826). David Kay, a former IAEA inspector, credits this "UN fiasco," along with the lack of secure areas and cleared personnel, with the U.S.'s growing reluctance to share intelligence with the IAEA (Kay 1996).

While solutions to these concerns are not readily obvious and are outside the scope of this paper, these issues are valid. Yet, the need to share intelligence remains. The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community best summarized the issue in its final report, in

which it stated:

[T]here are a range of activities undertaken by multinational bodies from peacekeeping operations to enforcing internationally imposed sanctions to dealing with humanitarian criseswhich either involve U.S. military or civilian personnel directly, or where the United States has a strong interest in seeing the activity succeed. To the extent that the United States has information important to the success of these activities, it is in the interest of the U.S. to find a way to share it (Commission: 129).

Certainly, the quest for weapons of mass destruction poses a serious threat to U.S. interests worldwide. As the remaining superpower with global commitments, it is a vested interest of U.S. to prevent the spread of these weapons and to preserve the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Foreign intelligence sharing is not a new concept. In fact, the U.S. has been sharing information derived from intelligence with its close allies since World War II. Established procedures have long existed for exchanging classified information between friendly governments and within multinational defense organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO (Macartney: 472). In the post-Cold War era, the window of information sharing has opened wider to include international bodies such as the UN and the IAEA.

Without question, the need to share intelligence with UN or UNaffiliated organizations will continue as these organizations increase their role in world politics. The U.S. is dedicated to supporting the efforts of the UN as it takes a more active role in world affairs. The role of U.S. intelligence in supporting these endeavors is well demonstrated. In 1993, thenDCI Woolsey proclaimed the commitment of the U.S. to supplying the information required by the UN to complete its mandate (Woolsey: 38). A major step toward improving this support, in the area of non-proliferation,

was the creation of the DCI's Nonproliferation Center. This interagency organization serves as a focal point for coordination and dissemination of intelligence regarding the proliferation threat.

Despite its limitations, U.S. intelligence contributed to the successful implementation of U.S. policy with regard to North Korea. It functioned as a tool of both foreign policy and public diplomacy, providing policymakers with the "actionable" information necessary to freeze North Korea's nuclear program, at least for now. For the IAEA, intelligence support has become an indispensable part of its improved safeguards regime. Its performance, however, shows that greater emphasis should be placed on human source collection to provide insight into the capabilities and intentions of potential proliferators. Technical collection, as demonstrated by the North Korean example, can not always satisfy this requirement.

FROM IRAQ TO NORTH KOREA: THE ROLE OF THE

COUNTERPROLIFERATION MINDSET

Theodore William Wolff, Jr.
Defense Intelligence Agency
August 1996

The United States Government is committed to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore it is important for government officials to understand the intelligence methodologies employed by the Intelligence Community (IC) for this counterproliferation goal. In their 1991 effort against post-Gulf War Iraq, the IC, working in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), developed a whole new approach to nuclear counterproliferation. The new approach grew out of the failure of both the IC and IAEA to detect the scope of Iraq's nuclear program.

The IC's and IAEA's new approach successfully overcame Iraqi concealment efforts, and when these two organizations applied their new methodology against North Korea, they achieved similar success in overcoming deception. Without the methodological changes instituted by the IC and IAEA for dealing with Iraq, their future successes against North Korea would have been severely limited.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Just as the lessons learned from Iraq influenced North Korea analysis, the methodologies employed against North Korea have utility in other counterproliferation problems. While there are many nuclear proliferation challenges in the world today, the threat posed by Iran is especially relevant to this discussion. Like Iraq and North Korea, Iran has signed the NPT treaty and is under IAEA safeguards. Experience with Iraq and North

Korea showed the IAEA and United States that signing the NPT did not guarantee compliance.

The IAEA has not found any NPT violations or breeches of nuclear safeguards in Iran (Foreign Policy Association: 21). The U.S. is nonetheless suspicious of Iran's nuclear intentions. The U.S. cites Iran's effort to obtain heavy water research reactors, uranium enrichment technology, and spent fuel reprocessing as evidence that the Islamic regime is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons technology (U.S. DoD OSD b: 14). In the future, Iran will expand its array of operational nuclear reactors with assistance from Russia, France, and China (Gerardi and Aharinejad: 208-210). Once these projects are complete, Iran will possess a nuclear infrastructure capable of producing weapons grade fissile material, the key hurdle on any pathway to the bomb (Gerardi and Aharinejad: 212).

When the new array of Iranian nuclear facilities becomes operational, it will pose a strong proliferation threat. The best method for the international community to counter Iran's program is the application of the same mindset developed on Iraq and used for North Korea. While Iran and the U.S. may never engage in a comprehensive bilateral denuclearizing accord, the intelligence methodologies are relevant and directly applicable. The IAEA should aggressively apply its new procedures to Iran. The U.S. should support the IAEA Iranian inspections with information on any suspected proliferation activity. The IAEA and U.S. Intelligence Community should apply the same probing skepticism against Iran that was shown Iraq and North Korea. The driving synergism of the counterproliferation mindset can help assure future Iranian compliance with NPT.

The intelligence and inspection methodologies developed for Iraq and North Korea nuclear analysis also have broader applications in the fields of chemical and biological weapons control. While the NPT treaty is verified via the IAEA, treaties limiting chemical and biological weapons are also evolving on-site inspection regimes. Each regime will require the same kind of intelligence support given the IAEA. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention treaties seek to ban chemical and biological weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for a highly intrusive inspection regime of on-site inspections, and the U.S. is currently negotiating to establish a Biological Weapons Convention on-site protocol.

The analytical demands of chemical/biological weapons detection increases the need for a shared counterproliferation mindset between any international chemical/biological on-site inspection agency and the U.S. Intelligence Community. The dual-use nature of the industrial infrastructure required for producing these weapons makes IC-international organization cooperation essential, perhaps more so than with nuclear activity:

[E]xternal visual signatures, such as those that might be observed through overhead photography, can provide clues of CW (chemical weapons) production activities but are rarely conclusive and must be supplemented with evidence from onsite inspections (U.S. Cong c: 15).

When the demand for verification of the Chemical and Biological treaties increases, the U.S. Intelligence Community and on-site inspection regimes can build upon the precedent of cooperation established by Iraq and North Korea analysis. The precedent of international organizations pursuing these goals is not new: UNSCOM had a broad mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 687 for removing from Iraq all weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological, and chemical assets. In the future, we are likely to witness an increased demand for the unique capabilities of the counterproliferation mindset.