became valuable Essential Elements of Information for Combined Task Force leaders. This information was extremely important in shaping certain decisions and in direct dealings with the Kurds. It also greatly affected our psychological operations and the way the themes were developed to influence events. This capability was eventually developed but should have been sought and provided earlier (USEUCOM b: 12).

Once deployed, U.S. units might not receive external intelligence support. Predeployment planning must take into account the ability of the unit to receive and properly store classified materials (Ayers: 19).

The most common methods and techniques for information gathering include:

■ Observation: U.S. forces and personnel not only conduct their mandated mission, they also operate and interact in well-populated areas. Because of this they need to be aware of their surroundings to observe and report on activities around them;

■ Patrols (mounted and dismounted): Squads and platoons, as in observation, must also be aware of all activity in their surroundings; Contacts and conversations with the parties to the dispute: Local officials, local inhabitants, soldiers on and off duty, often come in contact with these people;

Official reports from the host government and other sources;

The media: newspapers, radio, and television;

The interaction between peacekeeping forces and observer groups: Since observer groups serve longer than the peacekeeping force, they can provide the peacekeeping force with valuable background

information used to reduce ambiguities and preclude possible errors.

To ensure a steady and efficient exchange of information, observer groups working in the same area may attach an observer to each battalion headquarters to coordinate observation and patrol reports (Ayers: 22).

In the end, the ability of the U.S. to provide adequate intelligence support to peacekeeping rests with agreements established by the UN mandate and agreements with the parties. This is a result of the sensitive nature of intelligence activities in peacekeeping and the need to maintain impartiality.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Currently, the number of U.S. personnel authorized to participate in UN peacekeeping operations through the UN Participation Act of 1947 is not to exceed 1,000. That is, no more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel may participate in UN peacekeeping operations at any given time. On the other hand, there is no limit for U.S. military personnel participating in non-UN peacekeeping operations (Story b: 2).

In planning for the use of these forces, the regional commands use the "Adaptive Planning" approach. CINCS conduct operational planning in four broad categories: nuclear forces and strategic defense, regional conflict, the emergence of a global threat, and peacekeeping, all by maintaining normal high readiness levels.

Planning is decentralized. Regional commanders generally determine the assumptions, concept of operations, and forces to be deployed. However, their plans are approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and are coordinated with the services and Department of Defense agencies. The CINCs also receive their policy guidance, mission assignment, and final plan review from the Secretary of Defense. Finally, UN peacekeeping mandates are negotiated by the Security Council in New York, and the force structure is put together on an ad hoc basis depending on the contributions of members. The U.S. process can only begin after the UN has defined the mandate - creating a planning environment that is the exact opposite of the usual U.S. staff procedures.

The basic force structure and support mechanisms are situationally dependent and based on the mandate. The battalion is the smallest fully staffed and self-contained unit, and is exemplified by the light infantry battalion, with staff, from the 82d Airborne Division currently supporting the MFO in the Sinai (Ayers: 8).

Currently there is no U.S. doctrine that specifies task organizations for peacekeeping missions. To ensure success, commanders need to taskorganize their forces to meet the various challenges associated with multinational peacekeeping operations:

Make sure the force is balanced so that no one national element
dominates the others;

■Make sure the force is supplied with the proper mix and amount of qualified linguists;

■ Ensure the force is prepared to support liaison operations;

■ Structure the force to facilitate the logistics support needed to preserve its effectiveness (Bateman: 9).

As mentioned, light infantry battalions are the basic unit for peacekeeping. Even though light forces have great utility, they may not be suitable for all peacekeeping missions. They have less equipment and, lacking troop transport, must walk, carrying most of their equipment. This was a problem in UNOSOM I in Somalia, where units from the 10th Mountain Division were tasked to control between 50 and 100 square kilometers. Because they lacked organic transportation assets, light forces found it difficult to maintain control over their sectors of responsibility without augmentation by lift assets.

The U.S. military has other assets to augment existing force structures based on the mission. These include Military Intelligence assets, Engineer assets, Civil Affairs, Military Police, and mechanized forces.

