when considering that the UN Security Council (UNSC) had its hands. tied (MacKinlay: 169).

The MFO has been very successful for many reasons. One of the most important reasons is the relative simplicity of the actual peacekeeping operation. The MFO's mandate is effective, a buffer zone exists, the MFO operates in desert terrain that is relatively unpopulated, and both host countries provide a great deal of support for the mission. Therefore, these factors have reduced the level of complication and have contributed to the successful conduct of the mission (MacKinlay: 5). Both Egypt and Israel support the mandate of the MFO. This is evidenced in their signing of the Camp David Accords. Further, both sides have continually demonstrated their support for the MFO by continuing to help fund the mission (U.S. Cong b: 29) and limiting the number of border infractions over the years.

The MFO organization is seen as neutral by both the Israelis and Egyptians. This could be due, in part, to the divestiture of the MFO from the UN. However, because both Israel and Egypt have some voice in choosing MFO leaders, and both provide funding for the MFO, they have seen this international organization as truly neutral.

The MFO does have the capability to use some coercive force in conducting its duties. The MFO employs a Civilian Observer Unit, but the majority of the peacekeepers are armed infantry soldiers. This policy has both helped and impaired the peacekeeping abilities of the MFO.

The U.S. provides an infantry battalion and a logistics support unit to the MFO. This level of support requires approximately 1,200 U.S. military personnel. This is one of the largest deployments of U.S. peacekeepers, and therefore has the potential to spark both internal U.S. controversy and world criticism of a superpower meddling in Middle Eastern affairs. Therefore, this is not a positive variable in the conduct of the MFO.

U.S. peacekeeping forces are trained before they deploy to the Sinai. However, soldiers who have served in the Sinai feel they did not receive sufficient predeployment training to succeed in their mission (Segal: 395). This perceived lack of sufficient training is not as detrimental as it could be in a more complicated peacekeeping scenario.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

A great deal of political controversy erupted when President Reagan deployed U.S. Marine peacekeeping forces to Beirut. This debate subsided somewhat when Congress passed a resolution authorizing the force's employment. Until the U.S. Marine barracks was bombed in October 1983, the U.S. political debate did not adversely affect the mission. Yet, because its status changed considerably as the mission progressed from 1982 through 1984, its outcome was controversial. The ratings for the MNF are tied to the beginning of the MNF mission, before the barracks bombing, and before the U.S. Marines conducted any major reprisal actions. After the Marine reprisals and the subsequent bombing a number of these variables changed drastically. This matrix is meant to be a predictive device. Therefore, these variables shall be assigned relative weights tied to the Beirut peacekeeping situation before it unraveled.

Similar to the U.S. political controversy, there was some international debate on the use of multilateral peacekeeping in Beirut outside of UN auspices. Because of the political intricacies involved in negotiating a peacekeeping force for Beirut and the threat of a Soviet veto if certain conditions were not met, the UN was precluded from taking additional action. This does not mean that the entire international community opposed some further peacekeeping effort, but just that there was a lack of consensus on what action to take.

The complexity of any peacekeeping force installed in Beirut was obviously very high. The Lebanese government did not exercise a great deal of control, and the multiple warring factions and internecine combat made the mission difficult. This was perhaps one of the most complicated peacekeeping operations ever conducted.

While the Lebanese government welcomed the employment of the MNF, it did not exercise authority over the entire operational area. Many of the other factions involved in the fighting in Beirut did not support the mission of the MNF. This would mean that the MNF did not have complete host country support. For the same reasons that the MNF did not have complete support from the international community or the various factions in Lebanon, they also were not perceived as truly neutral. Any sense of neutrality declined significantly after reprisals were taken.

The MNF comprised combat soldiers who employed armored cars, Marine amtracks, and various other military weaponry (MacKinlay: 78). They were not merely unarmed observers, but an interposed military force. They relied on some use of coercion to carry out their mandate, although initially blatant acts of violence did not occur. The U.S. employed over a battalion of Marines in the MNF. This high level of U.S. participation is equivalent to that of the MFO.

