to push IAEA special inspections, claiming these actions were underlying reasons for North Korea's announcement to withdraw from the NPT (Hibbs h: 1).

On 18 March, the IAEA's Board of Governors, meeting in special session, adopted a second resolution on the North Korean issue (UNSC S/ 25445: 3). In the resolution, the Board expressed its concerns over the DPRK's announcement to withdraw from the NPT and confirmed that the DPRK's safeguards accord with the IAEA remained in force. Additionally, the Board requested that the Director-General take all necessary steps to resolve the issue and report back to the Board on 31 March.

The Board of Governors met again in special session in late March to discuss the implementation of safeguards in North Korea. The DirectorGeneral concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with Articles 3, 71, 73 and 77 of its safeguards agreement. The Board adopted another resolution, on 1 April, declaring that North Korea was “in noncompliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency." The IAEA also stated its intention to report the matter, as required by Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, to the full membership of the IAEA, and to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly (UNSC S/25556: 14-15).

Following intensive debate and negotiations among members of the Security Council, the Council's President issued a statement, on 8 April, expressing concern over the situation and the refusal of North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections (UNSC S/25556). The members of the Council, in the presidential statement, also reaffirmed the importance of the NPT and encouraged the IAEA to continue its deliberations with the DPRK to resolve the situation satisfactorily. Still, North Korea refused to cooperate with the IAEA. On 22 April, Russia increased the pressure when Moscow notified the DPRK that it had terminated bilateral nuclear cooperation as a result of the DPRK's announcement to withdrawal from the NPT.

The following week, North Korea denounced the IAEA resolution and called for bilateral talks with the United States, which Pyongyang claimed was the only way to resolve the impasse (Shigemura: A28). North Korea also spelled out its conditions for remaining in the NPT. The demands were: (1) the cancellation of future Team Spirit exercises; (2) inspections of

both ROK and U.S. military installations in South Korea; (3) a U.S. pledge that it would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; (4) the U.S. must abandon its nuclear umbrella over South Korea; and, (5) the U.S. must respect North Korea's socialist system. Many in the U.S. believed that the changing nature of North Korean demands was a pretext for stalling international inspections. Despite the rhetoric, during mid-May, North Korea allowed IAEA inspectors to conduct maintenance checks of monitoring devices and to replace film in surveillance cameras at the declared facilities in the Yongbyon complex.

On 11 May, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 825 without dissension (China and Pakistan abstained), a resolution expressing its "grave concern" and calling upon the DPRK to reconsider its withdrawal from the NPT and "to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty." Continuing, the Council further requested that the DPRK honor its obligations under the Treaty and called upon other nations to persuade North Korea to find a solution.

U.S.-DPRK Talks Begin

The first in a series of bilateral talks were held in New York from 2 to 11 June. Following the first round of negotiations, the U.S. and North Korea issued a joint statement outlining the principles agreed upon by the two sides. The agreed principles included assurances to refrain from the threat and use of force, to support "peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula" that included the "impartial" application of safeguards, "respect for each other's sovereignty," "noninterference in each other's internal affairs," and mutual "support for the peaceful reunification of Korea." More important, North Korea announced it unilaterally decided to suspend, at least temporarily, its withdrawal from the NPT ("U.S.-North Korea": 32).

A second round of high-level talks between the U.S. and the DPRK were held in Geneva during early July. The two sides released a joint statement at the conclusion of negotiations, outlining Pyongyang's agreement to exchange its graphite-moderated reactors for light water reactors that are less suitable for plutonium production. The U.S. agreed, in return, to support and assist the DPRK in this initiative. In addition, the North announced its willingness to pursue consultations with the IAEA concerning inspections and with South Korea on the implementation of the joint declaration ("U.S.-North Korea": 32).

In the meantime, the IAEA continued to press North Korea to comply with its obligations under the NPT. The DPRK again allowed IAEA inspectors to maintain surveillance equipment at the two Yongbyon facilities, in August. IAEA and DPRK officials meeting in Pyongyang in early September failed, however, to make any progress in their negotiations. North Korea, in fact, refused to discuss IAEA suggestions for overcoming the hurdles to resuming full-scope safeguards inspections. The DPRK held to its position that, under the "current circumstances," it was enough that North Korea allow IAEA inspectors to perform routine maintenance of the monitoring equipment.

At the opening session of the Board of Governors meeting, on 21 September, Director General Blix reported on the IAEA's lack of progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. He also informed the Board that the IAEA had requested routine and ad hoc inspections to begin in late September and, as of the meeting, North Korea had not responded. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board adopted a resolution placing the North Korean issue on the agenda of the IAEA's General Conference scheduled for the following week (IAEA Doc 291). North Korea argued that the resolution violated its sovereignty. Claiming it had made every effort to resolve the issue, Pyongyang attempted to transfer blame for the standoff to the U.S. for plotting to undermine its socialist regime and to the IAEA for continually demanding special inspections and for using third-party intelligence.

