INTELLIGENCE THEORY AND

PRACTICE IN SOMALIA

Robert J. Allen

Lieutenant, U.S. Navy
July 1994

We have a lot of work to do with the UN, in terms of the UN being able to do a Chapter VII mission in the future and do it more efficiently and better than we did here (Richburg f: A18).

UNOSOM II Deputy Commander

Lieutenant General Thomas Montgomery (USA)

The peace enforcement action in Somalia revealed the challenges of providing intelligence to a UN coalition in a combat situation. Many of the same obstacles to effective intelligence support seen at UN Headquarters in New York were encountered again in the field—with serious consequences. The realities of UN peace enforcement in the field exposed the limits of U.S. capabilities and doctrine for furnishing intelligence to multinational coalitions. In Somalia, the U.S. was able, despite some highly publicized military intelligence and operational failures, to deliver valuable intelligence to UN forces. Most importantly, however, the Somali misadventure demonstrated the danger of a peacekeeping operation becoming a peace enforcement action when political intelligence warnings are not heeded.

EXPANDING MISSIONS

The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) represented the third phase of peacekeeping in Somalia. Humanitarian motivations precipitated the initial deployment of UN troops in September 1992. The Security Council authorized the dispatch of 500 lightly armed Pakistani peacekeepers to Mogadishu to secure the city's port and airfield for

humanitarian relief shipments. This undertaking was known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) (Richburg b: A36). The anarchy and lawlessness that exacerbated Somalia's famine prevented the troops from fulfilling their mission and they became virtual prisoners in their compound at Mogadishu International Airport.

A deteriorating security situation and increasing death toll from starvation through October and November 1992 convinced President George

Bush to order a U.S. military operation in Somalia under UN auspices. Operation RESTORE HOPE, a U.S.-led coalition that eventually included 35 countries, provided security for humanitarian relief operations between December 1992 and May 1993. During this period, UN political and military direction of the peace operation was minimal. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was firmly under U.S. command. The U.S. military commander, Lieutenant General Robert Johnston (USMC), and chief diplomat, Robert Oakley, met regularly with General Mohamed Farah Aideed, the Somali clan leader who controlled south Mogadishu, the U.S. base of operations (Natsios: 137). They maintained a hands-off policy with the warlord and restricted UNITAF missions to those essential to ensure the flow of humanitarian relief (Richburg b: A36). Intelligence operations were directed by the U.S., and necessary information was provided to third countries on a bilateral basis.

Somalis welcoming Admiral Jonathan T. Howe to Kismayo, Somalia,
April 1993.

photo courtesy of NIMA ISLWL, Ground Photo Team

UNOSOM II, the UN follow-on to Operation RESTORE HOPE, set a number of precedents. It was the first UN peace operation to receive an explicit Chapter VII mandate (permitting the use of force in accomplishing

its mission). It marked the first large-scale participation by U.S. combat troops in a UN peace mission. And it was the first UN peace operation to receive the full benefit of dedicated U.S. intelligence support. The UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) received U.S. intelligence support from May 1992, but did not have a U.S. intelligence center collocated in the country for direct support. The Security Council greatly expanded the missions of peacekeeping forces in Somalia under UNOSOM II, while the number of troops available to perform them was simultaneously being reduced. The mandate authorized under Security Council Resolution 814 included disarming militias, negotiating an agreement on national reconciliation, and organizing the reconstruction of Somalia. It was these intrusions into Somali domestic political affairs that drew UNOSOM II into an unsuccessful urban counterinsurgency campaign between June and October 1993 and severely tested the concept of providing intelligence support to a multinational coalition.

INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

The UN intelligence organization which supported almost 24,000 troops from 32 nations from May 1993 through March 1994 was dominated by the U.S. The key intelligence support elements were the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Intelligence Support Element (ISE) and the UNOSOM Information Center (UNOSOM IC). The 80-person ISE possessed its own intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to support the 1,200-man U.S. Quick Reaction Force that remained in Somalia after the passing of command to the UN in May 1993. Connectivity through the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) permitted the ISE to draw upon products of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Staff support for the UNOSOM IC, like the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Situation Center in New York, was performed by many nonintelligence military personnel. An Italian Lieutenant Colonel served as the Director of the Information Center with a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel as his deputy. The U.S. was heavily represented in the 30-man facility, with six to seven seconded U.S. military intelligence professionals (two officers and four to five enlisted service members). An additional three U.S. personnel (two officers and one enlisted member) formed the ISE liaison cell at the UNOSOM IC. U.S., Australian, and New Zealand personnel were considered to constitute the UNOSOM IC's core analytical capability.

Information Sources

U.S. intelligence reports and analysis provided the bulk of the information flow into the UNOSOM IC, mirroring the intelligence sharing relationship at the UN Situation Center in New York. Other national contingents, like the U.S., had their own intelligence assets in Somalia, but did not contribute information to the UNOSOM IC on a regular basis. Belgium, France and Italy had intelligence operations in Somalia, but were reluctant to share information with the UN. The information exchange between the ISE and UNOSOM IC was primarily unidirectional, although the U.S. did receive some useful analytical products back from the UNOSOM IC. The U.S. Intelligence Community at the national level played a minimal role in providing support to the UN. Most intelligence was collected and produced locally.

Dissemination

Information exchange among elements of the intelligence network supporting UNOSOM II was uneven. The JDISS suite purchased by the UN to interface with the ISE and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) Situation Center in New York failed to live up to its promise as an intelligence exchange tool. The system went off-line in October 1993 and was not communicating effectively with its U.S. counterpart as late as March 1994. Most intelligence materials supplied by the ISE were therefore transferred in a hard-copy format or on computer diskette. The ISE was under no standing orders to route intelligence shared with the UNOSOM IC via the U.S. Communications links back to the U.S. Mission to the UN for transmission to the DPKO Situation Center.

Release Procedures

The decision as to which intelligence was to be shared with the UN in Mogadishu was essentially a "judgment call." Sanitization of materials for release was largely accomplished by fiat there were no firm guidelines. The elaborate sanitization procedures established in U.S. Intelligence Community concepts of operation were often circumvented because of a perception of shared risk with the UN troops. U.S. personnel were acutely aware, however, that any information released into UN channels was subject to compromise and edited out the more sensitive materials to protect intelligence sources and methods (Sanai).