ground movement. As drivers tended to get lost without maps, the CTF Intelligence Staff requested large-scale maps from the Defense Mapping Agency, while the Maps Officer and terrain analysts set about producing limited quantities of maps on a by-request basis. The 497th Reconnaissance Technical Group, through its forward-deployed liaison element, initiated and mass-produced a new and highly popular product: gridded photolithographic maps of each city from U-2R imagery. The security of the Kurds and humanitarian relief workers was probably the highest intelligence priority. This requirement called for the use of dedicated, quick-response, and fast-production tactical reconnaissance. Unfortunately, the tactical photographic processing and interpretation facility that remained at Incirlik Air Base could not be used because there simply was not enough ramp space for reconnaissance planes along with the tremendous number of multinational cargo, fighter, and ground attack planes needed for the operation. Instead, the U.S. Navy provided F-14 Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Pod System support from a carrier in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Finally, the U-2R aerial reconnaissance program supported every aspect of the operation, with the exception of warning intelligence. The sensor system on the U-2R had many advantages over other collection systems: a high-resolution image, broad-area coverage, and releasability to multinational forces. Flown every other day, each mission provided between 8,000 and 10,500 feet of imagery that covered every point of interest in the area of operations. The time required for flying, processing, and interpreting the film, unfortunately, exceeded the time allowed for tactical warning. Designed as a strategic collection platform, the U-2R program emphasizes broad-area coverage and high resolution over timeliness. Indeed, without a collection. system that provides constant surveillance, tactical warning was simply not available to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. As the most consistent means of intelligence collection under the Intelligence Staff's control, however, the U-2R became the intelligence collection workhorse for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Essentially, the U-2R would fly and image at least eight hours before returning to base; after it recovered, the film was couriered to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on a dedicated courier aircraft. Upon arrival, personnel from the 497th Reconnaissance Technical Group couriered the film to the production facility at Wiesbaden Air Base, consuming a minimum of another two hours when the autobahns were clear. Once the film reached the photo-processing lab, the processing consumed another eight to nine hours before all of the production film could be delivered to the interpreters at Schierstein Compound. From that point, initial interpretation reports could be transmitted electronically at any time, and select hardcopy images could be produced for special courier, that night, to Incirlik. In all, electronic reporting normally reached the consumers about 24 hours after the time of imaging. Hardcopy prints, however, were less predictable. Depending on the weather and a consumer's specific request, a hardcopy image taken from a previous mission's film could be produced and arrive at Incirlik within 10 hours, provided the imagery requested could be satisfied with archival imagery, there was no production backlog, and the ground courier could get the material to the special air courier at Ramstein Air Base before its flight time. Otherwise, select imagery that corresponded to the initial readout of the current mission would be received no earlier than 30 hours after the mission flew over the target. The dedicated air courier from Ramstein Air Base to Incirlik Air Base provided the most timely delivery of imagery and other intelligence materials that was possible. This procedure was established early into the operation and was maintained well after PROVIDE COMFORT II began. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN CAMBODIA William E. Whitney The UN effort in seeking a resolution to Cambodia's long-standing political conflict represented an unparalleled international diplomatic effort. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was begun at a time when the UN was mired in the controversy of both the Bosnia and Somalia missions. The mission was unique in its broad mandate, covering a range of operations to alleviate Cambodia's troubles. Massive in size, comprehensive in scope and precise in its mandate, UNTAC set a new standard for peacekeeping operations undertaken by the international community (UN h: 3). This paper will examine the history of the Cambodia conflict, the UN's role in it, and each of UNTAC's seven components that required information collection, synthesis of that information, and subsequent integration of that information into UNTAC's mission processes. The information considered here is called "intelligence" anywhere but in the United Nations environment. HISTORY Since Cambodia's emergence from French colonialism in the 1950s, the country had suffered not only the effects of the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, but also the devastating effects of civil conflict and the destructive totalitarian regime of the Khmer Rouge under the leadership of Pol Pot. The Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, a period in which approximately 1 million Cambodians perished. Within days of assuming power, the Khmer Rouge evacuated all cities, forcing virtually the entire Cambodian population into the countryside to live and work on a communal basis. Living conditions under the Khmer Rouge were extremely harsh, with collective manual labor for up to 18 hours a day, often with only meager rations of food (Curtis: 2). By 1977, communal cooking and eating were introduced throughout much of the country, and scrounging for food or hoarding was punishable by death. Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in late 1978 to stem repeated and bloody border violations by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge). The Khmer Rouge offered little resistance, and were pushed to the border of Thailand where they were able to regain some of their military strength. The Vietnamese communists installed a new government known as the Phnom Penh regime, under the leadership of Hun Sen, and changed the name of the country to the People's Republic of Kampuchea under the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) (Heininger: 24). Wall poster of last victims of the Khmer Rouge at Tuol Sleng prison, photo courtesy of NIMA ISLWL, Ground Photo Team In 1982, the Khmer Rouge entered into alliance with Cambodia's noncommunist resistance forces, establishing the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Prince Sihanouk's political party was known as the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative |