The United States, and its intelligence community, must display vigilance and resolve. Unfortunately, nuclear proliferation cannot compete successfully with other national priorities, as demonstrated in the case of Pakistan in the 1980s. The U.S. must carefully weigh a myriad of factors when making short- and long-term policy decisions. The U.S. inability to certify Pakistan's peaceful nuclear intentions and Pakistani ties to the Iraq problem indicate that nuclear proliferation is a continuing policy concern.

The Problems of the IAEA

Conflicting national interests have plagued states throughout history. The IAEA, representing over 116 countries, has had its share of conflicting "international interests."

Safeguards Effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness has been debated at the IAEA since its creation. Concerns over sovereignty and divergent views on the role of safeguards have contributed to diplomatic and political stalemate. The Iraq issue focused new attention on this issue. For example, the IAEA followed a routine, predictable inspection schedule. States pursuing clandestine development of a nuclear weapons program could clean up their operation prior to inspection and thus give the appearance of compliance with applicable safeguards. Iraq is a recent, yet classic example of this evasive strategy.

Never before had a country been caught violating its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Board of Governors came to the realization that IAEA safeguards are only as good as their implementation. This convergence of opinion has resulted in positive changes in the inspection process to ensure stricter compliance. The IAEA Board has implemented a shortnotice, random inspection methodology and will soon adopt safeguards measures designed to detect clandestine activity.

Export Controls. Export control groups, and their member states, have expressed a traditional reluctance to provide export information to the IAEA because of its proprietary, commercially sensitive nature. During the inspections in Iraq, however, this information was essential in uncovering the depth of the clandestine nuclear program. The IAEA's handling of export information was very successful.

Iraq showed that many gaps exist in the field of export controls. The export control groups, one of the three pillars of the nuclear

nonproliferation regime, have taken steps to enhance the comprehensiveness of export control guidelines. The inspections in Iraq also proved that greater cooperation between these groups and the IAEA produces a synergistic effect, making the regime as a whole stronger. A greater understanding and appreciation has developed between the two groups that will likely continue into the future.

A Lack of Aggressiveness. Historic evolution has framed the agency's safeguards approach. Until very recently, an aggressive application of safeguards was deemed discriminatory and prejudicial to a member's sovereign interests. The absence of assertiveness perhaps allowed Iraq to proceed unencumbered with its weapons development program. The Agency has since realized the benefit of a more aggressive attitude. Recently, IAEA inspectors have requested access to a number of suspected Iranian and North Korean nuclear facilities not declared by those states in their safeguards agreements. This trend will likely continue as the IAEA strives to deter proliferation.

Counterintelligence Problem. The IAEA is responsible for safeguarding the peaceful use of the atom, but is also the international purveyor of nuclear technology. With 85 percent of inspection personnel from non-nuclear weapons states, the IAEA must balance its approach. A lack of balance might actually make the IAEA a proliferant, as was the case with the director of the Iraqi national safeguards program. Nonetheless, this example has raised the IAEA's awareness of the dangerous potential of proliferation.

The IAEA and Nuclear Proliferation

The IAEA is a unique organization. Its role as the purveyor of peaceful nuclear energy gives the agency a full understanding of global nuclear activity and allows unparalleled insight into the prospects for illegal nuclear activity. Its staff of scientists and technicians are able to evaluate information available through the open press, scientific and technical journals, and a number of in-house and other information sources to enhance this understanding. Finally, through its safeguards system, the IAEA has the authority to question a target country or perform inspections to determine the purpose of suspected nuclear activity. No other organization, national or international, has the authority or the ability to perform all these tasks.

The IAEA safeguards system has three components:

1) deter the diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful use,
2) detect the diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful use, and
3) confirm by inspection that nuclear material is not diverted from

peaceful use.

The last two components are adequately addressed through the current safeguards approach. The first component has two implied tasks, the detection and deterrence of clandestine nuclear facilities, which have received new attention since Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program was revealed. It is now understood that the current safeguards system does not adequately address the issue of deterrence.

Deterrence is the key to a successful nuclear nonproliferation regime. Many factors enable deterrence to be effective. First, and perhaps foremost, is the ability of intelligence to detect clandestine nuclear activity. Countries cannot be fully confident that such activity will go undetected. Second, the political and economic impact of illegal proliferation can be a significant deterrent. When international concern is raised, political isolation and economic sanctions might persuade a proliferant to cease nuclear activity. Finally, the destabilizing effects of regional nuclear proliferation are a viable deterrent. Conventional military and nuclear arms races flourish at the cost of economic progress, a price many states cannot afford.

The IAEA's central role in the nuclear nonproliferation regime has continued despite the missteps in handling the problem of Iraq. In order to ensure an effective regime, the IAEA must be empowered with the ability to deter illicit activity. The use of intelligence by the IAEA will provide this deterrent capability.

The Future of Intelligence and the IAEA

The IAEA safeguards system is simply not designed to detect diversions such as Iraq's, and the IAEA is not in a position to develop an organic intelligence collection capability. The agency does not possess the resources for such a venture, and the great majority of member states would not support its creation. Moreover, member countries already have unilateral capabilities in place. The IAEA must therefore rely on the member states to provide intelligence information. The experience in Iraq has proved that

intelligence is a useful and necessary complement to a successful IAEA safeguards regime.

The IAEA is charged with the verification of safeguards on declared nuclear facilities. The safeguards program, much like the NPT, relies on the integrity of the signatories. A country's clandestine nuclear weapons development program is designed to subvert this pledge. Foreign intelligence information is the means to ensure that states are fulfilling the letter and spirit of the regime. Those that sign the treaty have pledged they will not develop nuclear weapons. Intelligence can be used simply to verify this pledge. Further, most countries motivated to possess a nuclear weapons capability are willing to do whatever is necessary to achieve that goal. The use of intelligence by the IAEA is a means of ensuring that the agency is doing whatever is necessary to achieve its goal of halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Just as revelations of the Iraqi program alerted the IAEA to its own inadequacies, it also provides a warning to potential proliferants. The next offender may be harder to expose. This argues for more sharing of intelligence in the future. It can be hoped that the U.S. Intelligence Community's relationship with the IAEA, born of necessity and sustained by success, can continue well into the future. The cost is only as much as the U.S. chooses to bear, and the benefits are many.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

William E. Campbell

Senior Master Sergeant, U.S. Air Force

August 1996

A principle function of intelligence is to support policymakers in achieving national security objectives. This was clearly demonstrated during the North Korean nuclear crisis. U.S. objectives vis-a-vis North Korea were focused and clearly defined throughout the Bush and Clinton Administrations, although the two administrations adopted slightly different strategies to achieve these goals. In June 1992, in a joint statement with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, President George Bush applauded North and South Korea's efforts in concluding the Joint Denuclearization Declaration as a positive step toward strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and adding to the peace and security in Northeast Asia (“Joint Statement": 18). President Clinton reiterated these goals, in July 1993, when he outlined his priorities for security in the Asian Pacific region. Speaking before the ROK National Assembly, President Clinton renewed U.S. commitments to the security of the South Korea and to the goals of a nuclear-free Korea and a strong international non-proliferation regime (Clinton f).

Measured against these objectives, the contributions of U.S. intelligence to U.S. strategy during the North Korean "nuclear crisis" were extremely important. Information supplied by U.S. intelligence served as the impetus for the actions taken by both the U.S. and the IAEA to persuade North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and eventually allow international inspections. Moreover, in describing the intelligence needs of the policymaker, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) R. James Woolsey, in a statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in 1993, said: