Lieutenant Allen and Technical Sergeant Payton A. Flynn review the first attempts by the U.S. to provide intelligence support to coalition or UN-sponsored peace operations in the field. The case studies include:

■ PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq

■UNTAC in Cambodia

■ UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia

The results were mixed. Military intelligence was not prepared to provide the kind of information most needed in the initial stages of a humanitarian assistance operation. The organizational cultures and bureaucratic imperatives of multinational parties or UN headquarters and military field operations do not make an easy match. Once the requirements of the