While the U.S. trained the infantry forces deployed to the MFO to conduct that specific type of peacekeeping mission, the Marines involved in the MNF received no peacekeeping training oriented to this coercive environment. Lack of training had a negative effect on the Marines' ability to conclude their mission successfully.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The MFO has been lauded as the most successful peacekeeping operation ever conducted. On the completed evaluation matrix, it receives a strong positive score (green). The MNF has been considered America's greatest peacekeeping disaster, and the MNF receives a strong negative rating (red). While UNTSO has been unable to meet its mandate completely, it has reduced the level of violence in its area of operation and provided some stabilizing effect. Therefore, UNTSO can be considered a peacekeeping operation with a mixed degree of success (yellow).

In order for the decision matrix to be more realistic and to reflect accurately the relationships among the eight variables, appropriate weights are assigned to each of the eight variables. This weighting technique produces a more responsive decision matrix, reflecting differing levels of significance for the variables in each case study. This weighting depends on the application of a hierarchical scale for the variables considered, in a procedure too detailed to be described here.

The overall assessment of these three case studies correlates very closely to the popularly perceived results of each of the three operations. As U.S. leaders consider any future opportunities to participate in peacekeeping operations, the combined or weighted assessment can guide the political decision required for participation.

FURTHER APPLICATION OF THE

PEACEKEEPING DECISION MATRIX

It is very difficult to predict the outcome of peacekeeping operations with any degree of accuracy. Peacekeeping operations not only fail or succeed, but they may also have an ambiguous or mixed outcome. Half of the peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN have stagnated into a continuous presence of blue-helmeted soldiers with no clear resolution on the horizon. Committing U.S. soldiers and prestige to a peacekeeping operation is a major foreign policy decision. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce uncertainty in the decisionmaking process and to attempt to assess the outcome of any peacekeeping undertaking. While the national command authorities may seek a full settlement of a foreign conflict or crisis, it may not be realistic to expect a complete cessation of hostilities and a final solution. A status quo solution may be acceptable to many parties involved in the conflict, including the UN, particularly if the conflict experiences a decreased level of violence and garners a reduced level of world media attention.

The framework used to analyze the three previous case studies in U.S. peacekeeping can also be used as an assessment tool when considering

future operations. The same decision matrix can be completed by using past peacekeeping experiences as a guide, thus gauging a possible future mission's chances of success or failure. A weighted decision matrix can provide a means to evaluate the risks involved when undertaking peacekeeping missions.

SHOULD THE U.S. COMMIT TO BOSNIA?

One can consider the potential for a larger contingent of NATO or UN peacekeeping troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This increased troop level could include up to 20,000 U.S. troops. An analysis of the Bosnian peacekeeping scenario using the methods illustrated above may illuminate the potential for either success or failure of the mission. This insight may then prove useful in the decisionmaking process involved in deploying U.S. peacekeepers.

We must first rate each of the eight variables in the matrix. Once each variable is assigned a relative value, corresponding weights will be multiplied by the values. This numerical total can then be compared against the scale of the three previous case studies. This will provide a general relationship or historically based comparison of the possible viability of the proposed peacekeeping operation.

While a great deal of political turmoil could be generated from the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia, President Clinton would most likely first secure a degree of political backing from both the Congress and the U.S. populace before authorizing further military action. This support could take the form of a congressional vote, similar to the approval given to the MNF in 1983. U.S. political controversy would then be considered neutral, if the President were able to generate enough political support to deploy troops. Most likely the President would not receive overwhelming support and there would be some controversy involved. Yet, if he were politically able to deploy additional troops, the controversy would not prevent deployment.

Before a larger contingent of peacekeepers would deploy to Bosnia under UN auspices, the UN Security Council would have to approve the expansion of the operation. The U.S. may participate under the NATO flag, but would first attempt to gain UN support to legitimize any actions. This UNSC approval would constitute world support.