outlines the mission, force structure, command relationships, logistics, accounting procedures, coordination and liaison procedures, and the responsibilities of U.S. military units and personnel involved in the peacekeeping mission.

If there is non-concurrence concerning the military's position, or if there is a lack of consensus among the services, the issue is resolved by the NSC and the President. This was the case, for example, with support to the UN Transitional Authority for Cambodia. The services did not want to get involved in Cambodia for fear of being drawn in militarily, thus risking the possibility of another quagmire like Vietnam. Nevertheless, President Bush ordered the Department of Defense to support UN peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia (Campbell).

There are four types of command structures the U.S. follows in peacekeeping operations: U.S. observer missions to the UN, U.S. forces (units) under UN command, non-UN command structures, and unique structures such as those in airlift operations.

First, U.S. military personnel serving as UN observers have one chain of command. These individuals serve under the command of the UN, or the organization responsible for overall observer operations. Furthermore, they are supervised by a "Chief of Staff," responsible for directing and employing the observers.

Second, in contrast to the single chain of command of individual observers, U.S. units under a UN command have a dual command structure. Once in the peacekeeping Area of Operations, the U.S. contingent is under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the UN contingency commander. For example, the U.S. contingent in Macedonia is OPCON to the Danish commander. That means the Danish commander is responsible for directing and employing the U.S. force. The U.S. theater commander relinquishes operational control and direction for all aspects of the peacekeeping operation and the military personnel in the U.S. peacekeeping unit. He may, however, have his staff monitor the operation and provide support to the U.S. peacekeeping force, but only if the support is in accordance with the terms of reference. The senior U.S. officer of the contingent serves two functions: as the U.S. contingent commander reporting to the Danish commander, and as the link between the U.S. peacekeeping force and the U.S. theater command.

Third, U.S. units under a non-UN command differ according to the situation. For example, a two-headquarters command structure is employed by the MFO in the Sinai. The political headquarters is located in Rome, Italy and the military headquarters is located in the operational region.

Fourth, U.S. sea/airlift assets remain under control of the supporting nation. For example, U.S. airlift assets used in Operation PROVIDE PROMISE in the former Yugoslavia remained under USEUCOM. Requests for airlift support are passed to the USEUCOM air component commander through UN liaison personnel who are in the operational country. The air component commander then assigns a mission number(s) to specific planes. The number represents the aircraft's flight mission. Once in the air, the aircraft is technically under UN control but only for the duration of the flight. After the mission is completed the plane reverts back to U.S. control (Murry).

As U.S. forces enter the peacekeeping arena subordinated to other national forces, U.S. commanders will experience a series of challenges, including language barriers, cultures and customs. The various military organizations have their own doctrine for organization, training, tactics, and staff operations which may differ from U.S. doctrine (Freeman: 6). Logistics will be a major challenge. The U.S. has one of the best logistical systems in the world. But as U.S. units participate in peacekeeping operations, the local area may limit the logistical support they receive (Pacific Armies: 192). As a result, U.S. commanders may find it difficult to carry out their mission. If it is perceived that U.S. forces receive superior support in comparison to other nations, animosity toward the U.S. may develop among the multinational forces, thus impacting on the overall morale and efficiency.

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence activities in peacekeeping are multifaceted, and intelligence activities, especially collection, are extremely sensitive. In peacekeeping the term "intelligence" is replaced by the term “information gathering” due to the negative connotations associated with the word "intelligence" and the political nature of peacekeeping operations. Host countries and belligerent parties may perceive intelligence collection as a hostile act (USA g: 13). As a result, intelligence activities may erode trust and impartiality, placing the force at risk (Malone: 17).

Still, intelligence and information gathering, when performed in accordance with the terms of reference and the agreement of the parties, serve an important role in U.S. peacekeeping operations. Even though the term intelligence is avoided to emphasize impartiality, the bulk of staff work is performed with intelligence in mind. The intelligence principles and intelligence cycle-direction, collection, processing, and dissemination—are adhered to as much as possible to ensure that intelligence products are clear and unambiguous (Ayers: 55).