International support was building behind the IAEA. On 1 October, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution expressing "grave concern" over North Korea's failure to discharge its safeguards obligations and urging the DPRK to "cooperate immediately" with the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement (IAEA Doc 1250). The resolution, however, failed to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. Seventy-two states voted in favor of the resolution, 2 voted against and 11 abstained. North Korea and Libya voted against the resolution, while China led the list of countries that abstained. North Korea expressed regret over the passing of the resolution and reiterated the DPRK's position that the resolution violated its sovereignty.

During October and November, the situation became more urgent because negotiations between the DPRK and the IAEA had broken off. Negotiations with the U.S. had tapered off and were limited to working-level

discussions. Time was also running out for the safeguards monitoring equipment in North Korea's declared facilities, which would soon require servicing. As a result, the IAEA submitted a report to the UN General Assembly outlining North Korea's continued non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. Director-General Blix also reported to the UN General Assembly that inspectors would no longer be able to verify the safeguards unless they were granted immediate access to the facilities (UNGA Res A/48/14). The General Assembly passed a resolution expressing "grave concern" over the situation and urged North Korea to "immediately cooperate" with IAEA inspectors (UNGA Res A/48/14). North Korea was the only member to vote against the resolution.

Just prior to the General Assembly meeting, the DPRK informed the IAEA that it was ready to accept limited inspections of its declared facilities for the purpose of maintaining safeguards equipment (Blix b). The North claimed that checking the seals and maintenance of equipment was sufficient for the IAEA to insure the continuity of safeguards. The IAEA declined the offer on the basis that all inspections, routine and ad hoc, were long overdue. North Korea had not allowed routine inspections of its facilities since February. Speaking before the IAEA Board of Governors in early December, Dr. Blix concluded that the safeguards system in place at North Korea's declared facilities could no longer provide adequate assurances that these facilities were being used for peaceful purposes (IAEA Doc 1253). North Korea and the IAEA resumed working-level discussions in December; however, little progress was made.

The U.S. increased the stakes in January 1994 when it announced plans to deploy advanced weapons and a national intelligence support team to South Korea. The Clinton Administration was becoming increasingly concerned that North Korea was close to developing a bomb. These fears were fueled, in part, by a revised intelligence estimate released earlier in December that stated North Korea had extracted enough plutonium for two bombs in 1989 (Hibbs g: 9). Moreover, the Intelligence Community believed that the DPRK had separated 8.5 to 12 kilograms of plutonium as opposed to the 80 grams claimed by North Korea (Hibbs e: 17). North Korea abruptly agreed to IAEA inspections of the seven declared nuclear facilities the following month (IAEA Doc 1255). The two undeclared waste sites, however, remained off limits to IAEA inspectors (UNSC S/1994/254: 5).

IAEA Inspections Resume

During mid-March 1994, IAEA inspectors conducted the first inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities in over a year. During the visit, however, North Korean officials prevented inspectors from conducting key checks at one facility and from taking samples from two key cells in the Radiochemical Laboratory (UNSC S/1994/322: 5). These tests were necessary to determine North Korea's reprocessing activities since the last IAEA inspection. In addition, inspectors found that some seals on monitoring devices had been broken. Pyongyang's failure to cooperate with inspectors prompted the IAEA Board of Governors, on 21 March, to find North Korea in "further non-compliance" with INFCIRC 403 and to refer the matter to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly (UNSC S/1994/322: 3).

Later that afternoon, the UN Security Council began intense deliberations on a response to the IAEA resolution. The result was short of U.S. expectations. The Council's President issued a statement calling upon the DPRK "to allow the IAEA inspectors to complete the inspections activities" (UNSC S/PRST/1994/13). The statement represented a compromise between the U.S., which wanted a resolution condemning North Korea's actions, and China, which believed the measure was too strong. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. announced the resumption of plans for Team Spirit '94, which was canceled earlier in March as a reward for North Korea allowing inspections. Clinton Administration officials also announced they would formulate plans to pursue international economic sanctions against North Korea (Fulghum: 22).

North Korea Discharges Fuel Without IAEA Supervision

The crisis deepened in mid-May when the DPRK announced that it had begun discharging the 8,000 spent fuel rods from its 5-Megawatt reactor at Yongbyon without close IAEA supervision. North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to observe the core discharge based on its "unique status" under the NPT. The IAEA considered this a violation of the safeguards accord, since removal of the rods, without safeguards measures, would destroy evidence of North Korea's past refueling activities. (IAEA Doc 1269).

Prior to the announcement, U.S. intelligence and the IAEA estimated that, based on Pyongyang's outdated refueling equipment, it would