training in mines, booby traps and unexploded ordnance, as well as Global Positioning System instruction.

It is imperative that units conduct predeployment training to prepare and become familiarized with expected peacekeeping activities. During their peacekeeping tour, units need to conduct training to reinforce what they have learned. Upon completion of peacekeeping operations and redeployment, units need to train back up to warfighting standards to regain their aggressive warrior mentality. They accomplish this by conducting live-fire exercises and field training exercises.

Emphasis on particular skills is predicated upon the situation, mission, and environment. Somalia, for example, possesses virtually no infrastructure. As a result, field sanitation and first aid take on added importance to prevent the spread of local diseases and illness within military units. Moreover, basic skills such as patrolling and mine awareness are exercised more frequently among combat arms units in comparison to combat support units. As more combat support units become involved in peacekeeping, emphasis on these skills will be required.

In addition to basic soldier skills, soldiers need to learn the Rules of Engagement to know when to use force. There are degrees of coercive methods of persuasion such as warning blows and warning shots. This was illustrated when British forces in the UN Protection Forces in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) fired carefully aimed .50 caliber rounds in the vicinity of Serbian snipers. Rather than engaging the Serb snipers with deadly force, the British commander fired warning shots that proved to be successful in forcing the Serbian snipers to disengage (Hunter).

Another requirement is force protection. This not only applies to the unit, but to the individual soldier as well. Since peacekeepers are often the victims of violence, emphasis must be placed on wearing body armor, constructing proper fighting positions, and practicing dispersal and cover procedures.

Handling civilians and detainees, and negotiation skills, are extremely important. In the peacekeeping environment soldiers and junior leaders are often away from their command for duties such as operating checkpoints. As a result, many find themselves in stressful situations dealing

with civilians and military personnel from both sides of the dispute. U.S. soldiers and junior leaders must exercise both good judgment and the ability to interact in an effective and fair manner with people. Peacekeepers must also know how to deal with the media. As mentioned earlier, soldiers need to exercise thought, judgment, and tact when dealing with people to prevent sending the wrong signal that may upset the disputants. Consequently, soldiers need to be aware of the media and the types of questions they may ask.

There are, in addition, particular tasks that require added emphasis in peacekeeping operations. Force protection shifts from personal protection to unit protection. It includes physical security measures such as barricades, properly placed guards, and an adequate dispersal of personnel, material and equipment to improve survivability in the event of an attack. Force protection includes counterintelligence training designed to teach units about other threats such as terrorism, espionage, and sabotage.

U.S. military units require intelligence training. This training occurs under the direction of the intelligence staff officer and usually consists of a series of familiarization briefs. These include intelligence requirements, the political situation in the field, the economic/social situation, geographic/ environmental factors, and host government security and threats. Intelligence staff officers are also responsible for familiarizing units with the area. and country. These briefs include the following information:

■Customs

■ Traditions

Religious issues

■The Multinational Forces, the disputants, and uniform and equipment identification

Familiarization with the host country language and the most
commonly used words.

Unit training for peacekeeping is not as simple as observer training. The foundation for success begins at the soldier level with basic soldiering skills, then integrating the soldiers into collective unit training beginning at the squad level. Commanders identify weaknesses and train in those areas while at the same time reinforcing what the unit already knows. During collective training the staff also conducts training and familiarization in areas that require additional attention.

Today unit training for peacekeeping today is fragmented and lacks doctrine and standardization. No designated schools or training packages are designed to assist commanders in preparing their units for peacekeeping operations. Even though training has occurred on an ad hoc basis, too few experienced U.S. personnel are available to provide a blueprint for what the U.S. military may expect in future operations and their experiences have not been incorporated the into new doctrine.