Military Intelligence units consist of counterintelligence and interrogator teams. These teams are designed for force protection and information gathering. They are taught interpersonal skills enabling them to interact with various groups of people. Interrogators are qualified linguists. Military Intelligence units also train and maintain other linguists who can bridge the language barrier.

Military Intelligence units also possess Ground Surveillance Radars. These assets collect on walking and moving targets at distances up to 10 miles and fill the information-gathering gap on certain types of peacekeeping missions, such as truce supervision and observation missions. These assets do have limitations. They cannot identify friend or foe, and terrain dictates their employment. On the other hand, these radars could be used to cue other assets or observer teams to a specific location to observe and report.

Engineers are another valuable asset available to commanders. One of the three Engineer missions that apply to peacekeeping, for example, is sustainment operations. If, for some reason, the Host Government/Host Nation is unable to provide adequate support to U.S. units, engineers could assist in establishing facilities and other force protection measures such as

bunkers, observation posts, and reinforcement to existing structures. Engineers could also improve trust through humanitarian operations such as digging wells and repairing damaged facilities and structures.

Next, Civil Affairs teams provide the critical link between the commander and the Host Nation agencies and departments. Commanders in UNOSOM I, for example, expressed the need for personnel with backgrounds in civil affairs and relief agencies to assist in solving daily civil problems (Abizaid and Wood: 23). Civil Affairs teams were critical in bringing needed assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

Military Police possess the skills required for peacekeeping, including:

Basic soldiering skills

A case-by-case approach to the use of force

The use of discretion in the de-escalation of potential violence
Handling and exchange of Prisoners of War (POW)
Assisting the Host Nation law enforcement authorities

■Traffic control and checkpoints

■ Force protection

■ Investigative and reporting techniques.

Military Police are in demand for UN operations. Constitutional and procedural difficulties are associated with obtaining host country civilian law enforcement because many law enforcement agencies/departments are under city, state, or provincial control with different legal guidelines and operating procedures. Local law enforcement organizations often operate under full strength and are therefore unable to deploy as units to support peacekeeping operations (Campbell).

Mechanized forces, specifically armored cavalry units, possess the mobility to conduct numerous patrols over large areas. These forces are the eyes and ears for the commander on the ground. As a result, they are skilled in observation techniques and reporting. They are also equipped with armored protection against small arms, grenades, and other material used by possible protestors. Nevertheless, as in any tactical situation, terrain dictates movement. Consequently, certain environments, such as the mountainous terrain in the former Yugoslavia, may hinder the mobility of mechanized forces, but the threat still requires them.

TRAINING

Increased demands for U.S. military participation in peacekeeping operations and the reorientation of U.S. military personnel and units away from their warfighting mission toward a peacekeeping environment has raised an air of caution in the military community. The most common argument is that peacekeeping operations reduce combat readiness. As former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan put it:

Although the Army can execute a variety of non-combat missions well, we recognize that lowered combat readiness is the price if we mistakenly structure the force with these missions primarily in mind (G. Sullivan: 33).

In peacekeeping, the aggressive warrior mentality shifts to caution and restraint. Any overreaction in word or deed by an inexperienced troop may shatter any good will that may have taken weeks, months or years to develop.

Part of the indoctrination process in the military is the familiarization with the importance of flexibility, discipline, and professionalism. There are certain personal traits required in peacekeeping, however, that cannot be easily taught. They include patience, impartiality, tact and inquisitiveness (MacKinlay and Chopra: 113). Service members must avoid thoughtless comments and behavior, both on and off duty. Furthermore, individuals need to question everything that occurs in their area, not allowing themselves to be lulled into a false sense of security (Ayers: 67-76; Abizaid and Wood: 10-22; UNTSO: 7).

After selection, U.S. observers attend the 5- to 10-day Individual Terrorism Awareness Course given at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The course teaches observers to minimize their vulnerability to terrorist identification, selection, and attack by learning how to detect terrorist surveillance. The course also includes instruction on terrorist operations, self-protective measures, and hostage survival techniques, including resistance to interrogation (Campbell). The Fort Bragg course is also used for administrative functions and additional training based on the location and situation of the mission. Observers receive Department of State and UN briefs, country and area briefs, intelligence briefs, and medical preparation for overseas requirements. Observers may also receive additional