require 90 days to remove the entire core of spent fuel rods. Instead, two weeks after refueling got underway, IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon complex reported that half of the core had been discharged. North Korea was using indigenous refueling equipment previously unknown to the IAEA or U.S. intelligence (Hibbs d: 1). U.S. officials had assumed that, based on the intelligence estimates, they would have more than a month to negotiate an agreement with the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors to tag the discharged fuel rods. The rapid refueling of the reactor meant that North Korea would likely complete the process before a settlement could be reached. Unless IAEA inspectors were allowed to map the irradiated fuel rods as they were removed, the IAEA would no longer be able to verify DPRK claims that the rods removed from the reactor's core were the original ones loaded in 1986. U.S. intelligence believed that North Korea had discharged and refueled the reactor during a 100-day outage in 1989 (Hibbs and Hart: 5).

Despite the lack of progress in this area, IAEA inspectors were permitted to complete some verification activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory during mid-May. The safeguards measures included performing gamma mapping (Hibbs d: 1) and taking smear samples from the plutonium glovebox area that was off-limits to IAEA inspectors during the previous inspection. Additionally, inspectors were allowed to service the surveillance cameras and replace seals at the laboratory (UNSC S/1994/601: 2).

IAEA and DPRK officials met again in Pyongyang, in late May, to find a solution to the reprocessing dilemma, but again no agreement was reached. The lack of progress prompted the UN Security Council to issue yet another presidential statement on the North Korean situation on 30 May. The President, on behalf of the Council's members, expressed "grave concern" over the discharge activities at North Korea's 5-Megawatt reactor and "strongly urged" the DPRK to proceed with refueling only in the manner prescribed by the IAEA. If North Korea followed IAEA guidelines, it would preserve the rods, allowing for fuel measurements at a later date (UNSC S/PRST/1994/28).

In June, the IAEA's Board of Governors officially condemned North Korea's actions. The Board adopted another resolution that “deplored” the DPRK's failure to comply with previous resolutions on the matter (IAEA Doc 1273). As a result, the Board suspended non-medical support to North Korea. Three days later and in response to the resolution, the DPRK

announced its immediate withdrawal from the IAEA. North Korea justified its decision based on the “unjust" Board of Governors resolution, which the DPRK claimed imposed "sanctions" that threatened the sovereignty of their country ("Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK"). The U.S. also announced plans to pursue international sanctions against North Korea in the UN, although China continued to oppose the measure strongly.

Former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang on a mission to defuse the crisis. Following the Carter visit, President Clinton announced that North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program and to resume diplomatic talks (Clinton e). U.S.-DPRK talks resumed in July, but were interrupted by the death of North Korea's only leader, Kim Il Sung. Talks resumed again in August. The IAEA General Conference once again adopted a resolution, in September, expressing its "grave concern" and "urging" the DPRK to "cooperate immediately" with the agency (IAEA Doc 1286). The U.S. and the DPRK finally reached an accord on the disposition of North Korea's nuclear program in October.

The agreement obligates North Korea to freeze its nuclear program under IAEA supervision and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors. In exchange, North Korea will receive two light water reactors by a target date of 2003, at which time North Korea must allow ad hoc and routine inspections of its nuclear facilities. The U.S., in the meantime, will facilitate the annual delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy oil to fuel North Korea's energy needs. In addition, the U.S. and the DPRK agreed to open liaison offices in each other's capitals as an initial step toward full diplomatic relations. Both sides also agreed to move toward full normalization of economic relations by reducing barriers to trade and investment.

While the framework requires North Korea to remain a party to the NPT, it provides an interim period of about 9 years in which IAEA routine and ad hoc inspections are prohibited. North Korea is not obligated to provide a full accounting of its nuclear activities until that time.

CONCLUSION

THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Audrey D. Hudgins
Captain U.S. Army
September 1992

Nuclear proliferation has been a concern since the world entered the nuclear age. Early international efforts to operate and control nuclear fuel cycles, envisaged in the Baruch Plan, met with failure. In the years following, the use of atomic energy became a national rather than international endeavor. To aid the spread of peaceful nuclear technology and to prevent its diversion to military use, in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created. Some characteristics of this international inspectorate were appropriate only to the time in which it originated. Former World War II enemies of the Allied victors were the targets of the safeguards regime. Following ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA safeguarded nuclear cycles the world over.

By design, the agency's mission was strictly one of inspection and verification through safeguards agreements. The detection of clandestine nuclear activities was a mission of the major powers. Disclosure of the extent and complexity of Iraq's nuclear weapons program eroded the level of confidence that the international community had in the nuclear inspection and regulatory abilities of the IAEA.

But Iraq was a failure of far greater proportions. Although the IAEA might be faulted for its lack of aggressiveness in inspection techniques, safeguards are simply one component of a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iraq violated all relevant aspects of this regime. Through

its accession to the NPT, Iraq pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq subverted the export control regime by clandestinely obtaining nuclear equipment and material. Finally, Iraq violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Iraqi nuclear weapons program showed that a signatory to the NPT could evade the IAEA, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and all other international scrutiny. As a result of this experience, all of these parties now realize the importance of global cooperation in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

Time has been the ultimate arbiter for international cooperation. Old enemies of World War II are now friends and allies. The Berlin Wall has fallen, and the two Germanies are now one. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have formed a new global environment. Bilateral arms control and disarmament treaties have evolved into multilateral confidence and security building measures. The United Nations has finally emerged as an effective promoter of international peace and security.

The IAEA, an organization under the auspices of the United Nations, has reaped the benefits of enhanced cooperation. In 1991, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the IAEA, and the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) joined forces to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Despite its failure in some areas, intelligence has been the key to success. The U.S. Intelligence Community must now further define its role in a new international security environment. In order to ensure its continued effectiveness, the Intelligence Community must protect its sources and methods. But the Intelligence Community serves the policymaker, who, in turn, serves the national interest. The U.S. National Security Strategy defines nuclear proliferation as one of those interests. In order for U.S. and global concern over proliferation to be addressed, countries must choose to give the IAEA the tools it needs to do its job. Intelligence is one of these tools.

The Problem of National Interest

Nuclear proliferation presents a great threat to U.S. national security. Regional arms races can be destabilizing, potentially causing major shifts in the strategic power balance. Gaps in the export control regime and the threat of Soviet nuclear scientist emigration only accelerate this dangerous nuclear timeline.