the nonproliferation arena. However, had this information been communicated to the IAEA, that program may have been slowed or halted.

A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS

The term proliferation has been used frequently in recent years to denote a new intelligence and national security area of interest, although it is not a new concept. Perhaps the earliest impetus for historic weapons proliferation was the invention of gunpowder. Proliferation in the last two centuries has led to the introduction of the rifle to the far reaches of North America, for example, with a devastating effect on native Americans. Further proliferation of firepower in warfare between the first and second world wars radically transformed the nature of war itself.

U.S. development of the atomic bomb during World War II initiated a bilateral arms race that was to spiral upward for the next 40 years. The USSR's desire to achieve nuclear parity with the U.S. was essential to combat "imperialism" and to ensure the USSR's place as a world power. Alarmed by their increasing vulnerability, other countries have since pursued nuclear weapons development programs, some with modest success. Although today nuclear weapons states number only a third of that predicted in the 1960s (Kitfield: 42), international efforts to control nuclear proliferation have not been entirely adequate and are even more important in today's destabilizing global environment.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

International concern regarding nuclear weapons proliferation developed quickly after World War II. The U.S. knew that its monopoly in the nuclear arena would be short-lived and thus suggested the implementation of international safeguards governing the development and use of nuclear technology. In 1945, the U.S., UK, and Canada proposed the creation of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) charged with "eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes" (U.S. ACDA a: 89). With little debate, this proposal was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 24 January 1946. Later that year the U.S. introduced the Baruch Plan to the UNAEC. The plan called for the placement of nuclear resources under international control; however, the proposal met with strong Soviet

opposition. UNAEC negotiations came to an impasse due to the dichotomy of views on implementation of the Baruch Plan. Thus, in 1948, both the Baruch Plan and the UNAEC were dissolved.

The U.S. then modified its strategy by promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the "Atoms for Peace" program. President Eisenhower introduced the program to the UN General Assembly in 1953 as a means of shifting interest away from the military applications of nuclear energy (Hiester: 403). The proposal, idealistic in word and spirit, essentially stated that the U.S. agreed to share nuclear technology with any country that would use it peacefully. Previous efforts to control nuclear technology had met with strong resistance from the Soviet Union, primarily because its nuclear weapons development program was dependent on technological information gained from the West. By 1949, Soviet possession of the bomb prompted them to join in the implementation of a nuclear nonproliferation agenda.

Through "Atoms for Peace," efforts to focus international attention on nuclear proliferation issues succeeded, with the creation of the IAEA under the auspices of the United Nations. At the UN international conference assembled in September 1956 to finalize the Statute of the IAEA, much of the controversy centered around the nature and application of safeguards. Many countries perceived a threat to their national sovereignty. Others expressed the concern that the proposed agency would interfere with the economic development of UN member states (Scheinman: 72). In the end, the conference approved the statute.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The "Atoms for Peace" program was extremely successful in promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy; however, it became clear that many countries sought to utilize “peaceful" nuclear technology as the first step in the development of nuclear weapons. By the mid 1960s the spread of "peaceful" nuclear technology had increased the risk of nuclear war. By 1964 the nuclear powers were five in number: the U.S. (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). At the time, the international community envisioned great potential for nuclear power. It was estimated that nearly 300 nuclear power plants would be in operation by 1985, prompting concern over the

diversion of plutonium (U.S. ACDA a: 89). With the rapid spread of nuclear technology and the motivation of many countries to become nuclear-capable, the diversion of plutonium from peaceful use became an increasing possibility. A new fear spread throughout the international community, the fear that dozens of nuclear weapons states would lower the threshold for conflict, and that regional animosities and disputes could escalate into the nuclear realm.

This concern was reflected in the 1964 U.S. proposal to the EighteenNation Disarmament Committee. The proposal called for the nondissemination and nonacquisition of nuclear weapons by nuclear and non-nuclear states, respectively, as well as the implementation of safeguards on the international transfer of peaceful nuclear materials. After three years of debate with the Soviet Union and other members, a coordinated draft treaty was submitted to the Committee. On 12 June 1968, the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the United Nations General Assembly.

The treaty seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons through the pledges of signatory countries and the application of the IAEA program of on-site inspections, audits, and inventory controls, collectively referred to as safeguards. Non-nuclear weapons states pledge to remain as such, and agree to allow inspection of their nuclear facilities in exchange for access to nuclear technology. Nuclear weapons states agree not to assist nonnuclear weapons states in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and pledge to continue their efforts to end the arms race. Currently 146 countries are signatories to the treaty, including all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Several countries of nuclear proliferation concern have not acceded to the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, Algeria, Argentina, and Brazil); however, in recent months these countries have indicated that this decision is under reconsideration.

In accordance with Article VIII of the NPT, review conferences are held every five years to validate the continued significance of the treaty. The first conference, held in Geneva in May 1975, resulted in a strong consensus for continuation of the treaty. Since that time, three conferences have been held, each provoking more intense debate over the effectiveness of the treaty. The fourth NPT review conference was held from 20 August to 15 September 1990 in Geneva. Key suppliers of nuclear materials, notably Germany and Japan, agreed to make such supplies

conditional on all nuclear materials and plants in the recipient state being subject to international safeguards, and constructive proposals were recommended to improve the inspection capacity of the IAEA.

The fifth conference, scheduled for 1995, will likely see a continuation of this trend as revelations of the extent and complexity of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, as well as the possible existence of other clandestine programs worldwide, raise the specter of international concern over nuclear proliferation. The NPT has had limited success in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons material and technology; however, in the absence of the regime, the number of nuclear and near-nuclear weapons states would have grown much more rapidly. With the recent accession of China and France to the NPT, there is hope that the spirit and intent of the treaty can be revitalized. With all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council signatories to the treaty, universal enforcement might be more likely.

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE IAEA

The IAEA's mission is to promote the growth and development of peaceful atomic energy and to administer safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programs. With over 116 members, the Agency monitors over 900 nuclear facilities in more than 50 countries (IAEA, IAEA Bulletin: 69). This responsibility is taken very seriously by the agency, as verification of a country's peaceful nuclear intentions provides confidence and promotes international stability.

Safeguards Before Iraq

Complementing its role as the purveyor of peaceful nuclear technology, the IAEA became the verification mechanism for ensuring that no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use occurred. The United States, a major participant in the design of the original statute, along with many other countries, pushed diligently for a regime that would be strict, but not infringe on a country's sovereignty. When the IAEA was created, the focus was on the former axis powers of World War II, specifically Germany and Japan. The central concern was to ensure these powers did not obtain this frightening new technology. Thus, the IAEA was charged with a watchdog function over large nuclear fuel cycles. As time went by, and with the inclusion of the NPT mission in its charter, the IAEA became the

accountant for nuclear fuel cycles throughout the world. This is no small task, and the IAEA set about creating a material and statistical accountancy system that would detect the slightest diversion of fissile material.

This important mission is carried out through a complex system of safeguards, detailed in INFCIRC 662, the agency's safeguards document for non-NPT member states, and in INFCIRC 153, which outlines safeguards procedures for NPT signatories. In accordance with Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute, safeguards are applied when the agency provides technical assistance, the signatories to a bilateral or multilateral agreement request it, or a country volunteers (Scheinman: 125). Before the NPT, INFCIRC 66 safeguards agreements were the standard, usually the result of a bilateral or multilateral agreement, but in all cases requiring the transferred nuclear material to be placed under safeguards. With the advent of the NPT, signatory countries were legally bound to accept IAEA safeguards under INFCIRC 153. INFCIRC 153 is more comprehensive, requiring NPT member countries to declare and open for inspection all peaceful nuclear facilities on their territories.

Safeguards under both types of agreement are not unilaterally imposed by the IAEA, but are subject to the conclusion of a safeguards agreement between the agency and a member state. Thus, from their inception, safeguards are accepted voluntarily. The obligation to place its nuclear program under safeguards has been accepted by the member state. Both the NPT and IAEA safeguards are treaties, relying on the integrity of the signatories to perpetuate the validity of the regime.

The agency safeguards system applies to all nuclear facilities listed on the "declared facilities list," which is part of the safeguards agreement reached between the agency and each member country. The agreement applies a myriad of safeguards verification techniques to ensure that no diversion of fissile material from peaceful use occurs. This verification system includes the review of nuclear facility design information, the installation of containment and surveillance equipment, nuclear material accountability, physical inventory verification, and issuance of the annual

INFCIRC stands for “Information Circular," a term used to denote official IAEA documents. The final version of INFCIRC 66 came into force in 1968; INFCIRC 153, in 1970.