DOCTRINE

Department of Defense peacekeeping doctrine development for the operational or theater level is the responsibility of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command holds this responsibility at the service level. Official U.S. doctrine for peacekeeping operations is found in only one chapter of a joint publication (U.S. DOD JCS Pub 3-07), one chapter of an Army field manual (USA FM 100-20), and in a draft version of another joint publication (U.S. DoD JCS Pub 3-07.3). Overall, there exists little pertinent U.S. doctrine. This is due, in part, to the lack of U.S. experience in peacekeeping, and in part to the failure of the Department of Defense to capture all lessons learned from U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations (USA c).

U.S. doctrine does stress nine general principles for peacekeeping missions: consent, neutrality, balance, single-manager management, concurrent action, unqualified sponsor support, force integrity, freedom of movement, and self-defense. Neutrality is a principle in both UN and U.S. doctrine. The U.S. principle of seeking concurrent action reflects the UN emphasis on seeking a diplomatic solution. The U.S. principles of balance, freedom of movement, and self-defense are closely related to the UN principle of minimizing the use of coercive force. The U.S. principles of single-manager management and force integrity deal with the military concept of maintaining a functional chain of command. These nine U.S. peacekeeping principles have application to the entire spectrum of possible peacekeeping missions.

EXPERIENCE

The overall experience of the U.S. military in conducting peacekeeping operations is unfortunately rather minimal. Of the twelve peacekeeping operations currently being undertaken by the UN, U.S. personnel are involved in only six: the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in

Palestine, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), the UN IraqKuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia (UN e). On 15 August 1992, of the 33,548 peacekeepers that the UN deployed around the globe, only 143 or one-half of one percent were U.S. soldiers (USA c). The U.S. supports UN peacekeeping operations with money, transportation, equipment, supplies and other items, but U.S. troop contributions are minimal.

The U.S. has had little experience participating in peacekeeping operations outside UN control. The U.S. military has had only three such opportunities. These three missions are the peacekeeping mission of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic under Organization of American States control in 1965, the use of U.S. Marines as peacekeepers in the Multinational Force in Beirut in 1983, and the ongoing use of 1,200 U.S. Army soldiers in the Sinai under the Multinational Force and Observers. These three examples provide experiences in the full spectrum of success for peacekeeping.

The U.S. military operation in the Dominican Republic can be classified as a military intervention that evolved into a peacekeeping mission as the level of violence subsided. Therefore, the U.S. experience in conducting peacekeeping operations outside of UN control is limited to just two cases of actual peacekeeping. Incidentally, both of these cases constitute the only experience that the U.S. has had in using large units (battalion-size or larger) for peacekeeping.

ARE WE READY?

A sufficient level of readiness is required for U.S. military forces to succeed in peacekeeping operations. The accompanying color-coded assessment reflects a subjective judgment of the authors on each readiness factor. The rating of each factor is based upon its importance and application to U.S. assets employed in recent peacekeeping operations. A "5" is the highest value (green). A "1" is the lowest. The numbers “1” and “2” are represented by red, and “3” and “4” are keyed to yellow.

Command and Control received a value of 3 (sufficient). The commands and commanders of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and UNOSOM I

exercised initiative and good judgment during their respective operations. Command structures and procedures currently exist.

Intelligence also received a value of 3 (sufficient). National and strategic assets are available prior to deployment and provide limited support after deployment. Tactical systems are designed to provide access to intelligence products and information. In the field, the main obstacle is the knowledge and experience of the intelligence staff officers, and the lack of specific intelligence on the peacekeeping environment.

Force structure, like intelligence, exists. The U.S. military possesses the assets required to function in a peacekeeping environment. However, during PROVIDE COMFORT and UNOSOM I, force structure was not suitable. Light infantry forces were tasked to control large areas better suited to mechanized forces. Consequently, force structure received a value of 2 (deficient). The U.S. also lacks the necessary organizational structures for pre-deployment planning.

Next, doctrine, training, and experience work together. Doctrine provides the organizational and instructional basis, and training tests and provides experience for the doctrine. Where doctrine does not exist, ad hoc training and experience are left to develop the doctrine in a reverse manner. Currently, there is little or no doctrine. As a result, units have been forced