The guidance for the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Lebanon provides an example of well-established procedures designed to restrict certain behavior that may be perceived as partial toward one of the belligerents. Individual observers, for example, are required to sign a document that outlines these restrictions, including both the observers' responsibilities when handling information and information obtained during their tour of duty:

Military observers shall exercise the utmost discretion in regard to the handling of documents, cables, maps or other UNTSO papers, and they shall follow detailed instructions issued by UNTSO concerning such documentation. In particular, documents, cables, maps or other papers, copies thereof or notes of their contents may not be taken away from the mission, published or otherwise handled or communicated to others, except with the prior approval of the Chief of Staff in each case...Military observers, after UNTSO assignment, shall not divulge the contents of documents, cables, maps or other papers of UNTSO, except with the prior approval of the Secretary-General in each case (UNTSO: 28).

The U.S. has agreements with other nations concerning the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence information. Since a UN peacekeeping force is multinational, many participating countries will not have sharing arrangements. If it is perceived by other nations of the force that information is intentionally withheld, mistrust and suspicion may develop and undermine peacekeeping efforts. Maintaining a delicate balance is a critical aspect of an overall intelligence effort.

The mandate of a peacekeeping mission often contains restrictions on flying, specifically overflights and airspace control. Since parties to a peacekeeping agreement are often suspicious of espionage, certain

restrictions may be included in the agreement with the parties. The most common restrictions associated with flying include:

Prohibited areas of overflight

■ Photography

■ Night flying

■The carrying of non-peacekeeping force personnel

The battlefield in peacekeeping, in contrast to conventional conflict, is not linear. The key terrain comprises not just military objectives, but the people and military in the area. There are no separate Rear Area Operations Centers, Main Command, or Forward Command Posts. As a result, the intelligence staff officer(s) must coordinate widely and as far in advance as possible.

There are three general intelligence functions in peacekeeping: early warning, intelligence in support of the mandate, and force protection. Information for early warning provides decisionmakers the time needed to prevent the possible outbreak of conflict. Intelligence in support of the mandate is tactical in nature, and allows the force commander to employ peacekeeping forces to carry out the mandate. Information for U.S. commanders is also needed to protect U.S. peacekeeping forces from terrorists, assassination, sabotage, and full-scale military attack.

Five broad intelligence requirement categories apply across the peacekeeping spectrum. Each category will have a specific set of essential elements of information or priority intelligence requirements that are situational and time dependent. They include:

■ Political: Requirements that involve detailed information on the political and military aspects of the conflict between the belligerents; ■ Economic/Social: Requirements that focus on the factors of the conflict, resources, general conditions, cultural information, the ethnic situation, and religious taboos or sensitivities of the belligerents and Host Country;

■Geographic/Environmental: Requirements that are predicated upon the location and the type of conflict, or level of war;

Security: Requirements that are designed to analyze the loyalties and intentions of the Host Country, and the capability of the force to provide security for U.S. forces;

Threat: Requirements that examine the threat to U.S. forces. These include the military capabilities and intentions of the belligerents; their Order of Battle, and their combat history, as well as any other threats such as terrorism or civil unrest.

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visiting UNOSOM II operations in Somalia,
October 1993.

UN photo by Fabrice Ribere

Experiences in Iraq and in Somalia illustrate the importance of possessing and comprehending this information. First, in Somalia information was required on various clans, political parties, feuds, and economic realities. The intelligence provided on the militia proved reliable. However, U.S. commanders realized that to be successful they needed continuous information about local civil conditions. Consequently, U.S. commanders were forced to shift their efforts to gather and process information in their "tactical" area (Abizaid and Wood: 19).

Second, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT further validates the need for cultural and political information:

Besides the normal intelligence requirements, this type operation called for a strong and immediate provision of "cultural" intelligence. Information on the Kurds such as their political and tribal structure; life-style habits such as food, clothing, etc.; leaders and military organization; and history of their conflict with the Iraqis,